Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Joseph Jackson, an employee of the Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH), was operating a dump truck and performing clean-up work pursuant to a state of emergency declaration, when he struck Joseph Belcher's automobile. Belcher filed this action against Jackson and the DOH (Defendants), alleging negligence and vicarious liability. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that because Jackson was working as an emergency service worker at the time of the accident, he was entitled to immunity under W. Va. Code 15-5-11(a). The circuit court denied Defendants' motion, concluding that section 15-5-11(a) contemplated exceptions to the immunity that the statute provided to emergency service workers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 15-5-11(a) operates to provide a limited waiver of the emergency service worker immunity provided by the statute where the emergency service worker is an employee of the State and the recovery sought is confined to "the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage." View "Jackson v. Belcher" on Justia Law

Fluker filed a lawsuit against Cava Toyota World on April 3, 2009, alleging that he was wrongfully terminated from his employment. The defendants reported the lawsuit to their insurance carrier, National Union, four days later, but National Union did not respond until November 11, 2009, when it sent a denial of coverage letter. The defendants defended the lawsuit without the assistance of their insurance carrier and sought to file a third-party complaint against National Union, asserting common law “bad faith” and violations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act , arising from the denial of coverage. The third-party complaint did not seek a finding that there was coverage under the National Union policy or request that the court find coverage and order National Union to defend the lawsuit. The trial court entered summary judgment for National Union, finding that the claims contained in the third-party complaint were not derivative of the claims asserted in the underlying lawsuit. The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cava, v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

In 2009 McCausland, executed a “Last Will and Testament” naming Fluharty as executor and bequeating the residue of his estate to a Trust, established in 2002. Months later, McCausland was physically incapacitated and living in a nursing care facility. It is alleged that McCausland dictated the terms of a new will to his nephew, Brown. McCausland did not sign or mark the typewritten will, and no one signed or marked it on his behalf. Two of McCausland’s health care providers in the nursing home signed the will and subsequently attempted to attest the document by signing affidavits averring that they “did witness [McCausland] stating that the new last will and testament contained his final desires.” In 2010, McCausland died and the original will was probated and recorded. More than a year later, the petitioners sought to have the original will revoked and the second will admitted to probate. The trial court held that, under W. Va. Code § 41-1-3, the second document is not a valid will. The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. A testator’s failure to sign his non-holographic will, or to request that it be signed on his behalf, renders the will void under these circumstances. View "Brown. v. Fluharty" on Justia Law

A 2007 stockholders’ derivative suit alleged that Massey’s officers and directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to make sure that Massey employees were complying with environmental and mine worker safety laws and regulations. A 2008 settlement released the claims in exchange for certain reforms to be made a part of corporate governance policies relating to company oversight and conduct regarding environmental and mine worker safety standards. The reforms were incorporated into Massey’s written Corporate Governance Agreement and were to remain in effect for five years. On April 5, 2010, an explosion occurred at Massey’s Upper Big Branch Mine at Montcoal, West Virginia, killing 29 miners. According to a contempt petition, investigations subsequent to the disaster found systematic mine safety compliance failures leading up to the explosion. The trial court dismissed the civil contempt petition. The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. The petitioners lacked standing to pursue contempt proceedings because they no longer own any Massey stock; Massey has been purchased by Alpha Natural Resources; and the respondents were removed by Alpha as corporate directors and officers. View "Manville Pers. Injury Settlement Fund v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

After drinking and getting into an argument with his wife, Goins shot a gun at a vehicle in which his wife’s brother and his family were seated. He was convicted of five counts of misdemeanor brandishing and sentenced to five consecutive one-year terms of incarceration. The West Virginia Supreme Court reversed in part, on a Double Jeopardy claim. The trial court erred in sentencing Goins for five counts of brandishing, when only a single incident of breach of the peace was established. There was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. View "State of West Virginia v. Goins" on Justia Law

Respondent was employed by Petitioner. After Respondent was terminated, she filed a complaint with the West Virginia Human Rights Commission alleging that she was unlawfully discriminated against. The director of operations for the Commission issued a finding that no probable cause was found in Respondent's complaint and ordered it dismissed. After the assistant attorney general (Sheridan) conducted an administrative review hearing, the Commission found probable cause was alleged in the complaint. Sheridan then filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Respondent in proceedings before the Commission. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Sheridan, arguing that he was conflicted from representing Respondent because he had acted in a judicial capacity while conducting the administrative review. The administrative law judge denied the motion. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court (1) declined to issue the writ insofar as it requested that Respondent's claims be dismissed; (2) declined to order that a subpoena be issued to allow Petitioner to access documents reviewed during the administrative review; but (3) issued the writ to state that Sheridan could not represent Respondent in proceedings before the Commission. View "State ex rel. Ten S. Mgmt. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) filed an abuse and neglect petition against Mother. The basis of the petition was the allegation that Mother intentionally abused two unrelated, non-household member children who were left in her care. At the outset of the adjudication hearing, Mother relinquished her parental rights to Daughter in lieu of proceeding with the hearing. The circuit court accepted the relinquishment and denied Mother's request for post-termination visitation without receiving evidence pertaining to the request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) where during the pendency of an abuse and neglect proceeding, a parent offers to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights and that relinquishment is accepted by the court, the relinquishment may be used as the basis of an order of adjudication of abuse and neglect of that parent of her children; (2) the circuit court erred in failing to enter an order of adjudication; and (3) the circuit court erred in failing to conduct a hearing and receive evidence on the issue of post-termination visitation. View "In re Marley M." on Justia Law

The cases underlying these consolidated appeals involved the purchase of an automobile. Plaintiffs purchased vehicles and signed retail installment contracts with three separate dealers. The dealers assigned their rights in the contract and vehicles to Credit Acceptance Corporation, who financed the purchases. All of the contracts contained arbitration clauses. Plaintiffs later commenced civil actions against Credit Acceptance in circuit court, alleging, inter alia, violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection act (WVCCPA). Credit Acceptance filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss, which the circuit court denied, finding that the arbitration agreements were unconscionable based upon the unavailability of some of the arbitration forums named therein and because Plaintiffs in the agreements waived their respective rights to a jury trial. The Supreme Court reversed in both of the cases, holding that because one of the arbitration forums named in the arbitration agreements remained available to arbitrate the parties' disputes, and because an arbitration agreement is not unenforceable solely because a party to the contract waives her right to a jury trial, the causes must be remanded for entry of orders compelling arbitration. View "Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front" on Justia Law

Respondent refinanced the mortgage on his home with a loan he obtained from Petitioner. Because Respondent failed to make his monthly loan payments in accordance with the parties' agreement, Petitioner invoked its right to initiate a foreclosure sale of the house. After the foreclosure sale, the property was sold to Petitioner. Because Respondent refused to vacate the house, Petitioner filed an unlawful detainer action. In response, Respondent asserted various counterclaims against Petitioner alleging violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. The circuit court conditionally granted Petitioner's motion to dismiss Respondent's counterclaims and additionally certified two questions for the Supreme Court's consideration regarding whether Respondent timely asserted his counterclaims. The Supreme Court concluded that the counterclaims were not timely. View "Tribeca Lending Corp. v. McCormick" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery and convicted to a term of incarceration of ten to twenty years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in admitting testimony solicited by the prosecution because the statements did not amount to an improper reference to Defendant's silence post-Miranda warning; (2) did not err in allowing W. Va. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence of a second uncharged bank robbery; (3) did not violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by permitting a police officer to testify about statements made by a witness who did not take the stand at trial because the statements were not introduced to inculpate Defendant and were not testimonial; and (4) did not err in finding that the investigating officer's affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. View "State v. Bruffey" on Justia Law