Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When he was fifty-five years old, Plaintiff Albert Postlewait, Jr. applied for a job with the City of Wheeling as a mechanic. Although Plaintiff had the highest score on the City's application examination, the City instead hired an eighteen-year-old applicant. Plaintiff filed an age-discrimination lawsuit against the City, and the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The City filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that one of the jurors had not been forthright and truthful during voir dire. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the City's motion for a new trial was timely, and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion. View "Postlewait v. City of Wheeling" on Justia Law

Defendant Rhonda Stewart was convicted for the first degree murder of her husband. At trial, the circuit court prohibited Defendant from presenting evidence that she had been battered and abused by her husband during their thirty-eight-year marriage and did not allow an expert witness to testify as to how this abuse may have affected Defendant's state of mind and reasoning as it related to premeditation, malice, or intent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on well-established precedent, Defendant was entitled to present evidence of Battered Woman's Syndrome and evidence of abuse through eyewitnesses and expert witnesses; and (2) because the jury could have reasonably found that Defendant's crime was not first degree murder, but second degree murder or manslaughter had the jury been allowed to hear the abuse evidence, Defendant did not receive a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Employee of a railway company was accused by his Employer of stealing rail. After it was discovered that Employee was involved in the removal and sale of the rail, Employee's employment was terminated. An arbitration panel reinstated Employee's employment the next year. Employer then submitted the matter to an assistant prosecutor. Employee was never arrested or incarcerated. Employee subsequently sued Employer for malicious prosecution. During the trial, the circuit court granted Employee's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether Employer had procured his prosecution, which was one element of his required proof. The jury then returned a verdict in favor of Employee. The circuit court denied Employer's motions for judgment as a matter of law, new trial, or remittitur. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Employer's post-trial motions, holding that the circuit court committed reversible error by determining as a matter of law that Employer procured the malicious prosecution of Employee where testimony of the assistant prosecutor directly contradicted the proposition that Employer had a level of control over the prosecution amounting to procurement. Remanded for a new trial. View "Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Higginbotham " on Justia Law

Grandmother filed a petition for permanent guardianship of Child, who was over fourteen years old and had nominated his Grandmother to be his guardian. Child's Mother contested the guardianship. The family court denied Grandmother's petition. The circuit court affirmed, holding that appointing a third party as a guardian for a minor over the objection of a non-offending, biological parent would violate that parent's constitutional right to the custody of his or her own child. At issue on appeal was whether W. Va. Code 44-10-4 and the case law interpreting it required courts to appoint any guardian nominated by a minor above the age of fourteen, unless the guardian was "unfit." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly concluded that it was not obligated under section 44-10-4 to appoint Grandmother as Child's guardian, despite Child's age and Grandmother's fitness; (2) the circuit court correctly concluded that Mother's constitutional rights as Child's biological mother would be violated by appointing a third party as Child's guardian; and (3) because Mother did not voluntarily transfer or relinquish her custody of Child, Grandmother was not Child's psychological parent. View "In re Antonio R.A." on Justia Law

Appellee was allegedly hit in the head by a law enforcement officer during a confrontation. Appellee filed a civil complaint against the city and the two officers involved in the incident (Appellants), alleging that his civil rights had been violated due to the use of excessive force by the officers. Appellants moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity from suit both on qualified immunity and statutory immunity grounds. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of summary judgment, holding (1) a public officer is entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages for performance of discretionary functions where (i) a trial court finds the alleged facts do not demonstrate that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, or (ii) a trial court finds the evidence could establish the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right but further finds that it would be clear to any reasonable officer that such conduct was lawful in the situation confronted; and (2) Appellants were entitled to qualified immunity from suit, either because (i) no constitutional violated was established by the facts alleged, or (ii) a reasonable officer confronting the same situation, without notice to the contrary, would have considered the action lawful. View "City of St. Albans v. Botkins" on Justia Law

Employee submitted a claim for workers' compensation under Employer's policy with Insurer, which claim was paid in full. Employee also filed a deliberate intent lawsuit against Employer. After assuming the attorney's fees and costs associated with defending and settling the action, Employer filed a complaint against Insurer, alleging various claims related to Insurer's denial of coverage in the defense of the deliberate intent action. The circuit court granted Employer's motion for partial summary judgment on its bad faith claim against Insurer and awarded damages to Employer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Insurer met its obligation under W. Va. Code 23-4C-6 to make deliberate intent coverage available to Employer upon the Employer's voluntary request; and (2) because the language of the policy was plain, and the exclusion of deliberate intent coverage was clear, the circuit court erred in concluding that the policy was ambiguous and therefore resulted in deliberate intent coverage being included in the policy under the doctrine of reasonable expectations. View "W. Va. Employers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Summit Point Raceway Assocs." on Justia Law

The assessor and sheriff of Mingo County sought to remove Gregory Smith from his position as commissioner on the Mingo County Commission. A three-judge court empaneled by the Supreme Court denied the petition for removal and dismissed the case. Smith subsequently filed a petition for a writ a mandamus, seeking to compel the Commission to reimburse him for attorney's fees and costs that he spent in defending against the removal petition. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in (1) finding that Smith could have sought reimbursement of attorney's fees from the three-judge panel, and (2) determining that Powers v. Goodwin, which authorizes the use of mandamus to obtain reimbursement of attorney's fees following a successful defense in a removal action, was no longer good law. The Court (1) remanded for reconsideration of whether Smith established the three necessary elements entitling him to a writ of mandamus, and (2) directed the circuit court, in considering whether Smith had a clear legal right to the relief sought, to determine if Smith met the three-part test set forth in Powers. View "State ex rel. Smith v. Mingo County Comm'n " on Justia Law

Petitioner, a constructor, was sued by several people living in new homes built by Petitioner (Residents). Residents claimed they were injured by radon gas leaking into their homes because of improper construction by Petitioner. Petitioner argued that the agreement to purchase the new homes required Residents to arbitrate their claims, whether they signed the agreement or not. The circuit court found the arbitration provision ambiguous and unconscionable and refused to compel Residents into arbitration. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to compel Residents to arbitrate their claims. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court was within its authority to refuse to enforce the arbitration clause against Residents because the arbitration provision was ambiguous, unconscionable, and unenforceable. View "State ex rel. Richmond Am. Homes v. Jefferson County Circuit Court (Sanders)" on Justia Law

The Racing Commission suspended certain jockeys' occupational permits for thirty days and imposed fines for the jockeys' failure to declare an overweight amount. Afterwards, PNGI Charles Town Gaming (PNGI), a non-party in the underlying action, excluded the jockeys from its facility. The circuit court (1) entered an injunction and stayed the imposition of sanctions by the Racing Commission until the conclusion of a hearing before the Commission; and (2) extended the injunction and the stay to include PNGI, preventing PNGI from excluding the jockeys from PGNI's premises pending the outcome of the jockeys' administrative appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an ejection of a permit holder by a racing association or its stewards is subject to review by the Commission, and therefore, the jockeys, as permit holders, had the right to appeal the ejection, and PNGI was bound by the Commission's decision, subject to judicial review; and (2) PNGI waived its assigned errors regarding the injunction and stay. View "PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute regarding developed property. Developer filed a complaint alleging that the project's general contractor (Contractor) and an engineering firm (Firm) had negligently provided recommendations with respect to site preparation. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor Firm on Contractor's cross-claims against Firm that sought recovery of remediation costs incurred by Contractor, concluding (1) some of Contractor's cross-claims were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and (2) W. Va. Code 55-2-21 did not apply to toll any limitations periods because Contractor's claims were independent causes of action as opposed to cross-claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court prematurely found that section 55-2-21 did not apply because it failed to analyze whether the claims arose from the same transaction or occurrence and, thus, constituted cross-claims or independent causes of action; and (2) genuine issues of material fact existed so as to preclude summary judgment if Contractor's claim was an independent cause of action. Remanded. View "J. A. Street & Assocs. v. Thundering Herd Dev." on Justia Law