Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, Tudor's Biscuit World of America, appealed the circuit court's order denying its motion to alter or amend the court's order denying its motion to set aside the default judgment rendered against it in this workplace injury action. Tudor's asserted (1) the circuit court erred in its application of the "reasonable time" requirement set forth in W.V. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to its motion to set aside the default judgment, arguing that such timeliness requirement was inapplicable to void judgments; and (2) the circuit court improperly applied and weighed the factors set forth in Parsons v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corporation in denying its motion for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court should have properly set aside the default judgment, as (1) Tudor's motion to set aside the default judgment was filed within a reasonable period of time; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in its analysis of the Parsons factors to the extent that such analysis resulted in its denial of Plaintiff's motion for relief from default judgment, and therefore, to that extent, erred in denying Tudor's subsequent motion to alter or amend. View "Tudor's Biscuit World of Am. v. Critchley" on Justia Law

Petitioner Marcella Dunbar appealed from an order of the circuit court accepting Petitioner's plea to the charge of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentencing Petitioner to incarceration for not less than one nor more than fifteen years. Petitioner contended that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress the evidence gathered pursuant to a traffic stop of the vehicle in which he was riding as a passenger. The Supreme Court reversed Petitioner's conviction, holding that the traffic stop initiated in this case was improper, and consequently, the evidence leading to Petitioner's arrest for drug violations was not admissible evidence and should have been suppressed. Remanded. View "State v. Dunbar" on Justia Law

Petitioner Charles Thompson was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree, sexual abuse by a custodian, and sexual abuse in the third degree. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's direct appeal. Petitioner then filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus, which the circuit court denied after two evidentiary proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State produced sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner; (2) Thompson's argument that certain testimony should have been excluded was not recognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding; and (3) Petitioner failed to prove his claims of ineffective assistance by a preponderance of the evidence. View "State ex rel. Thompson v. Ballard" on Justia Law

At issue in this construction lawsuit was whether the circuit court erred in refusing to compel a plaintiff corporation to arbitrate its claims against three defendant corporations. The circuit court had previously entered two orders in which it found the arbitration clauses in Defendants' contracts with Plaintiff were unconscionable. Further, the circuit court found it would be inequitable to fracture Plaintiff's lawsuit into multiple "piecemeal" arbitrations and lawsuits against Defendants. Defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to halt enforcement of the circuit court's orders and to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate its claims. The Court granted the requested writ of prohibition as moulded, holding (1) the arbitration agreements were not unconscionable, and therefore, the circuit court erred in refusing to enforce the agreements; (2) the FAA requires that if a lawsuit presents multiple claims, some subject to an arbitration agreement and some not, the former claims must be sent to arbitration even if this leads to piecemeal litigation; and (3) the circuit court's refusal to enforce the arbitration clauses ran afoul of the FAA. View "State ex rel. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Circuit Court (Tucker) " on Justia Law

This case was a consolidation of three separate wrongful death lawsuits. Each lawsuit arose from a nursing home's attempt to compel a plaintiff to participate in arbitration pursuant to a clause in a nursing home admission contract. The Supreme Court (1) ruled that the arbitration clauses were unconscionable and unenforceable in two of the cases, and (2) held that the Nursing Home Act could not be relied upon to bar enforcement of the arbitration clause in the third case. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded to consider whether the arbitration clauses were enforceable under state common law principles that were not specific to arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA. On remand, the Supreme Court (1) held that the doctrine of unconscionability that the Court explicated in Brown I was a general, state, common-law, contract principle that was not specific to arbitration and did not implicate the FAA; (2) reversed the trial courts' prior orders compelling arbitration in two of the cases and permitted the parties to raise arguments regarding unconscionability anew before the trial court; and (3) found the issue of unconscionability in the third case was not considered by the trial court but may be raised on remand. View "Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner was the mother of six children, three of whom were minors. Respondents were Mother's ex-husbands and fathers to the minor children. Upon her divorces, Mother received primary custody of the minor children. Fathers later filed motions for modification of custody, which the family court denied. The circuit court reversed, finding the family court had abused its discretion, and placed the three children in the primary custody of their fathers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court erred in concluding that a substantial change in circumstances was not present under the facts of the case, and the circuit court did not err by reversing the family court's order. View "T.H. v. D.K." on Justia Law

Petitioner was prosecuting attorney for Kanawha County. Respondent was a circuit judge in Kanawha County. Respondent was a defendant in a murder prosecution pending in the County. Petitioner requested a writ of prohibition to challenge a ruling of the Kanawha County circuit court barring the introduction of certain shell casings found at the scene of the crime and firearms and ammunition seized from a residence associated with Respondent. The evidence was suppressed as a sanction for the State's admitted failure to make the shell casings available to the defense for inspection and possible testing. The Supreme Court granted the request and prohibited the enforcement of the circuit court order excluding the materials at issue from evidence, holding that while the State's conduct was troublesome, the circuit court failed properly to analyze the necessary factors for sanctions against the State pursuant to its holdings in State ex rel. Rusen v. Hill. View "State ex rel. Plants v. Circuit Court (Webster) " on Justia Law

Petitioner Darrell McGraw, state attorney general, sought a writ of prohibition directed to Respondent Charles King, judge of the circuit court, to enjoin enforcement of an order dismissing Petitioner's action seeking enforcement of certain investigative subpoenas issued against Respondents, Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (FAL), Community Loans of America, Inc. (CLA), and the president and CEO of both corporations. Petitioner began the investigation of Respondents after receiving complaints by West Virginia residents regarding the collection of title loans provided by FAL and CLA. The circuit court ruled that the investigative subpoena was procedurally defective and therefore invalid, and denied Petitioner's request for enforcement of the subpoena. The Supreme Court denied the requested writ of prohibition because Petitioner had another adequate remedy, that being an appeal of the circuit court's order. View "State ex rel. McGraw v. Circuit Court (King)" on Justia Law

By the Supreme Court's order, Magistrate Carol Fouty was suspended without pay from her position as magistrate following a finding of probable cause that Fouty had engaged or was currently engaged in a serious violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and further noting that Fouty previously had received a written admonishment for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. Fouty requested a hearing on the issue of her suspension without pay, which was granted by the Court. The Court then affirmed the suspension without pay, holding that the Code of Judicial Conduct and existing case law supported Fouty's suspension without pay pending the completion of the underlying judicial disciplinary proceeding. View "In re Fouty" on Justia Law

In this matter the Supreme Court considered whether a decedent's will that directed "all my just debts be paid as soon as conveniently possible after the date of my death" obligated the decedent's estate to pay the mortgage on two parcels of real property devised to Respondents. The circuit court determined that the "just debts" clause required the decedent's estate to pay the mortgage on the two properties and deliver an unencumbered interest in the two properties to Respondents. Petitioner, the executrix of the will, appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the doctrine of exoneration was applicable to this case, and under the doctrine, Respondents were entitled to receive an unencumbered interest in the two devised properties. View "Estate of Fussell v. Fortney " on Justia Law