Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jonathan Darby, who was employed by Kanawha County Board of Education (BOE) as a school bus driver, was terminated when the BOE concluded that Darby had violated the BOE's sexual harassment policy. Darby appealed his termination. After considering the evidence, the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board hearing examiner ordered the BOE to reinstate Darby to his previous position. The BOE appealed. The circuit court reversed, determining that the hearing examiner held the BOE to the wrong burden of proof. Darby appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the hearing examiner used the proper burden of proof in weighing the evidence; and (2) the circuit court improperly exceeded its scope of review, failed to give proper deference to the hearing examiner's factual findings, and wrongly substituted its own judgment on the credibility of the witnesses for that of the hearing officer. View "Darby v. Kanawha County Board of Education" on Justia Law

In 2010, a professional debt collector began aggressively attempting to collect a deficiency balance Linda Barr allegedly owed to a bank on a motorcycle loan. According to Barr, the debt collector, among other tactics, misrepresented facts to her and improperly accessed and used information from Barr's and her husband's credit report. Barr filed a complaint against the bank and the debt collector, alleging violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. The debt collector moved to dismiss. The district court certified the question of whether a consumer has a private cause of action against a professional debt collector who has engaged in debt collection practices that are prohibited under the Act to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the Act does provide a consumer with such a cause of action. View "Barr v. NCB Management Services, et al." on Justia Law

The Clerk of the McDowell County Commission appealed an order of the Circuit Court of McDowell County pertaining to mandamus proceedings. The Commission was directed to reimburse the attorney fees of A. Ray Bailey who was the prevailing party in an election contest. The Commission argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the Commission to pay Mr. Bailey's fees when the Commission was not a party to the election contest. Furthermore, The Commission argued that there was no statutory authority to support the award. Upon review of the arguments and law governing this matter, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's order directing payment of attorney fees by the Commission.

Appellant Harpers Ferry appealed a circuit court order in favor of Appellee Ralph Taylor. Mr. Taylor asked the City for permission to create a path along a street so that a truck he used could access his property. At the time of Mr. Taylor's request, City Councilman Robert DuBose lived near the proposed path. The City approved Mr. Taylor's request on the condition that he got an authorization from the Mayor. Mr. DuBose abstained from voting on the request, but he participated in all discussions. Two days after the City approved Mr. Taylor's request, Mr. DuBose sent emails complaining about the request. In response, the Mayor imposed additional conditions to the request. Council held a special meeting for the sole purpose of discussing Mr. Taylor's project. At the meeting, Council added more conditions. Mr. Taylor filed a declaratory judgment against the City, arguing that the additional conditions were discriminatory. Mr. Taylor won the case, and the court awarded him attorney's fees. The City argued to the Supreme Court on appeal that Mr. Taylor was not entitled to attorney's fees. After careful review of the briefs, the record submitted on appeal and the oral arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

In 2009, a petition for abuse and neglect was filed in circuit court regarding N.A, I.A, C.P. and M.P. The petition was filed against the children's biological mother and their maternal grandparents, all of whom were alleged to have care and custody of the children as they all resided at the grandparents' home. The petition was based on allegations of domestic abuse between the mother and grandfather in the presence of the children. At an adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court found that the children's mother had neglected her children. The circuit court ordered that the Department of Health and Human Resources retain legal custody of the children while physical custody remained with the grandparents so long as the mother had no contact with them. DHHR found that the grandparents consistently violated the "no-contact" order of the court. The children were eventually placed in foster care. "Joshua G." was listed on the petition, but was not accused of any abuse. Joshua was the biological father of M.P. He petitioned the court for sole custody of M.P. The court denied his request. Among the issues all parents brought on appeal were whether the circuit court erred by (1) denying Joshua custody of M.P.; and, (2) denying the grandparents' request for physical custody of all the children. The Supreme Court declined to rule on the issues presented on appeal. Rather, the Court remanded the case for additional hearings at the circuit court. The Court considered that though the record reflects the extent to which the children were abused, it acknowledged that the children still have strong bonds with their grandparents. "It is imperative . . . that the circuit court focus on whether such continued contact [with the grandparents] is in the best interest of the children." The Court advised DHHR to develop a permanency plan for the children so that the siblings remain together. "The lower court faces a Herculean task of requiring wisdom, compassion and the strength to protect the children to the greatest degree possible from physical and emotional harm, and to create stability and safety."

Appellants Family Protection Services Board, its secretary/treasurer, and several of its members all appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Men & Women Against Discrimination (MAWAD). The Board is a public body created by the West Virginia Domestic Violence Act (WVDVA). Among other things, the Board is charged with establishing and enforcing standards for the licensure of all domestic violence shelters and family protection programs in the state. The Board also provides funds for shelters and programs once they become licensed. In 2008, MAWAD filed a complaint alleging that the Board implemented the WVDVA in a discriminatory manner. MAWAD sought to enjoin the Board from disbursing funds to shelters and programs until the alleged discriminatory practices were addressed. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of MAWAD, rendering three legislative rules promulgated by the Board as "null and void." Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Court found MAWAD lacked standing to bring suit against the Board. The Court dismissed the case.

The West Virginia Medical Imaging & Radiation Therapy Technology Board of Examiners appealed an order of the circuit court. In the order, the court reversed the Board's decision to suspend Appellee Kenneth Harrison's medical license. The Board issued a final administrative decision that found Dr. Harrison practiced outside the scope of his medical imaging and radiation therapy license when he administered intravenous allergy medicine to a patient without the treating physician's involvement. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision.

Defendant Stanley Myers appealed an order of the circuit court that determined he was a sexually violent predator. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant asserted that the trial court failed to make a statutory determination within the time frame contemplated by the governing statute. On the day after Defendant's release from prison in 2006, he registered with the State Police as a "sexual predator." As a result of an incident several years later, the State discovered Defendant was not on the "sexually violent predator" list. The State filed a motion to request Defendant be placed on the list. Upon careful review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by determining, contrary to state law, that Defendant was a sexually violent predator after Defendant had completed his period of incarceration. The Court reversed the decision of the lower court.

Appellants Farouk Abadir, Hosny Gabriel, Ricardo Ramos, Alfredo Rivas and Michael Vega sued their former attorney Mark Dellinger and his law firm Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, LLP because Mr. Dellinger settled a case in which they were all defendants without their consent. The circuit court dismissed the case, concluding that the Supreme Court had already decided that Mr. Dellinger had the âapparentâ authority to settle. Furthermore, the court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded Appellants from challenging what Mr. Dellinger had done. In this latest appeal, Appellants alleged that the circuit court erred in granting Mr. Dellingerâs motion to dismiss because the court failed to distinguish between the âactualâ and âapparentâ authority an attorney had to settle a case. After a thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court agreed, and held that the circuit court erred in granting Mr. Dellingerâs motion to dismiss. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.

A parcel of land in Tyler County was split in ninths and bequeathed to the heirs of Robert Amos. Plaintiff and Heir Barbara Renner began to purchase the other heirs’ one-ninths interests. In 2000, Ms. Renner owned six-ninths of the original parcel. Billie Worden, C.W. Anderson and Mary Anderson owned the remaining three-ninths. Ms. Renner brought a partition suit against the Andersons and Ms. Worden. Appellants Edgar and Hazel Bonner owned a tract of land that bordered the Worden/Anderson portion. During the pendency of the partition suit, the Bonners acquired an undivided one-ninths’ interest in the Worden ninth by virtue of a deed from Ms. Worden. The Bonners said they bought the interest to preserve their right to cross the property in order to access the nearby state highway. The Bonners then intervened in Ms. Renner’s partition suit. Ms. Renner sued the Bonners, claiming that they interfered with a contract between Ms. Renner and Ms. Worden over the purchase of Ms. Worden’s parcel. The court granted partial summary judgment to the Bonners, finding that they owned a one-ninth interest in the land. The court also found that Ms. Renner now owned the other eight-ninths’ interest in the property. Ms. Renner brought a separate suit against her relatives and the Bonners to force the partition so that all could be paid for their respective interests in the land. A hearing was held in the circuit court, and the court appointed three Commissioners to prepare a report as to whether the property could be partitioned. The report acknowledged that all parties were concerned with access to the state highway. The Commissioners recommended that the parcel be split using the right-of-way to the highway as the division line. The Bonners objected because according to the Commissioner’s report, they would get a smaller piece of land. Furthermore, the Bonners argued that if Ms. Renner sold her parcel, the Bonners would be landlocked. The court held a hearing of the parties’ objections to the Commissioners’ report. Without taking any evidence, the Court held that the parcel should be sold as one parcel at public auction. A judicial sale was held at the front door of the county courthouse, at which the only bidders were Ms. Renner and the Bonners. Ms. Renner was the highest bidder, and bid over $200,000 for the entire parcel. The Supreme Court reversed the actions of the trial court, finding that the lower court should have held an evidentiary hearing on issues presented by the parties regarding partition. The Court found that the lower court and its appointed Commissioners failed to address why the parcel should not have been partitioned: “Evidence on these issues must be taken by the circuit court, and the circuit court’s ruling on the matter must be supported by a detailed order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Renner v. Bonner" on Justia Law