Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Wal-Mart's posttrial motions and the court's judgment against each defendant in this personal injury case according to its apportioned fault, holding that the circuit court did not err.Plaintiff sued Wal-Mart after she sustained serious injuries in a collision with a fleeing shoplifter in a Parkersburg Wal-Mart. Following a jury trial, the jury awarded $16.9 million in damages, apportioning thirty percent of the fault to Wal-Mart and the remainder to the shoplifter. The circuit court denied Wal-Mart's posttrial motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Wal-Mart owed a duty to Plaintiff to protect her from the shoplifter's criminal conduct, and a reasonable juror could have concluded that the shoplifter's flight was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries; (2) the circuit court did not commit reversible error when it refused to instruct the jury on intervening cause; (3) any error in the circuit court's exclusion of certain allegations in Plaintiff's complaint was harmless; (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Plaintiff prejudgment interest on her past medication expenses; and (5) the circuit court did not err in refusing to enter Plaintiff's proposed judgment order. View "Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. v. Ankrom" on Justia Law

In this personal injury action, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court denying Plaintiff a new trial on damages and imposing sanctions, holding that the verdict awarding no damages was inadequate.Plaintiff sued Defendant for the intentional tort of battery. The jury found Defendant liable for battery but awarded Plaintiff no damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) because the uncontroverted evidence was not only that the battery caused Plaintiff's brain injury but also that Plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury for which he was not compensated, the verdict was inadequate; (2) the circuit court was within its discretion to require the parties to bear their own costs and to order Defendants to pay the costs of the jury trial; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions in the form of attorney fees where Defendants displayed a pattern of discovery misconduct. View "McKenzie v. Sevier" on Justia Law

In these two related proceedings the Supreme Court granted the writs of prohibition sought by Monster Tree Service Inc. (Monster, Inc.) and Monster Franchise, LLC to set aside defaults entered against them in the circuit court, holding that the circuit court erred by failing to grant Monster, Inc.'s and Monster Franchise's motions to set aside their defaults.Respondent was injured when he fell from a tree while working for Monster Tree Service of the Upper Ohio Valley, Inc. (Monster UOV), an Ohio corporation. Respondent sustained his injuries in Marshall County, West Virginia. Respondent sued Monster UOV, Monster Franchise, and Monster, Inc. in Marshall County Circuit Court. The circuit court later entered defaults against all defendants. Monster Franchise and Monster, Inc. moved to set aside their defaults. The circuit court denied both motions. The Supreme Court granted both entities' writs of prohibition, holding (1) Respondent's attempt at service on Monster Franchise was ineffective and that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter a default judgment against Monster Franchise; and (2) the circuit court committed clear error as a matter of law when it refused to vacate Monster, Inc.'s default. View "State ex rel. Monster Tree Service, Inc. v. Cramer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Monongahela Power Company's (Mon Power) motion to dismiss on the basis of statutory immunity, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that a private corporate entity or employer is not entitled to immunity under W. Va. Code 15-5-11(a).Michael Buzminsky, an employee of HSC LLC, was electrocuted and injured when he was sent to perform repairs to the City of Ronceverte's wastewater treatment plant. Michael and Vickie Buzminsky (collectively, Plaintiffs) pled negligence against Mon Power, alleging that, despite its knowledge continued electrical issues, Mon Power left the plant energized. Citing the immunity extended to emergency services workers pursuant to W. Va. Code 15-5-11(a), Mon Power moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over it because it was statutorily immune. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the immunity established for "duly qualified emergency services workers" pursuant to section 15-5-11(a) applies only to individual employees and does not extend to such employees' private employer or corporate entity; and (2) Mon Power does not derivate immunity vicariously through the immunity which its employees enjoy under the statute. View "Monongahela Power Co. v. Buzminsky" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Cindy Langman on John Zsigray's claims for outrage and intentional infliction of emotional stress and reversed the order granting Langman's motion to dismiss the defamation claim regarding statements she made to a law enforcement officer, holding that Zsigray's complaint included sufficient allegations to withstand a motion to dismiss on this portion of the defamation claim.After a law enforcement officer's investigation into an incident at McDonald's Zsigray was charged with criminal harassment. Following a jury trial at which Langman testified Zsigray was found not guilty. Zsigray later filed a complaint against Langman, alleging, inter alia, defamation. The defamation claim was based on Langman's statements to the officer and her testimony. The circuit court granted Langman's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) properly ruled that Langman's testimony during the magistrate court trial judge was entitled to absolute immunity from Zsigray's defamation claim; (2) erred in ruling that Langman's statements to the officer were also absolutely privileged; and (3) did not err by granting Langman's motion for summary judgment on the outrage and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. View "Zsigray v. Langman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition requested by Petitioners seeking to have the circuit court dismiss Nadine Rice's tort action with prejudice under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 41(b), holding that Petitioners failed to show that the circuit court's order was whether clearly erroneous as a matter of law or a flagrant abuse of its discretion.Rice sued Petitioners alleging several claims arising from her alleged negligent ejection from her home. For various reasons, Rice's case did not progress. Petitioners later moved the circuit court to dismiss the case with prejudice. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that good cause justified the delay and that the delay had not prejudiced Petitioners. Petitioners then sought an extraordinary writ to prevent the circuit court from acting beyond what they argued were the court's legitimate powers. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Petitioner's did not show that this case was an extraordinary case requiring an extraordinary remedy. View "State ex rel. Johnson & Freedman, LLC v. Honorable Warren R. McGraw" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition sought by the West Virginia Regional Jail Authority (WVRJA) seeking to have the Court prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its order denying the WVRJA's motion to dismiss Bobbi Bryant's complaint against it as time barred, holding that WVRJA failed to demonstrate that the circuit court's order was clearly erroneous.The WVRJA moved to dismiss Bryant's complaint on the sole basis that the claims asserted against it were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The circuit court found that because the statute of limitations was appropriately tolled as to the co-defendant and because Bryant alleged a civil conspiracy cause of action the statute of limitation as to the co-defendant was imputed to the WVRJA. The WVRJA then filed a petition for writ of prohibition with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the circuit court did not commit clear legal error in denying WVRJA's motion to dismiss the complaint as time barred, based on the applicable statute of limitations, such that a writ of prohibition is warranted. View "State ex rel. Regional Jail Authority v. Honorable Carrie Webster" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified by the federal district court by concluding that the term "person" as used in the wrongful death statute, W. Va. Code 55-7-5 and 55-7-6, does not include an ectopic embryo or an ectopic fetus.Three years after Defendant performed a bilateral tubal litigation on Plaintiff for permanent sterilization purposes doctors discovered a live ectopic pregnancy located in Plaintiff's left fallopian tube. Because the ectopic pregnancy had no chance of resulting in a live birth and would result in Plaintiff's death if allowed to continue, the ectopic embryo was removed. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and as the administratrix of the estate of her ectopic embryo, and her husband filed suit against Defendant, asserting wrongful death. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The federal district court then certified two questions to the Supreme Court for resolution. The Supreme Court answered the second question, rendering the first question moot, holding that the term "person" as used in the wrongful death statute does not include an ectopic embryo or an ectopic fetus. View "Saleh v. Damron" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court insofar as it denied summary judgment to Beth Thompson on Joseph Whitt's intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment claims, holding that Thompson was immune from liability on those claims.Whitt was terminated from his employment as IT Director for Cabell County. Whitt sued Thompson, the Cabell County Administrator who informed Whitt of his termination, and the Cabell County Commission, which made the decision to terminate. The circuit court denied Thompson's motion for summary judgment on grounds of immunity and both Defendants' motions for summary judgment on the merits of the substantive claims in the complaint. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court's order insofar as it denied statutory immunity to Thompson on the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment, holding that Thompson was entitled to immunity; and (2) declined to review the court's ruling denying summary judgment on Whitt's whistleblower claims. View "Cabell County Commission v. Whitt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of prohibition sought by Defendants challenging the circuit court's denial of Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, holding that the circuit court erred when it refused to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress but did not err when it refused to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for general negligence.Plaintiff brought his complaint alleging that he suffered emotional injuries after witnessing a co-worker sustain fatal injuries due to Defendants' negligence. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because the Plaintiff and his co-worker did not meet the "closely related" requirement. The circuit court denied the motion. Defendants then filed this petition requesting a writ of prohibition challenging the denial of the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part and denied it in part, holding (1) an employee cannot recover damages for emotional distress after witnessing an injury to an unrelated co-worker under a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's claim for general negligence because the claim was not duplicative of Plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. View "State ex rel. Maxxim Shared Services, LLC v. Honorable Warren R. McGraw" on Justia Law