Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Michael Chenoweth was arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Thereafter, Commissioner Joe Miller of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles issued an order revoking Chenoweth's privilege to drive a motor vehicle. The circuit court reversed and vacated the revocation of Chenoweth's driver's license based on its finding that the trooper improperly stopped Chenoweth's vehicle without an articulable reasonable suspicion. In so doing, the circuit court applied the exclusionary rule to an administrative driver's license revocation proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no illegal stop, and thus it was not necessary to reach the issue of whether the circuit court properly applied the exclusionary rule in this case. View "Miller v. Chenoweth" on Justia Law

This case involved a decision by the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH) to provide a wage increase for current and newly hired employees in three counties that were part of its District 5 operations. Appellants, who worked in DOH's District 1 counties, filed administrative grievances contending that they were victims of unlawful discrimination because of DOH's failure to provide them with a wage increase. The West Virginia public employees grievance board and the circuit court found no merit to Appellants' contention. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants did not provide the Court with a basis on which to find that the board's findings were arbitrary or capricious so as to represent an abuse of discretion. View "Hammond v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Petitioner Donna Boley filed a petition asking for a writ of mandamus directed to Respondents, the Secretary of State of West Virginia and Frank Deem. Petitioner was an incumbent state senator seeking re-election for the Third Senatorial District (District 3). Deem sought to challenge Petitioner for the Republican Party's 2012 nomination and was certified as eligible by the Secretary to have his name placed on the ballot. Petitioner filed the petition challenging Deem's eligibility to be a candidate for state senator against her, asserting that Deem did not met the residency requirements contained in the state Constitution and the Senate Redistricting Act of 2011. Deem conceded that a plain reading of the residency requirements made him ineligible to be a candidate for state senator in District 3 but argued that the residency requirements should be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court found that the residency requirements were constitutional and granted the requested writ, ordering the Secretary to withdraw her certification of Deem's candidacy for state senator in District 3 and commanding that Deem's name be removed from ballots to be used in the May 2012 Republican party primary election. View "State ex rel. Boley v. Tennant" on Justia Law

After police officer stopped motorist Joe White at a sobriety checkpoint and directed White to perform a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the officer arrested White for driving under the influence of alcohol. The Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles revoked White's license to operate a motor vehicle for six months, and the circuit court affirmed. White appealed, challenging the admissibility of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test as an indicator that he was intoxicated and the lawfulness of the sobriety checkpoint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence concerning the horizontal gaze nystagmus test as a field sobriety test was admissible; but (2) White was entitled to a new administrative hearing based upon his challenge to the sobriety checkpoint, as the finding of the Commissioner that the checkpoint was set up in accordance with standardized guidelines was clearly wrong. Remanded. View "White v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 1974, Amos and Lois Harper purchased property in a subdivision. In 2001, the property was sold at a foreclosure sale to the Bank of New York. Because the property taxes were not paid, the sheriff sold the tax lien on the property in 2007 to Marquis Development. Marquis sold the property to Gavin Smith, who subsequently served an eviction notice on Lois Harper's son, Mike Harper. The Harpers filed this declaratory judgment action against Marquis and Smith, claiming that they were the owners of the subject property. Ultimately, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and declared that Smith was the owner of the subject real estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred to the extent it concluded that Smith was a bona fide purchaser given the fact that he was on notice of a potential defect in the tax deed received by Marquis; but (2) because the Harpers lost title to the property as a result of the foreclosure sale in 2001, the Harpers had no standing to challenge Smith's status as a bona fide purchaser. View "Harper v. Smith" on Justia Law

Kyle Hoffman was a passenger in an automobile driven by William Piper (William) when an accident resulted in the deaths of Hoffman and William. Robin Prinz, administratrix of the estate of Kyle Hoffman, filed a complaint asserting a wrongful death claim against Julie Piper (Petitioner), administratrix of the estate of William, and a declaratory judgment claim against State Farm. The complaint alleged that William's grandfather maintained a personal liability policy through State Farm that provided coverage to William. The circuit court bifurcated the two claims and stayed the wrongful death action pending resolution of the declaratory judgment action. The circuit court found the State Farm policy provided liability coverage for the allegedly negligent actions of William. State Farm appealed. Petitioner filed a motion to stay the wrongful death action pending the Court's resolution of State Farm's appeal, which the circuit court denied. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order denying the stay. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to further stay the wrongful death proceedings; and (2) a writ of prohibition is not available to correct discretionary rulings. View "State ex rel. Piper v. Circuit Court (Sanders)" on Justia Law

Michelle Falquero was employed by the state Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) when she filed a grievance alleging (1) that she had been constructively discharged due to a hostile work environment which spurred her to tender a letter of resignation, and (2) that when her working conditions improved she was wrongly denied the opportunity to rescind the voluntary resignation even though DEP had not formally accepted it. The state Public Employee's Grievance Board found merit in Falquero's contention that her job at DEP should not have been terminated because she could and did rescind her voluntary resignation before DEP had accepted it and ordered DEP to reinstate Falquero with back pay. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding (1) acceptance of a tender of resignation of public employment may occur when the employer (i) clearly indicates acceptance through communication with the employee, or (ii) acts in good faith reliance on the tender; and (2) because the evidence showed that acceptance of the resignation did not occur, the circuit court did not err in upholding the ruling of the Grievance Board. View "W. Va. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Falquero" on Justia Law

Respondent Timothy Judge was charged with failure to register as a sex offender. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, which the trial court granted after concluding that Respondent did not violate the West Virginia Sex Offender Registration Act by failing to re-register as a sex offender after a one-night period of confinement in jail for an unrelated charge. The State appealed, contending that every dismissal from a penal institution, regardless of the nature of the offense or the length of confinement, requires a sex offender to initiate the registration process required by the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the indictment, holding that Respondent was in compliance with the registration requirements of the Act, and Respondent was not required by the provisions of the Act to re-register with the state police following his release from jail. View "State v. Judge" on Justia Law

Employee injured his back while working for Employer. Employee ultimately received a permanent partial disability award for his back injury. Employee then sought a psychiatric consultation, which resulted in Employee being assessed with major depressive disorder. The claims administrator denied Employee's request to add depression as a compensable injury of his workers' compensation claim, and the Workers' Compensation Office of Judges and Workers' Compensation Board of Review (BOR) affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a claimant must get prior authorization from a claims administrator before seeking an initial psychiatric consultation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) W. Va. S.C.R. 85-20-12.5(a), which states that an initial psychiatric evaluation must be authorized by a claims administrator, is an invalid administrative regulation; (2) W. Va. C.S.R. 85-12-12.4 sets forth a three-step process that must be followed when a claimant is seeking to add a psychiatric disorder as a compensable injury in his or her workers' compensation claim; and (3) in the instant case, Employee did not receive the process that he was entitled to under section 85-12-12.4. Remanded. View "Hale v. Office of Ins. Comm'r" on Justia Law

After finding that Mother was an abusive and neglectful parent, the circuit court terminated Mother's parental rights to Child, a sixteen-year-old minor, despite the recommendation of the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) that only Mother's custodial rights be terminated. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in terminating Mother's parental rights because it (1) failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 34 of the rules of procedure for child abuse and neglect proceedings; and (2) failed to acquire and consider the wishes of Child as to the termination of Mother's parental rights, as required by W. Va. Code 49-6-5(a)(6). View "In re Ashton M." on Justia Law