Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants defaulted on their obligation to Plaintiff, who had loaned them $200,000 secured by a first deed of trust on real property they owned. Plaintiff subsequently purchased the subject property at a trustee’s sale and then filed the instant lawsuit seeking a deficiency judgment for the unpaid balance of Defendants’ promissory note. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and awarded Plaintiff post-judgment interest on this award. Defendants appealed, arguing that the deficiency judgment was too high and should have been adjusted to reflect the fair market value of their property when it was sold at the trust deed sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a trust deed grantor may assert, as a defense in a lawsuit seeking a deficiency judgment, that the property was sold for less than its fair market value at the trust deed foreclosure sale. Remanded. View "Sostaric v. Marshall" on Justia Law

Respondent obtained a home mortgage loan from Lender. Lender obtained a mortgage lender bond from Petitioner and later filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the United States Code. Respondent subsequently filed a complaint naming Petitioner as defendant solely as surety for Lender. At the time this suit was filed, Lender was bankrupt and judgment proof. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the bond conditions had not been satisfied because Respondent had not obtained a judgment against the bond principal, Lender. The circuit court certified a question of law to the Supreme Court, which answered that the bond at issue was a judgment bond and that the unambiguous bond language requires an aggrieved party to obtain a judgment against the principal before maintaining an action against the surety of the bond. View "Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. James" on Justia Law

While owning a one-fifth interest in two tracts of land in Wyoming County, George P. Cook appointed his son, Gene, as his power of attorney. Subsequently, Gene, acting under the power of attorney, conveyed to himself George’s undivided one-fifth interest in the two tracts of land. George subsequently died. Approximately one decade later, Gene, as the ostensible owner of the undivided one-fifth interest in the two tracts, along with the owners of the other four-fifths interest, leased the property to Toney’s Fork Land, LLC for mining activities. Thereafter, Gene field a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment quieting his title to the undivided one-fifth interest in the two tracts. George’s daughters, Elizabeth and Katherine, counterclaimed, alleging that their father’s estate was the owner of the two tracts and that Gene had no authority to enter into the lease with Toney’s Fork. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Gene, concluding that the power of attorney was authentic and that the deeds executed by Gene were valid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the authenticity of the power of attorney, which brought into dispute the validity of the deeds. View "Chichester v. Cook" on Justia Law

In 1982, Hospital and Doctor entered into a “Memorandum Agreement” in which Hospital agreed to deed certain real property to Doctor. The Memorandum Agreement contained a provision entitled “Option to Repurchase.” In 2012, Hospital filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Doctor asking the circuit court to declare that the Option to Repurchase was an option contract rather than a right of first refusal. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Hospital, finding that the Option to Repurchase agreement was a “valid” option contract. Doctor appealed, arguing that the validity of the option contract was not an issue before the circuit court, and therefore, the summary judgment order should be reversed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the ruling contained in the circuit court’s summary judgment order that the option contract was a “valid” option contract, as Hospital’s complaint for declaratory judgment did not seek a determination of the validity of the option contract; and (2) affirmed the order’s ruling that the Option to Repurchase agreement was an option contract. View "Black v. St. Joseph's Hosp. of Buckhannon, Inc." on Justia Law

After Patricia Kelch, a resident of the Town of Shepherdstown, constructed a fence around the perimeter of her property, Kelch filed an application for a building permit with the Shepherdstown Planning Commission, seeking to make the fence a permanent fixture. The Planning Commission denied the application. On appeal, the Board of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Shepherdstown (“BZA”) granted a variance with regard to the fencing material and ordered Kelch to lower the fence height, finding that Kelch met all the requirements for the granting of a variance. Borys Tkacz, an adjoining property owner of Kelch, appealed the BZA’s decision. The circuit court vacated the decision of the BZA and awarded Tkacz attorney’s fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in concluding that the BZA had no jurisdiction over the matter; (2) erred in finding that the BZA applied an erroneous principle of law; and (3) improperly substituted its judgment for that of the BZA. View "Bd. of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Shepherdstown v. Tkacz" on Justia Law

EB Dorev Holdings, Inc. purchased tax liens on certain properties from Kanawha County. The West Virginia Department of Administration, Real Estate Division (WVDOA) later filed a complaint against EB Dorev and Kanawha county seeking to prevent the issuances of the tax deeds to EB Dorev. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the WVDOA and voided the sale of the tax liens. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in ruling that the properties were entered exempt from 2009 real estate taxes upon the WVDOA’s purchase of the properties from private entities in August and September of 2008; but (2) the circuit court’s alternative finding that the tax liens at issue were extinguished through the doctrine of merger was not in error. View "EB Dorev Holdings v. W. Va. Dep’t of Admin., Real Estate Div." on Justia Law

The Catalanos purchased a parcel of real estate and recorded the deed. Later, the Catalanos sold the property to Raymond Smith, but the deed was never recorded. At the time of the conveyance, the Catalanos’ real property taxes were delinquent. The county sheriff subsequently sold the tax lien, in the name of the Catalanos, to Sunrise Atlantic LLC. Thereafter, by tax deed, the county clerk conveyed the property to Sunrise. The deed was recorded. Sunrise conveyed the property to Harpagon MO, LLC, which conveyed the property to Don Mason. The Masons recorded the deed. Thereafter, the Catalanos filed a complaint asserting that they were not provided with the required notice to redeem the property before the tax deed was delivered to Sunrise. The circuit court invalidated the deeds of the Masons, Harpagon, and Sunrise and restored title to the Catalanos because Sunrise failed to serve the Catalanos with the statutorily required notice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Mason v. Smith" on Justia Law

The circuit court appointed E.D. to be the guardian and conservator of Respondent, an elderly man with dementia. Acting as Respondent’s conservator, E.D. filed a motion seeking permission to sell two parcels of Respondent’s real property, one in West Virginia and one in Maryland, to pay for Respondent’s living expenses. The circuit court denied E.D.’s motion, concluding (1) the court lacked jurisdiction over the Maryland real estate, and (2) it was not in Respondent’s best interest for the West Virginia property to be sold “at this time.” The Surpeme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in finding it was without jurisdiction to approve the sale of Respondent’s Maryland property and in finding it was not in Respondent’s best interest to sell the West Virginia property. Remanded to the circuit court for entry of an order properly approving the sale of both properties. View "In re Donald M." on Justia Law

This case had its origins in a property damage action brought by Jason and Gina Corrick against B&B Transit, Inc. B&B Transit filed a notice and coverage claim with its insurer, Montpelier US Insurance Company. Montpelier eventually settled the case against B&B Transit. While the Corricks’ complaint was still pending, Respondents, including B&B Transit, filed a first-party bad faith claim against Petitioners, including Montpelier and its national coverage counsel, Charlston, Revich & Wollitz (“CRW”). Respondents subsequently served discovery requests on Petitioners. After CRW opposed disclosure of certain requested documents, Respondents filed a motion to compel disclosure of the documents. The circuit court entered an order requiring CRW to disclose certain documents. Petitioners sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court’s discovery order. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition as moulded, concluding that part of the circuit court’s order permitting discovery of documents sought by Respondents was prohibited from enforcement because the documents were protected under the attorney-client privilege. View "State ex rel. Montpelier US Ins. Co. v. Hon. Bloom" on Justia Law

The Hegyi Trust filed an action against Dean and Martha Lowe involving certain real property. The Lowes filed a counterclaim against the Trust and a third-party complaint against Joseph and Joyce Richards, seeking to obtain property situated on the border of West Virginia and Virginia. The circuit court dismissed the Lowes’ counterclaim and third-party complaint, concluding (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Lowes’ claims because they involved a determination of a boundary line between West Virginia and Virginia, and (2) the Lowes failed to join indispensable parties to the litigation - the States of West Virginia and Virginia. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit courts of West Virginia have subject matter jurisdiction to resolve interstate boundary line disputes between private litigants involving the issue of whether real property is located within West Virginia or another state; and (2) the circuit court erred in determining that West Virginia and Virginia were indispensable parties because the rights of neither state would be impaired or impeded by the circuit court’s decision on the merits of the Lowes’ claims. View "Lowe v. Richards" on Justia Law