Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition sought by Southland Properties LLC against the circuit court for denying Southland’s alleged right to intervene in an action instituted under W. Va. Code 11A-3-60 (section 60 proceedings) by Kenneth Jones. Jones sought to compel the Deputy Commissioner of Delinquent and Nonentered Lands of Marion County to deliver deeds to two tracts of land Jones purchased at a tax sale. The Deputy Commissioner declined to issue the deeds to Jones because the statutory timeframe for issuance of the deeds following the tax sale had passed. Southland, which owned the properties at issue and failed to pay property taxes for several years, moved to intervene in the section 60 proceeding on the grounds that it was an indispensable party. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Southland’s motion to intervene, holding that Southland was not an indispensable party to the section 60 proceedings because Southland made no attempt to redeem and its ownership interest as a delinquent taxpayer was predicated on redemption. View "State ex rel. Southland Properties, LLC v. Honorable David R. Janes" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals requiring the Supreme Court to interpret various provisions of the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Rule (WVSCMRR), W.Va. CSR 38-2-1, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) did not err in finding that the WVSCMRR does not require a coal company, in its application for modification of its mining permit, to demonstrate compliance with the Utility Protection Standard found at W.Va. 38-2-14.17; (2) did not err in ruling that the permit application sufficiently described how the coal operator would comply with the Utility Protection Standard; but (3) erred in finding that the WVSCMRR applied regardless of a coal operator’s common law property rights. View "Texas Eastern Transmission v. W. Va. Department of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

At issue was the admissibility of expert testimony valuing wetland property for the purpose of just compensation in a condemnation proceeding where the highest and best use of the wetlands was determined to be the development of a wetlands mitigation bank. The Supreme Court held (1) the highest and best use of the wetland property as a mitigation bank may be considered in a condemnation proceeding to the extent that such a factor would be weighed in negotiations between private persons participating in a voluntary sale and purchase of the land at the time it was taken; (2) however, the market price of mitigation credits that ultimately may be produced from the property cannot be the sole basis for measuring the land’s value in determining just compensation; and (3) because the expert testimony at issue in this case provided a value that was based solely upon the market price of mitigation credits that could be developed from the land, as opposed to the fair market value of the land itself in a voluntary transaction between a knowledgeable buyer and seller, the circuit court erred in admitting that testimony. The court remanded the case for a new trial. View "W. Va. Department of Transportation, Division of Highways v. CDS Family Trust, LLC" on Justia Law

The 1977 deed at issue in this case was ambiguous and of such doubtful meaning that reasonable minds disagreed as to the deed’s intent, and therefore, the circuit court erred in finding the deed was clear and in finding that the grantors did not convey one-half interest in oil and gas beneath a tract of land in Marshall County to the grantee.In 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants asserting that, in the 1977 deed, Plaintiffs retained ownership of the one-half undivided interest in the oil and gas and, therefore, Defendants trespassed on their oil and gas interest and engaged in conversion. Plaintiffs then amended the complaint to request a declaratory judgment interpreting the 1977 deed. The circuit court determined that the deed was clear and unambiguous and declared that Plaintiffs kept for themselves the one-half interest in the oil and gas. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that the 1977 deed was unambiguous and in granting a declaratory judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. View "Gastar Exploration Inc. v. Rine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the final order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to the sheriff and treasurer of Barbour County and the assessor of Barbour County (collectively, Respondents) and finding that Petitioners were liable for payment of certain property taxes for the years 2011 and 2012. Petitioners had purchased a tax lien on certain mineral interests from the Deputy Commission of Delinquent and Nonentered Lands of Barbour County on September 19, 2011 and secured a deed to the property on January 23, 2012. On appeal, Petitioners argued that they were not liable for the 2011 and 2012 property taxes because they were not owners in possession of the property during those years. Respondents argued that Petitioners were liable for the taxes at issue because their deed specified that they acquired title in 2004. The Supreme Court held that because W. Va. Code 11A-3-62 relates the tax lien purchaser’s title back to the year of the assessment for the property taxes that became delinquent, the circuit court did not err in determining that Petitioners were liable for the 2011 and 2012 property taxes. View "Ancient Energy, Ltd. v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Sue Walters filed a lawsuit against Quicken Loans, Inc., alleging that Quicken Loans violated the “illegal loan” provision of the West Virginia Residential Mortgage Lender, Broker and Servicer Act, W. Va. Code 31-17-8(m)(8), in originating a primary mortgage loan for her. A jury found in favor of Walters and awarded her damages in the amount of $27,000. Walters sued additional defendants - an appraiser and the entity that serviced the loan - with whom she settled. In total, the court offset $59,500 of the $98,000 paid by the settling defendants against the total damages, costs and fees awarded against Quicken Loans. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in allowing the illegal loan claim to go to the jury, as section 31-17-8(m)(8) applies to a single primary mortgage loan; (2) did not err in ruling that Walters was a prevailing party and thus entitled to an award of fees and costs; (3) erred in offsetting only a portion of the settlement monies received from the settling defendants against the total compensatory damages received by Walters. View "Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Walters" on Justia Law

Where a lessee designates tracts of land for pooling regarding horizontal drilling and production of oil and gas from the Marcellus Shale Formation, which includes nonparticipating royalty interests (NPRI), consent or ratification by the holders of the nonparticipating royalty interests is not required where the holders of the NPRIs have conveyed the oil and gas in place and the executive leasing rights thereto to the lessor.At issue was a voluntary pooling and unionization lease provision regarding horizontal drilling and production of oil and gas from the Marcellus Shale Formation. PPG Industries, Inc., the lessor, and Gastar Exploration USA, Inc., the lessee, signed a lease under which 700 acres were designated by Gastar as the Wayne/Lily Unit for purposes of pooling the oil and gas interests held by various individuals and entities. PPG and Gastar challenged the circuit court’s entry of partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, who collectively held a nonparticipating royalty interest in the oil and gas underlying a parcel included within the Wayne/Lily Unit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that the validity of the pooling provision in the PPG-Gastar lease and the designated Wayne/Lily Unit were void until such time as pooling was consented to and ratified by Plaintiffs. View "Gastar Exploration Inc. v. Contraguerro" on Justia Law

Leslie Meadows filed a complaint against William Erps claiming that Erps owed he money from several real estate projects that she shared with him. For purposes of appeal, Meadows’s claims involved two of those transactions with Erps: (1) claims related to the purchase of, improvements to, and sale of the Sutphin property; and (2) claims related to the financing for the Twiford apartments. The circuit court awarded judgment to Meadows in the amount of $18,675 with respect to the Sutphin property and $67,000 for the Twiford apartments, for a total sum of $85,675. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court’s award of judgment of $18,675 to Meadows as an abuse of discretion; and (2) the circuit court’s award of $67,000 was an abuse of discretion, and the circuit court’s award of judgment on the Twiford apartments is hereby reduced to $30,000. Remanded with directions to vacate the judgment for Meadows on the Sutphin property and to enter judgment for Meadows on the Twiford apartments in the amount of $30,000. View "Erps v. Meadows" on Justia Law

Respondent filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to force the West Virginia Department of Highways, Division of Highways (DOH) to institute a condemnation proceeding for limestone it excavated from a certain parcel of land during its construction of a portion of the Corridor H highway. The mandamus proceeding was resolved through an agreed order whereby the DOH was required to institute a condemnation proceeding against Respondent’s mineral interest in the property. After a jury trial, the circuit court awarded Respondent $941,304.53 as just compensation for the removal of the limestone from the property. The circuit court subsequently determined that Respondent was entitled to attorney’s fees and expenses for both the mandamus proceeding and condemnation proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) an award of attorney’s fees and expenses was warranted in this case; but (2) the final order was devoid of factual findings regarding the reasonableness of the amount of the attorneys fees and expenses awarded. Remanded for an additional hearing on that issue. View "West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways v. Newton" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the proposed expansion of municipal geographic boundaries by minor boundary adjustment by the City of Summersville, West Virginia, as approved by the Nicholas County Commission. Petitioners brought this action against the County Nicholas Commission and its members (collectively, Respondents), alleging that certain statutory requirements governing annexation were not met during the approval process, the annexation was not in the best interests of Nicholas County, the annexation amounted to a public nuisance, and that the annexation resulted in an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation. The circuit court granted the County Commission’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment in part, concluding that the County Commission complied with the statutory requirements in entering the order on boundary adjustment, which authorized the City’s annexation of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in affirming the County Commission’s determination to approve the City’s petition for an annexation by minor boundary adjustment. View "Coffman v. Nicholas County Commission" on Justia Law