Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Petitioners and Respondent, Town of Clay, entered into a construction contract, Petitioners filed a complaint for preliminary injunctive relief based on a dispute over the contract. Petitioners paid a $25,000 injunction bond to the circuit court. Later, the court dismissed Petitioners' complaint and ordered that Petitioners' bond be forfeited and paid over to the Town to compensate it for its attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the bond was subject to forfeiture in the absence of a finding that the underlying suit was filed in bad faith; (2) Petitioners were not given a fair opportunity to contest whether the attorney fees and costs were incurred by Respondent in attempting to secure a dissolution of the bond; and (3) the circuit court erred in not holding a hearing under the standards set forth in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Petrolo to determine whether the fees and costs were reasonable. Remanded. View "Multiplex Inc. v. Town of Clay" on Justia Law

Petitioner injured her wrist and shoulder at work while assisting a contract employee lift a box of clothes that had been left in Petitioner's office. The Workers' Compensation Board of Review (BOR) denied Petitioner's claim for benefits because Petitioner's injury was not attributable to an injury or disease "in the course of and resulting from" her employment as required by W. Va. Code 23-4-1(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BOR's decision was neither in clear violation of any constitutional or statutory provision, based upon a material misstatement or mischaracterization of the evidentiary record, nor the result of erroneous conclusions of law. View "Morton v. W. Va. Office of Ins. Comm'r" on Justia Law

Respondents sought to prove adverse possession of a tract of land against Petitioner. In support of their claim, Respondents presented evidence that they were the children of Ralph Pack, who purchased the tract of land at issue, and that they grew up on the land and used it between 1926 and 1957. After a bench trial, the circuit court ruled that Respondents acquired the disputed land through adverse possession. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Respondents established that their uses of the property were continuous, open, and notorious. View "Wallace v. Pack" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice action against two attorneys and a law firm (Respondents) alleging that their negligence resulted in failed collateral in securing a promissory note, particularly a defective deed on certain property. Plaintiff then sued a holding company and two individuals to recover the remaining balance due under the note. In the collection action, the circuit court entered a stipulated settlement that extinguished the parties' obligations under the note. In the malpractice action, the circuit court awarded summary judgment to Respondents, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to prove he sustained damages as a result of Respondents' alleged professional negligence because the stipulated settlement extinguished the defective deed upon which Plaintiff based his claim for damages. After the circuit court entered a subsequent nunc pro tunc order in the collection action omitting the language extinguishing the parties' obligations under the note, Plaintiff sought relief from the summary judgment ruling in the legal malpractice action. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to prove Respondents' alleged professional negligence caused him to sustain any purported damages; and (2) based on the law of judicial estoppel, the circuit court correctly ruled that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief from its earlier summary judgment ruling. View "Burnworth v. George" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple felonies, including first degree murder. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that the trial court erred in allowing him to represent himself, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel. Specifically, Defendant contended that the trial court failed to make him aware of the disadvantages of self-representation or to make sufficient inquiries to assess whether Defendant's decision to proceed pro se was knowingly and intelligently made. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Petitioner to represent himself. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner was employed by CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT) as a conductor. Alleging that he sustained injuries to his back due to unsupportive seats on the cabooses and locomotives, Petitioner filed this action against CSXT under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). CSXT filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the claim was barred by the FELA statute of limitations because it was filed more than three years after Petitioner's FELA claim accrued. The circuit court granted CSXT's motion. Petitioner appealed, asserting that disputed material facts existed concerning the applicable statute of limitations and whether he knew or should have known of his injury and its cause more than three years before filing his complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to show his cause of action accrued within three years of the filing of his FELA claim. View "Caudill v. CSX Transp." on Justia Law

Decedent died as a result of the injuries he received when he was attacked by several pit bull terriers. Petitioner, the administratrix of Decedent's estate, brought this action against Respondents, the Monroe County Commission and Patricia Green, the Monroe County dog warden, alleging, inter alia, that Respondents failed to impound the dogs due to non-payment of taxes and for not having proper registration and failed to impound and/or destroy the dogs for being vicious. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the public duty doctrine and statutory immunities. Petitioner subsequently moved to amend her complaint to incorporate allegations of fact to support her claim that a "special relationship" exception to the public duty doctrine applied. Before ruling on the motion to amend, the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing Petitioner's case on the basis of statutory immunities and in failing to grant Petitioner's motion to amend her complaint. Remanded. View "Bowden v. Monroe County Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were owners of the surface of a thirty-acre tract of land. Defendant, an oil and gas corporation, claimed that, in 1949, it leased the rights to the gas under the tract. In 2006, the parties entered into a contract allowing Defendant to build a 200-foot access road. Defendant later constructed a roadway approximately 1300 feet long on Plaintiffs' surface tract, erected an above-ground pipeline across the tract, and drilled a natural gas well. Plaintiffs sued Defendant alleging breach of contract. Defendant asserted it was entitled to summary judgment because of an exculpatory clause within a 1941 deed that severed the surface of the tract of property from the minerals below. Defendant contended that, as a lessee of the oil and gas under the property, it was a beneficiary of the exculpatory clause and entitled to operate on Plaintiffs' tract without liability for any injury to the surface by reason of removing minerals. The circuit court granted Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained on whether Defendant breached the contract. View "Thornsbury v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree in violation of W. Va. Code 61-2-1 and arson in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and five years imprisonment for the arson conviction. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the first degree murder conviction; (2) section 61-2-1 is not unconstitutionally vague; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress; and (4) Defendant's argument that the trial court erred when it denied his post-trial motions was without merit. View "State v. Horn" on Justia Law

Respondent's vehicle was stopped for swerving and crossing the centerline. Respondent then failed three field sobriety tests and was arrested for driving under the influence. While in the town hall, the officer performed a chemical test of Respondent's breath, and the results indicated Respondent had a blood-alcohol content level of 0.105. Respondent's driver's license was subsequently revoked for six months. The circuit court reversed the Division of Motor Vehicle's (DMV) order and reinstated Respondent's revoked driver's license, concluding that the DMV's revocation order was biased, prejudicial, and reached in a preconceived manner. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the revocation order, holding that the facts provided sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Respondent was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and thus represented an adequate basis for the DMV to revoke Respondent's driver's license. View "Dale v. McCormick" on Justia Law