Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked Respondent's driver's license for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The circuit court reversed the DMV's order, reasoning that (1) the DMV failed to prove Respondent's alcohol content at the actual time of driving the vehicle; (2) the DMV did not comply with Muscatell v. Cline, which requires a hearing officer to address credibility issues in a reasoned manner; and (3) the failure of the investigating officer to appear at the license revocation hearing required the dismissal of the case against Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the breath test was administered within two hours of Respondent's arrest, the evidence resulting therefrom was admissible as prima facie evidence that Respondent was under the influence of alcohol while driving; (2) Muscatell's requirement in this case was adequately satisfied by the hearing examiner; and (3) the circuit court improperly relied on an outdated rule in finding that dismissal of the case was required where the arresting officer was not present at the hearing. Remanded for reinstatement of the DMV order revoking Respondent's driver's license. View "Dale v. Veltri " on Justia Law

Hospital sought full tax refunds in relation to Hospital's attempt to reclassify certain services from either "inpatient" or "outpatient" hospital services to "physicians' services" for purposes of the West Virginia Health Care Provider Tax Act. The Office of Tax Appeals denied Hospital's request, and the circuit court affirmed. In seeking to reclassify items of overhead as "physicians' services," Hospital focused on its use of certain billing codes that were required by federal law. The Tax Commission argued that Hospital's reliance on these billing codes to identify what qualifies as "physicians' services" under the Act was misplaced. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the overhead items at issue did not qualify as "physicians' services" under the Act. View "Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v. Lorensen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff (HOA) was a condominium owners' association that brought suit on its own behalf and on behalf of its members against various individuals and corporations seeking damages arising from the alleged defective development, negligent construction, and misleading marketing of a condominium complex. The complex consisted of dozens of units owned by members of the HOA. The circuit court granted Respondents' motion to join all unit owners, denied the HOA's motion for a protective order, and certified six questions to the Supreme Court. The Court answered only one of the questions, finding it unnecessary to address the remaining questions, holding (1) a unit owners' association is an adequate representative when a lawsuit is instituted by a unit owners' association on behalf of two or more unit owners pursuant to the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act and the damages sought include unit specific damages affecting only individual units; and (2) this case should proceed in accordance with W. Va. Trial Court R. 26. View "Univ. Commons Riverside Home Owners Ass'n v. Univ. Commons Morgantown, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondents graduated from College's legal assisting program with associate degrees. Respondents filed a complaint against College, alleging that College induced Respondents to enroll in College's legal assisting program by verbally guaranteeing legal assistant jobs to Respondents after graduation. The jury found College engaged in both unconscionable and fraudulent inducement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting relief to Respondents and denying College's motion for judgment as a matter of law, where (1) the circuit court erred in finding College violated the state Consumer Credit and Protection Act, and accordingly, Respondents did not have cognizable causes of action for unconscionability and inducement by unconscionable conduct pursuant to W. Va. Code 46A-2-121; (2) the circuit court erred in ruling that the agreement between the parties was unconscionable under the common law of contracts based on a lack of consideration; and (3) because the circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law on Respondents' fraudulent inducement claim on the basis that it was time-barred, Respondents did not have an equitable claim for fraudulent inducement, and therefore, the circuit court erred to the extent that it granted equitable relief to Respondents on the basis of fraudulent inducement. View "Mountain State Coll. v. Holsinger" on Justia Law

The family court granted Husband and Wife a divorce. The court awarded wife spousal support of $500 a month for thirty-six months; ruled that Husband must pay wife $80,390 in equitable distribution; provided an "in-kind" debt payment plan wherein Wife was to reimburse Husband one-half of any debt payments made to Husband's mother in connection with a loan; and awarded Wife attorney fees. The circuit court reversed, concluding (1) Wife was not entitled to spousal support and the amount in child support already paid by Husband should be deducted from the equitable distribution payment; (2) the family court erred in awarding attorney fees to Wife; and (3) Wife's repayment of her half of the loan should be deducted from Husband's payment of $80,390 to Wife. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions that the order of the family court be reinstated, holding (1) the family court arrived at a fair and equitable grant of spousal support; (2) the family court was within its discretion in ordering the in-kind repayment of the loan and in ordering Husband to pay $80,390 to Petitioner in equitable distribution; and (3) the family court did not err in awarding attorney fees to Wife. View "Cochran v. Cochran" on Justia Law

William Watkins became a family court judge in 2002. In 2011, Judge Watkins became the subject of numerous complaints filed with the Judicial Investigation Commission. The Hearing Board concluded that Judge Watkins had committed twenty-four separate violations of nine separate canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Watkins conceded that he was repeatedly intemperate with litigants, showed disrespect for authority, and was unable to properly manage his office and staff. The Board recommended that the Supreme Court censure Judge Watkins on each of his violations; suspend Watkins, without pay, until his present term of office ended in four years; and require Judge Watkins to pay the costs associated with the investigation and prosecution of these proceedings. The Supreme Court adopted the Board's recommended sanctions, holding (1) the Court had the constitutional authority to impose such a lengthy suspension; and (2) the sanctions were appropriate in this case. View "In re Judge Watkins" on Justia Law

The circuit court found Frieda, Cordelia's elderly mother, to be a protected person. After determining that Cordelia was exploiting Frieda, neglecting her needs, and mishandling her finances, the court directed Cordelia to turn over to Frieda's conservator a full accounting of what she had done with Frieda's assets. Cordelia failed to comply with the order. The mental hygiene commissioner subsequently found Cordelia to be in contempt for failing to account for the disposition of assets belonging to her mother. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's finding that Cordelia was in contempt; (2) affirmed that portion of the $50 per diem contempt sanction that applied prospectively from the actual date of the entry of the order of contempt; but (3) reversed that portion of the sanction that was retroactive, and reversed the sanction insofar as it purported to be for "compensation or damages." View "In re Frieda Q." on Justia Law

This case involved Hunter, who was seventeen months old at the time an abuse and neglect petition was filed. Both of Hunter's biological parents had their parental rights terminated. Hunter was placed with foster parents, and Hunter's grandmother (Grandmother) was allowed to have visits with Hunter twice a month. Grandmother later petitioned the circuit court for additional contact with Hunter. The circuit court granted the petition in an order that was entered in the middle of the foster parents' six-month adoption waiting period. After entry of the order, the issue arose as to whether a grandmother can continue to receive visitation after a child has been adopted by a non-relative. The circuit court submitted the certified question to the Supreme Court, which answered the question in the negative, holding that the Grandparent Visitation Act does not provide for continued grandparent visitation after a child is adopted by a non-relative. The Court then vacated the circuit court's order granting visitation to Grandmother. View "In re Hunter H." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of simple battery as a lesser included offense of malicious assault. The circuit court resentenced Defendant to one year incarceration. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting his medical records into evidence during his trial. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) it was error for the trial court to allow the prosecutor to introduce evidence of Defendant's medical records, as the prosecutor could not support issuance of a subpoena duces tecum under W. Va. R. Crim. P. 71, and W. Va. Code 57-5-4 could not be relied upon as authority for issuance of the subpoena; but (2) this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. McGill" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a registered professional nurse, was terminated from her employment when her employer concluded that Petitioner had unlawfully obtained prescription narcotics for personal use or distribution to others. In 2008, Petitioner's employer filed a complaint against Petitioner in that regard with the Board of Examiners for Registered Professional Nurses. Petitioner was subsequently hired at another medical center, and her employment was terminated. In 2009, Petitioner's second employer filed a complaint with the Board, suggesting that Petitioner had unlawfully obtained prescription narcotics for personal use or distribution to others. In 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of prohibition asking the Supreme Court to direct the Board to dismiss the 2008 and 2009 complaints, alleging that the Board's continuances of the administrative hearings scheduled to resolve the two complaints were contrary to law, had deprived Petitioner of substantial resources, and had improperly delayed the entry of a final administrative decision. The Supreme Court granted the writ and dismissed the two complaints, holding that the Board effectively denied Petitioner an opportunity to be heard in opposition to the allegations against her. View "State ex rel. Fillinger v. Rhodes" on Justia Law