Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Davises failed to pay the real estate tax for their property, resulting in a statutory tax. The Davises then filed a petition for bankruptcy, which was granted. Subsequently, the sheriff sold the tax lien. After the statutory time period that the Davises could redeem the property had passed and the property remained unredeemed, the tax lien purchaser received a tax deed conveying the Davises' property. The trial court set aside the tax deed, concluding that the tax lien sale should not have been held because the Davises had been in bankruptcy and because the sheriff did not give sufficient notice to the Davises of the tax delinquency, lien, and sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred (1) in considering issues relating to the sufficiency of the sheriff's service of the notices; (2) in considering the sheriff's pre-sale notices to the Davises, as only the post-sale notice to redeem is relevant in a lawsuit to set aside a tax deed; and (3) by granting judgment without making sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the effect the Davises' bankruptcy had on the tax lien. Remanded. View "Rebuild America, Inc. v. Davis" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, Petitioners Paul Hoston and Reese Riley were convicted of drug-related offenses. In their appeals, Petitioners challenged the circuit court's denial of their motions to suppress evidence obtained against them through the use of a body wire worn by a confidential informant into their homes that recorded the illegal drug transactions. The electronic interception was authorized in both cases by a magistrate. Petitioners contended that such electronic interception could only be authorized by one of five designated circuit court judges, and therefore, the evidence was illegally obtained and should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. The Supreme Court affirmed the final orders of the circuit court, holding (1) electronic interception by law enforcement authorities of a person's conduct or oral communications in his or her home is governed by W. Va. Code 62-1F-1 to -9; and 9; and (2) pursuant to W. Va. Code 62-1F-2(a), an order authorizing law enforcement authorities to conduct electronic interception of conduct or oral communications in the home can be obtained from either a magistrate or a judge of a circuit court within the county wherein the non-consenting party's home is located. View "State v. Hoston" on Justia Law

This case was before the Supreme Court on a writ of prohibition brought by Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (MassMutual) seeking to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing two orders requiring the president and CEO of MassMutual to submit to depositions. MassMutual argued (1) the orders requiring its president to submit to depositions were properly the subject of a writ of prohibition, and (2) the orders compelling the depositions of this high-ranking corporate executive, despite his lack of any personal or unique knowledge about the cases, were clearly erroneous and constituted an abuse of the circuit court's discretion. The Supreme Court issued the writ after adopting the apex deposition rule, a framework for assessing whether the deposition of a high-ranking corporate official is proper, holding that because the circuit court, in this case, did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law, there was an insufficient basis to sustain the circuit court's orders. View "State ex rel. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jefferson County Circuit Court (Sanders)" on Justia Law

Kendra Sulick was convicted by a jury on three counts of criminal civil rights violations pursuant to W. Va. Code 61-6-21(b). Sulick appealed the circuit court's denial of her post-trial motions, raising several arguments that essentially challenged the constitutionality of section 61-6-21(b) on vagueness and proportionality grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to prove that Sulick committed the acts complained of, and the evidence proved that the acts met the requirements of the statute; and (2) section 61-6-21 is not unconstitutionally vague and does not allow for a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the offenses sought to be prosecuted. View "State v. Sulick" on Justia Law

At issue in these consolidated appeals was the redistricting legislation adopted by the Legislature in 2011. Petitioners, several individuals and groups, challenged the constitutionality of H.B. 201, which was redistricting legislation regarding the House of Delegates, and S.B. 1006, which was redistricting legislation regarding the Senate. The constitutional challenges were before the Supreme Court as petitions for writs of prohibition and mandamus. The Court denied the requested writs, holding that the redistricting plans for the House of Delegates and the Senate were securely within the realm of constitutional mandates, as (1) in regards to H.B. 201, the constitution did not prohibit splitting counties or a plan containing multi-member delegate districts, the delegate residency dispersal requirement served a valid purpose, and no unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering occurred in this matter; and (2) S.B. 1006 did not violate the equality in population provisions of the state Constitution, did not unconstitutionally divide certain election precincts and cross county boundary lines, and did not violate the compactness requirement of the state Constitution insofar as it established certain senatorial districts. View "State ex rel. Cooper v. Tennant" on Justia Law

Upon granting Husband and Wife a divorce, the family court directed Husband to pay $1,000 per month in spousal support. The court found that the award did not need to be paid out of Husband's veteran's disability benefits. The circuit court set aside the award of permanent spousal support and directed Husband to pay supposal support in the amount of $500 per month for eighteen months. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in determining the amount of spousal support to be awarded, federal service-connected veterans disability benefits received by the payor spouse may be considered by the family court as a resource, along with the payor's other income, in assessing the ability of the payor to pay spousal support; and (2) because the circuit court, among other things, (i) failed to address with any specificity Husband's veterans benefits or the parties' Social Security awards, (ii) failed to address with specificity how those disability benefits were taken into account in setting aside the family court decision, and (iii) did not determine that any of the factual findings of the family court were clearly erroneous, the action was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Zickefoose v. Zickefoose" on Justia Law

In two condemnation proceedings, the circuit court entered orders requiring the Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH) to turn over to Defendants, three individuals who owned and leased condemned property, appraisal reports involving several properties condemned by DOH for its South Mineral Wells Project. The DOH filed petitions for writs of prohibition, contending that federal law did not permit the release of appraisal reports from properties not owned or possessed by Defendants. Defendants argued that the court's orders were consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. West Virginia Department of Transportation v. Cookman, which allowed appraisal reports to be discoverable. The Court consolidated the petitions and granted the writs of prohibition, holding (1) the decision in Cookman was expressly overruled in its entirety because it failed to consider controlling federal law; and (2) a real property appraisal report generated in compliance with 42 U.S.C. 4601 and W. Va. Code 54-3-1, et seq., and its accompanying regulations, was not discoverable in a condemnation proceeding by party who did not own or have any legally cognizable possessory interest in such real property. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. Circuit Court (Reed)" on Justia Law

This was a consolidated appeal of two cases wherein the circuit court dismissed two appeals filed by a corporation, Shenandoah Sales & Services (Shenandoah), disputing the county assessor's valuation of real estate owned by the corporation. The corporation failed to retain a lawyer to prosecute its appeals to the circuit court and instead appeared through its vice-president, David Tabb. The circuit judge ordered the corporation to appear through a lawyer in circuit court and stated that the court would not accept pleadings or motions from the corporation that were not signed by a lawyer. The corporation failed to retain a lawyer and the court dismissed the corporation's appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by ruling that Shenendoah was required to be represented by a lawyer in the circuit court; and (2) W. Va. Code 11-3-25(b) is unconstitutional insofar as the word "agent" allows an applicant's non-lawyer representative to appeal a decision of the board of equalization and review to a circuit court. View "Shenandoah Sales & Service, Inc. v. Assessor of Jefferson County" on Justia Law

Steven Posey was injured after falling at the City of Buckhannon's solid waste transfer station while unloading garbage bags and other material. Posey and his wife filed a complaint against the City, alleging negligence. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the City was entitled to immunity from liability pursuant to the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act. The Poseys appealed, contending that transfer stations, such as the one conducted by the City, were not included in the governmental immunity provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that a transfer station conducted directly by a political subdivision as a temporary collection site for solid waste to be transported to a dump or sanitary landfill constitutes a "facility" within the meaning of the immunity provisions of the Act. View "Posey v. City of Buckhannon" on Justia Law

Timothy Waldron was convicted by a jury of one count of delivery of a controlled substance and was sentenced to one to five years imprisonment. Waldron appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court committed error in admitting audio and video recordings of the drug transaction because the admission of certain statements on the recordings violated his right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the record provided on the issue, the trial court did not err in admitting the recordings of the drug transaction where Waldron failed to provide the Court with either the recordings of the drug transaction or the text of the statements he alleged violated Crawford v. Washington, nor did the trial transcript contain any testimony from the recordings, and, consequently, the Court was unable to determine whether those statements fell outside the application of the general rule that such statements are admissible the defendant when they are not offered for the truth of the matter they assert. View "State v. Waldron" on Justia Law