Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Respondent, who had a diagnosis of autism with obsessive compulsive disorder traits and hyperactive traits, had participated for several years in the federal Mentally Retarded / Developmentally Delayed Home and Community-Based Waiver Program, which provided in-home and community-based services for persons with mental retardation or a delayed development condition. The state Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) subsequently terminated Respondent's benefits. The circuit court reversed the DHHR's decision based on the DHHR's failure to present evidence that Respondent's condition had improved since he first began receiving benefits. DHHR appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in placing the burden of proof on it rather than on Respondent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when the DHHR seeks to reduce or terminate benefits that a claimant is receiving under the Waiver Program, the DHHR has the burden of proof to show a change in circumstances warranting such action, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in determining that the DHHUR had the burden to show some medical improvement in Respondent's condition; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the DHHR had failed to meet its burden of proof. View "Hardy v. B.H." on Justia Law

Petitioner, who had a diagnosis of severe autism, had been participating in the federal Mentally Retarded / Developmentally Delayed Home and Community-Based Waiver Program, which provided in-home and community-based services for persons with mental retardation or a delayed development condition. The state Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) terminated Petitioner's benefits after determining that Petitioner did not demonstrate substantial adaptive deficits in three or more major life areas. A hearing officer upheld the DHHR's decision. The circuit court affirmed without holding any further proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court committed error by failing to make an independent review of Petitioner's eligibility for participation in the Waiver Program. Remanded. View "Bills v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Taxpayer, related corporations that operated a vertically-integrated poultry production business, sought an exemption from ad valorem taxes on five industrial personal property tax returns it filed with the State Tax Department, claiming it was exempt from such taxation under either the "subsistence of livestock" or the "farm" exemption under W. Va. Code 11-3-9-(a)(21), (28). The State Tax Commissioner concluded that Taxpayer was not entitled to either exemption. The trial court (1) ruled that Taxpayer was entitled to claim the "subsistence of livestock" exemption in connection with its hatchery operation but not with regard to personal property used at its live haul center and feed mill operation; and (2) concluded that none of Taxpayer's operation qualified for the "farm" exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in ruling that Taxpayer was not entitled to any exemptions from personal property taxation in connection with its commercial poultry operation other than the exemption afforded to its hatchery operation. View "Pilgrim's Pride v. Morris" on Justia Law

After Appellee was arrested for DUI, the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked Appellee's driver's license for two years. Appellee filed a request for an administrative hearing, which was conducted on May 6, 2008. By final order dated October 13, 2009, the DMV Commissioner ordered that Appellee's privilege to drive a motor vehicle be revoked for six months. Appellee appealed the revocation order, arguing that the seventeen-month delay between the administrative hearing and entry of the final order revoking his driver's license violated his procedural due process rights. The circuit court reversed the order, concluding that the excessive delay violated Appellee's due process rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellee was required to show actual and substantial prejudice as a result of the delay. Remanded to (1) give Appellee the opportunity to present evidence of prejudice and to give the Commissioner the opportunity to present evidence regarding the reasons for the delay; and (2) balance the resulting prejudice against the reasons for the delay in order to determine whether the delay violated Appellee's right to due process. View "Miller v. Moredock" on Justia Law

Petitioners were fifteen employees of the county Board of Education, who filed a grievance regarding changes made to the subsequent year's extracurricular coaching contracts, claiming they were entitled to receive notice and a hearing prior to the adoption of the changes and that they received neither. The ALJ and the circuit court denied the grievance. Petitioners appealed, contending that W. Va. Code 18A-2-7 gave them the right to receive a hearing before the Board could unilaterally alter the terms of the coaching contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Petitioners' grievance, holding that the circuit court's decision was not clearly wrong nor was it arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law. View "Martin v. Barbour County Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

First National Keystone Bank retained an independent accounting firm to audit its records at a time that members of the bank's management were fraudulently concealing the bank's financial condition. The accounting firm issued a clean audit concerning the bank. It was later discovered that the bank had overstated its assets by over $500 million. Upon investigation, the FDIC concluded that the law firm that represented the bank had engaged in legal malpractice. The FDIC settled its claims against the law firm. The accounting firm was later found liable to the FDIC in federal district court for a negligent bank audit. The accounting firm subsequently sued the law firm, alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and tortious interference with the accounting firm's contract to perform the audit. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the law firm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the claims of the accounting firm against the law firm were, in reality, contribution claims rather than direct or independent claims and were, therefore, barred by the settlement agreement between the law firm and the FDIC. View "Grant Thornton, LLP v. Kutak Rock, LLP" on Justia Law

This matter involved two actions consolidated by the circuit court for appeal purposes concerning the application of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act (WPCA). Appellants, two employees whose positions were eliminated as a result of their employer's merger with United Bank, appealed circuit court orders granting summary judgment to Appellee, United Bank, and dismissing their claims for liquidated damages based on the provisions of the WPCA regarding late payment of compensation due at termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lower court did not err in categorizing the termination of employment of either Appellant as a lay-off rather than discharge and in thus finding Appellants were fully compensated for all pay due within the prescribed statutory period. View "Lehman v. United Bank, Inc." on Justia Law

Craig Griffith, state tax commissioner, appealed from an order entered by a circuit court that reversed an earlier order of the Office of Tax Appeals and found that Frontier West Virginia was entitled to a refund of its telecommunications tax for the 2004 year in the amount of over nine million dollars. The Supreme Court reinstated the order of the Office of Tax Appeals and (1) affirmed the circuit court's ruling finding the subject statute, W. Va. Code 11.13B02(b)(5), was plain and unambiguous; (2) reversed the circuit court's ruling finding the governing rule, W. Va. C.S.R. 110-13B-2.6, invalid; and (3) reversed the circuit court's determination that the West Virginia Public Service Commission's (PSC) list of competitive services that were exempt from the telecommunications tax applied to define a taxpayer's gross income for the calendar year in which the PSC issued its list. Rather, the Court held that the PSC's list operated to define a taxpayer's gross income for the calendar year following the issuance of the list. View "Griffith v. Frontier West Virginia, Inc." on Justia Law

After finding that the County Commission of Greenbrier County acted arbitrarily and capriciously by reducing the budget of the Sheriff of the County, the trial court directed the Commission to, among other things, allocate sufficient funds in the next fiscal year budget for the Sheriff to fill any necessary vacant positions. The Commission subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of the trial court's directives. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the writ of mandamus to the Sheriff where the record was devoid of any evidentiary basis for the trial court's conclusion that the budget cuts at issue would necessarily interfere with the Sheriff's ability to fulfill his constitutional and statutory duties. View "Greenbrier County Commission v. Circuit Court (Cummings)" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several jail employees, lost their jobs after their positions were eliminated upon the closing of the Cabell County Jail. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against the County under the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act (the Act), seeking payment of their accumulated sick leave and alleging that they were entitled to liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. At issue on appeal was whether the County should have been granted judgment as a matter of law based on the following written provision of its sick leave policy: "When the services of an employee have been terminated, all sick leave credited shall be cancelled as of the last working day with the department." The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding that Plaintiffs' accumulated sick leave as of the date they were terminated with the County did not constitute unpaid wages to which they were entitled within the meaning of the Act. Remanded to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of the County. View "Wolfe v. Adkins" on Justia Law