Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought an action for unlawful detainer against Defendant. The circuit court granted relief and ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendant $50,000 for the cost of a log cabin that Defendant was required to vacate. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by determining that she would be unjustly enriched if she did not reimburse Defendant for the cost of the log cabin. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in granting relief for unlawful detainer; but (2) because the pleadings suggested that Defendant incurred costs greater than $50,000 in the erection and maintenance of the log cabin, the circuit court’s order valuing the log cabin home at $50,000 must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings to determine the correct amount Defendant is entitled to recover from Plaintiff. View "Ward v. Ward" on Justia Law

Billy Hoosier, Jr. mistakenly placed a modular home on a parcel of land owned by Heartwood Forestland Fund IV, LP. Heartwood filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief to inform its ownership of the tract of land at issue and an ejectment order for the removal of Hoosier’s modular home. The circuit court entered an order directing that Hoosier receive title to the portion of Heartwood’s parcel encroached upon and that Heartwood receive from Hoosier the fair market value thereof, less Hoosier’s improvements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Hoosier’s modular home must be removed from Heartwood’s property and relocated at Hoosier’s expense, as that Hoosier’s modular home was not an improvement or benefit to Heartwood’s tract, and Hoosier’s failures concerning procedural matters precluded him from any relief. Therefore, Hoosier was entitled to neither a conveyance of title from Heartwood nor compensation for alleged improvements to Heartwood’s property. View "Heartwood Forestland Fund IV, LP v. Hoosier" on Justia Law

Petitioner was the owner of a parcel of land within a larger tract of land owned by Respondent. When Petitioner was conveyed the land, the deed contained a restrictive covenant stating that Petitioner “shall install no septic or sewage system of any kind, no septic tank or leach bed on the real estate herein conveyed.” Relations between Petitioner and Respondent deteriorated, and Petitioner filed a complaint alleging that Respondent was interfering with his use of the right-of-way. Respondent counterclaimed that Petitioner had installed a septic or sewage system on his property in violation of the covenants in his deed. The circuit court ruled against Petitioner on the septic system issue, concluding that the restrictive covenant in Petitioner’s deed was perpetual, rather than personal, thereby running with the land. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) abused its discretion in concluding that the restrictive covenant in Petitioner’s deed was enforceable; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in determining the width and use of a right-of-way across Respondent’s land. View "Cottle v. Davis" on Justia Law

The West Virginia Department of Transportation (DOH) filed a condemnation action against Western Pocahontas and Beacon Resources, Inc. seeking to take approximately thirty acres owned by Western Pocahontas and leased to Beacon to construct a portion of a highway. The circuit court granted DOH the right to take possession of the land. Beacon objected to the DOH’s valuation of the coal underlying the thirty acres of land taken. During trial, the owner of Beacon gave his opinion of the fair market value for Beacon’s lease based solely upon his opinion of the future profits of his business. The jury returned a verdict awarding Western Pocahontas and Beacon $24 million as just compensation for the mineral interest acquired by the DOH and for damages to the residue. The DOH appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to disregard lost business profits earned by Beacon when calculating just compensation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the DOH was entitled to an instruction that the jury was not to consider evidence of Beacon’s lost business profits when assessing just compensation. Remanded for a new trial. View "W. Va. Dep’t of Transp. v. W. Pocahontas Props., LP" on Justia Law

Respondent owned the mineral rights to a certain parcel of land. When the Division of Highways (DOH) began construction of a highway through the land owned by the surface owner, the DOH excavated approximately 237,187 tons of limestone from the property. Respondent filed a mandamus action against DOH seeking to force DOH to institute a condemnation proceeding for the limestone removed from her mineral reservation in the land. The DOH filed this condemnation action, and the condemnation commission returned a verdict favorable to DOH. Respondent subsequently demanded a jury trial. Based on the jury’s findings, the trial court awarded Respondent $941,304. DOH appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "W. Va. Dep’t of Transp. v. Newton" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a dispute between a homeowners association that was a West Virginia Limited Expense Planned Community (“Association”), and homeowners who failed to pay their association assessments (“Homeowners”). The instant conflict revolved around the Association’s ability to place a lien on the real property of homeowners whose dues were delinquent. The Association filed separate complaints against the Homeowners, who responded by filing separate answers and counterclaims asserting violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act (WVCCPA). The circuit court consolidated the cases and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Association as to all of the Homeowners’ counterclaims, concluding (1) the Association had valid common law liens against the Homeowners’ real property; and (2) a homeowner associations’ attempts to collect assessments are not subject to the WVCCPA. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) an association is statutorily authorized to assert a consensual common law lien against real property; and (2) the unfair debt collection provisions of the WVCCPA do apply to a homeowner association’s attempts to collect delinquent assessments. View "Fleet v. Webber Springs Owners Ass’n" on Justia Law

Mark and Tammy Davis owned property that secured a credit line deed of trust held by Huntington National Bank. The Davises failed to pay their 2005 and 2006 real property taxes, resulting in a notice of delinquency being published. The Davises subsequently filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. A second notice of delinquency was then published announcing that the tax lien would be sold. A notice of the tax lien sale was mailed to the Davises but was returned undeliverable. The Davises received a discharge in bankruptcy, after which the tax lien was sold. No party redeemed the property, and the tax deed was issued to Rebuild America, Inc. The Davises then filed this action seeking to set aside the tax sale. The circuit court granted relief, finding that the issuance of the two statutory notices of delinquency while the Davises were under the protection of a bankruptcy stay voided the tax deed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy stay rendered the statutory notices void ab initio, and therefore, the tax lien sale did not comply with the required statutory procedure. Accordingly, the tax deed issued in this matter must be set aside. View "Rebuild America v. Davis" on Justia Law

Respondent filed a complaint against Petitioners alleging that Petitioners placed certain impediments and obstructions within a twenty-foot right-of-way that existed over a paved roadway that provided deeded access to Respondent’s property. Respondent sought a permanent injunction against the placement of impediments in the right-of-way. The circuit court permanently enjoined Petitioners from placing any impediments or obstructions within the right-of-way. The court also concluded that Respondent had a prescriptive easement for the location of his water line through Petitioner’s property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting injunctive relief to Respondent prohibiting Petitioner from placing obstructions in Respondent’s easement and concluded that the current location of Respondent’s water line was an appurtenant prescriptive easement through Petitioners’ property. View "Weatherholt v. Weatherholt" on Justia Law

Certain trustees registered trust deed assignments securing the payment of a promissory note for the purchase of residential real estate with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) rather than recording the trust deed assignments in county record books. Wyoming County and all other similarly situated West Virginia Counties (“Wyoming County”) filed a putative class action against the trustees, alleging that the recording of trust deed assignments in county record books is required by law. The circuit court denied the trustees’ motion to dismiss, ruling that trust deed assignments are required to be publicly recorded and that Wyoming County was entitled to show that the trustees had been unjustly enriched by using MERS to record the assignments. The trustees challenged that ruling in this original proceeding in prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in denying the trustees’ motion to dismiss, as West Virginia law does not require that the assignment of a trust deed must be recorded in the office of the clerk of the county commission. View "State ex rel. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Hon. Warren R. McGraw" on Justia Law

The underlying case involved oil and gas wells owned and operated by four separate partnerships. The partnerships owned mineral interests in the form of leases to extract oil and gas from real estate. The partners themselves, however, owned no part of the mineral interests. Plaintiff alleged that he owned an interest in the partnerships. A federal district court determined that Plaintiff’s assertion of an interest in the four “mining partnerships” failed because he could not produce a written instrument in conformance with the Statute of Frauds showing his ownership interest in the partnerships. Plaintiff appealed. Because of the vagaries of West Virginia law on this issue, the U.S. Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Supreme Court. The Court answered that (1) the Statute of Frauds requires the partners of a “mining partnership” to show their membership through a deed, will, or other written instrument establishing they are co-owners of the mineral interest being mined; but (2) because the real property of a general partnership belongs to the partnership entity and not to the individual partners, no written instrument is required to establish a partnership interest in a general partnership. View "Valentine v. Sugar Rock, Inc." on Justia Law