Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners and Respondents executed a land contract whereby Respondents agreed to sell a piece of property to Petitioners. After the land contract had been fully consummated, Respondents refused to tender a deed to Petitioners. Petitioners filed suit, seeking a delivery of a general warranty deed for the property, including all oil and gas rights. Two months later, Respondents tendered a deed to Petitioners reserving oil and gas rights. The deed was recorded on February 17, 2010. Petitioners moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the land contract did not contained any language indicating Respondents' intention to except oil and gas rights, any questions of interpretation should be resolved in favor of the grantees. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, finding that when the deed was recorded, the land contract was merged in the deed and any cause of action based upon the contract was extinguished. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the contract was unambiguous, and Respondents failed to establish any legally sufficient basis for varying its terms; and (2) therefore, Respondents were obligated to convey their title and interest to the property, including their vested oil and gas rights. Remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Petitioners. View "Spitznogle v. Durbin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of operating or attempting to operate a clandestine drug laboratory. Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of two to ten years and was later re-sentenced for appeal purposes. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by admitting into evidence Petitioner's statement made two years after the events alleged in the indictment and by denying Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that Petitioner's statement was relevant to the charges against him and was not unduly prejudicial; and (2) sufficient evidence existed to sustain Petitioner's conviction of operating or attempting to operate a clandestine drug laboratory. View "State v. Hypes" on Justia Law

In the underlying abuse and neglect petition, the circuit court adjudicated that respondent parents had neglected their four infant children. The parents then moved for a post-adjudication improvement period. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHR) and the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) objected. After a hearing, the circuit court granted the parents a six month post-adjudication improvement period. A written order was entered on June 19, 2012. On September 25, 2012, the DHHR and GAL filed a joint petition seeking a writ of prohibition to bar enforcement of the circuit court's order, arguing that the circuit court erred by not allowing evidence of the parents' pre-adjudication neglect and that the parents failed to meet the requisite legal standards for granting a post-adjudication improvement period. The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, holding that DHHR and GAL failed to demonstrate that the circuit court (1) lacked jurisdiction to grant the parents a six month post-adjudication improvement period, or (2) exceeded its legitimate powers in granting the post-adjudication improvement period. View "State ex rel. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the valuation and corresponding tax assessment of seventy-nine condominium units owned by Pope Properties / Charleston LLC (Pope Properties). The Kanawha Assessor determined that for ad valorem tax purposes for 2011, the seventy-nine units should be valued as follows: $63,700 for each of Pope Properties' sixteen one-bedroom units and $70,000 for each of its sixty-three two-bedroom units. The Board of Equalization and Review upheld the determination. Pope Properties appealed, contending that the units should be valued at $42,000 for each of the one-bedroom units and $49,000 for each of the two-bedroom units. At issue on appeal was the Assessor's use of the market data approach in determining the value of the units rather than the income approach to valuation advocated by Pope Properties. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Assessor did not err in choosing or applying the market data approach in this case. View "Pope Props. / Charleston LLC v. Kanawha County Assessor " on Justia Law

Gerald Kirchner accidentally shot and killed Robbie Bragg while both men were working for Grimmett Enterprises (Grimmett). Kirchner's mother, Barbara Surbaugh, filed a complaint against Bragg and Grimmett. The parties settled, after which Defendants assigned all claims they might have against their respective insurers for refusing to provide a defense and coverage. Thereafter, Surbaugh filed a declaratory judgment action against Grimmett's insurer, American States. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. At issue was whether an employee exclusion in the policy was ambiguous and whether the exclusion had been brought to the attention of Grimmett. The circuit court denied the motions. After a jury trial, the circuit court concluded that the employee policy exclusion was unenforceable because the exclusionary language had not been brought to the attention of Grimmett. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment should have been granted in favor of American States, as American States established at the summary judgment stage that no material issue of fact was in dispute as to the exclusion being unambiguous and disclosed to Grimmett. Therefore, the exclusion was enforceable. View "Am. States Ins. Co. v. Surbaugh" on Justia Law

The lawsuit underlying this certified question action arose after the fatal 2006 fire in the Aracoma Coal Company's mine in West Virginia killed two miners, both of whom died from carbon monoxide intoxication. Petitioners, the widows of the minors, filed the underlying lawsuit against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for negligent inspection of the mine. The United States moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that a private party inspecting mines in similar circumstances to those alleged in the complaint would not be held liable under West Virginia law. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The federal court of appeals certified to the West Virginia Supreme Court a question of law. The Supreme Court answered by holding that a private party conducting inspections of a mine and mine operator for compliance with mine safety regulations is liable for the wrongful death of a miner resulting from the private party's negligent inspection. View "Bragg v. United States" on Justia Law

Nancy Belcher was the designated health care surrogate of decedent Beulah Wyatt. Belcher signed an arbitration agreement that was presented to her when she sought to admit Wyatt to the McDowell Nursing and Rehabilitation Center (McDowell Nursing). Wyatt died after living ten months in the nursing home. Lelia Baker subsequently filed a wrongful death suit against McDowell Nursing alleging that its negligent care of Wyatt caused and/or contributed to her death. McDowell Nursing filed a motion to dismiss and to enforce the arbitration agreement. The circuit court denied the motion and concluded that the agreement was unenforceable because Belcher did not have the authority to waive Wyatt's right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court denied McDowell Nursing's subsequent request for a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order, holding that Belcher, as a health care surrogate, did not have the authority to enter the arbitration agreement because it was not a health care decision and was not required for Wyatt's receipt of nursing home services from McDowell Nursing. View "State ex rel. AMFM, LLC v. Circuit Court (King)" on Justia Law

In 2004, the Berkeley County Water District and Sewer District filed requests with the Public Service Commission (PSC) to charge capacity improvement fees (CIFs) due to rapid population growth in the county. The PSC approved the requested CIFs. Petitioners subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court, seeking relief from paying the CIFs. The circuit court found that the PSC lacked jurisdiction to establish the CIFs. However, the Supreme Court found Petitioners had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before the PSC and reversed. Subsequently, the PSC discontinued the CIFs, finding that the Sewer District and Water District no longer satisfied the criteria for charging the CIFs. Thereafter, the PSC granted Petitioners' motion to deny the Water and Sewer Districts' petitions for reconsideration. Petitioners appealed to challenge errors they alleged were contained in the PSC's final order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioners were judicially estopped from challenging the errors. View "Larry V. Faircloth Realty, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner claimed to be Child's psychological parent. Child's biological mother had virtually no contact with Child. When Child's biological, custodial father (Respondent) pleaded guilty to several crimes, Petitioner filed a motion to intervene in an existing family court action and sought either shared parenting with Respondent or guardianship of Child if Father was sentenced to prison. Father petitioned the circuit court for a writ of prohibition, claiming that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider a motion for shared parenting or guardianship. The circuit court granted the writ, thus halting the family court's consideration of Petitioner's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the family court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's motion, and therefore, the circuit court erred in issuing its order granting a writ of prohibition. View "Brooke B. v. Ray C." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a car owner and the purchaser of that car, filed suit against Advance Stores, which supplied a car battery to the original owner. The battery died shortly after the second owner purchased the car, and Advance Stores refused to provide a free replacement under the limited warranty. After the Supreme Court answered a certified question and remanded the case, the trial court allowed Plaintiffs to amend the complaint to add an additional cause of action for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Act). Advance Stores moved to dismiss the third amended complaint. The trial court denied the motion in part and allowed the third amended complaint to go forward on new theories. Thereafter, Advance Stores filed this petition for a writ of prohibition, asserting that the circuit court ignored the mandate of the Supreme Court in McMahon I. The Supreme Court granted the writ and directed the circuit court to grant in full Advance Stores' motion to dismiss the third amended complaint, holding that in failing to present a claim under the Act in McMahon I, Plaintiffs were precluded from amending their complaint to assert the claim under the limited remand. View "State ex rel. Advance Stores Co. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law