Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Terri Cole and her husband financed the purchase of a home through a loan secured by a deed of trust on the home and the underlying property. In 2005, Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. became the servicer of the loan. Code defaulted on her loan in 2010. Vanderbilt foreclosed and purchased the home and real property at a trustee's sale. Thereafter, Cole refused to vacate the home. Vanderbilt filed an unlawful detainer action. Cole counterclaimed, alleging that Vanderbilt had violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA). Regarding the unlawful detainer claim, the circuit court found in favor of Vanderbilt. As to the remaining issues, the jury found Vanderbilt engaged in several violations of the WVCCPA. The circuit court subsequently awarded civil penalties to Cole totaling $32,125, and, some weeks later, granted Cole's motion for attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's civil penalties order and award of attorney fees, holding that the circuit court did not commit error with regard to either the civil penalties order or the attorney fees order. View "Vanderbilt Mortgage & Fin., Inc. v. Cole" on Justia Law

Respondents were former employees of Verizon West Virginia, Inc. who filed wrongful termination claims against Verizon based upon alleged violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act. Petitioners were Verizon and various of its managerial and similar-positioned employees (collectively, Verizon) who were named as defendants in the underlying wrongful termination proceedings. At issue before the Supreme Court was Verizon's contention that Respondents' counsel's (Law Firm) prior representation of other former employees of Verizon in substantially related matters that were settled and dismissed required Law Firm to be disqualified. The circuit court permitted Law Firm to continue its representation of Respondents. Verizon subsequently requested the issuance of a writ of prohibition disqualifying Law Firm. The Supreme Court denied the writ, finding that Verizon was not entitled to prohibitory relief because (1) Law Firm's successive representation of its former and current clients did not constitute a conflict under the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct; and (2) moreover, the relief requested by Verizon would impermissibly restrict Law Firm's right to practice law in contravention of the Rules of Professional Conduct. View "State ex rel. Verizon West Virginia, Inc. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Employee resigned from her employment with Employer after Employee failed to accommodate Employee's responsibilities regarding daycare for her children. Employee filed for unemployment compensation benefits. An ALJ found Employee was eligible for benefits. The Board of Review of Workforce West Virginia reversed the award of benefits, finding that Employee's departure was not for good cause involving fault on the part of Employer. The circuit court reversed, concluding that Employee was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits because Employee had terminated her employment for good cause involving fault on the part of Employer. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the decision of the Board of Review, holding that Employee terminated her employment voluntarily without good cause involving fault on the part of Employer. View "Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Epling" on Justia Law

Decedent executed a will in which all of his possessions to his wife. Decedent and his wife (Ex-Wife) divorced a few months later. One year later, Decedent died. Ex-Wife later sold the real property devised to her in Decedent's will to Petitioners. Thereafter, Decedent's mother (Respondent) filed an objection to final settlement, contending that Decedent's divorce from Ex-Wife after the execution of his will and prior to his death automatically revoked any disposition to Ex-Wife. The county commission ordered that Decedent's estate should pass to his heirs at law as if he had no will and found that Respondent was the sole heir to Decedent's estate. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition to quiet title to real estate and claim for unjust enrichment against Decedent's estate. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that Ex-Wife did not possess title to convey to Petitioners and that title to the subject real property should be quieted in Respondent's favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Respondent was not time-barred from claiming title to the subject property; and (2) the circuit court did not err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of Respondent. View "Johnson v. Kirby" on Justia Law

The underlying litigation in this case involved the Legislature's enactment of "Special Acts" for nine county boards of education requiring them to divert a portion of their regular levy receipts in support of their local libraries. The Kanawha County Board of Education (BOE) originally brought suit in circuit court, alleging that one such Act's requirement that the BOE contribute to the funding of the Kanawha County Public Library violated equal protection. The Supreme Court agreed and found the statute unconstitutional. In response, the Legislature amended the statute. The County BOE then filed the instant action, arguing that the statute as amended violated equal protection. The circuit court invalidated as unconstitutional the Special Act to the extent it required the BOE to divert a portion of its regular levy receipts in support of the Library or transfer the funding obligation to its excess levy, and enjoined the Library and the West Virginia BOE from enforcing the Special Act as it pertained to the County BOE's library funding obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act, to the extent it obligated the County BOE to divert a portion of its regular or excess levy receipts to the Library, was unconstitutional and unenforceable. View "Kanawha County Pub. Library Bd. v. Bd. of Educ. of County of Kanawha" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust and third degree sexual assault. Due to Petitioner's health concerns, the trial court permitted Petitioner to serve his sentences by the alternate means of electronically-monitored home incarceration. Petitioner subsequently sought habeas corpus relief for sentencing and post-sentencing matters. The trial court modified the terms of Petitioner's home incarceration to afford Petitioner, among other things, one hour per day of recreational time outside the physical confines of his house and to permit travel outside the state for necessary medical appointments. Petitioner appealed, seeking immediate release from any further incarceration in light of his continuing deterioration due to Parkinson's disease. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no basis for habeas corpus relief or for further modification of the terms of Petitioner's sentencing. View "Elder v. Scolapia" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of ten counts of sexual abuse by a guardian. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The circuit found that Defendant's indictment conflicted with constitutional due process requirements by failing to apprise Defendant of the charges against him for purposes of preparing a defense and that the indictment exposed Defendant to double jeopardy based on the possibility that the same evidence would be used to convict him on multiple, identical counts. The circuit court ordered that Defendant's conviction and sentence on nine of the ten counts be vacated and set aside. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was not denied due process because he was provided with adequate notice of the charges against him; and (2) Defendant was not convicted in violation of double jeopardy principles. View "Ballard v. Dilworth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit the felony offense of robbery in the first degree. Defendant appealed, contending that the circuit court committed reversible error by refusing to give the jury an instruction for misdemeanor assault and/or an instruction for battery as a lesser included offense to the charge of robbery in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not commit error in refusing to give Defendant's requested instructions for assault and battery, as misdemeanor assault and battery are not lesser included offenses of first degree robbery. View "State v. Wilkerson" on Justia Law

In 2002, the circuit court entered an order finding Defendant not guilty of first degree arson by reason of mental illness. The court ordered Defendant to be committed to a mental health facility in West Virginia. The placement failed effectively to treat Defendant's mental illness, as did Defendant's placement in another West Virginia psychiatric hospital. The circuit court subsequently transferred Defendant to a South Carolina psychiatric hospital, determining that the placement was the best available treatment option for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the order transferring Defendant to South Carolina did not violate the clause "no person shall be transported out of, or forced to leave the State for any offense committed within the same" contained in the West Virginia Constitution; (2) the circuit court did not err in concluding that Defendant's placement in the South Carolina facility was consistent with the statutory directive requiring Defendant to be placed in the "least restrictive environment" to manage his mental illness; and (3) the transfer was not in violation of the Interstate Compact on the Mentally Disordered. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Defendant was convicted of robbery in the second degree and attempted robbery in the second degree. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for robbery in the second degree. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of Defendant's prior convictions for crimes committed in 2000 and in admitting evidence that Defendant was on parole when the instant crimes occurred, as (1) Defendant did not open the door for the introduction of the evidence; (2) the State failed to offer any relevant contention to refute the trial court's pretrial determination that Defendant's prior convictions were not admissible under W.Va. R. Evid. 404(b); (3) the State failed to prove that Defendant's prior convictions for wanton endangerment in 2000 were intrinsic to the charges of robbery and attempted robbery in 2009; (4) the marginal value of evidence of Defendant's parole status was far outweighed by its prejudicial impact; and (5) the improperly admitted evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Baker" on Justia Law