Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs - Christine Brehm and Amber Hess - in these suits for declarations of coverage against Progressive Max Insurance Company, holding that the circuit court erred in its grant of summary judgment.Plaintiffs were passengers in a Toyota Camry, a rental vehicle operated by Susan Bindernagel, when another driver crashed into the Camry. Bindernagel's insurer, Progressive, denied underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage because the rental vehicle was not a "covered auto" under the policy. The circuit court found that because Plaintiffs had been Bindernagel's guest passengers in the rental car when the crash occurred they were entitled to UIM coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the clear statutory language nor the terms of the insurance policy specifically provided for UIM coverage to those in Plaintiffs' position. View "Progressive Max Insurance Co. v. Brehm" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioner to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its order to strike the notice it received pursuant to W. Va. Code 55-7-13d regarding Respondent's belief that some or all of the fault in the matter should be assigned to the Monongalia County Commission, holding that Petitioner was entitled to the writ.Respondent was employed by the County Commission when he was injured his work. After resolving his workers' compensation claim Respondent sued Petitioner for further compensation. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the motion at issue. The circuit court granted Respondent's motion to strike the notice, concluding that fault could not be assigned to the County Commission, and, alternatively, that Petitioner failed to allege deliberate intention on the part of the County Commission. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of prohibition, holding (1) the circuit court committed clear error in ruling that the County Commission could not be named as a nonparty defendant under W.Va. Code 55-7-13d; and (2) section 55-7-13d did not require Petitioner to meet the deliberate-intention standard in order for fault to be assigned to the County Commission. View "State ex rel. March-Westin Co. v. Honorable Phillip D. Gaujot" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the order of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's claim against Respondent for defamation, holding that Petitioner's allegation that Respondent made the supposed defamatory statement maliciously precluded dismissal of Petitioner's claim under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).Petitioner, a patrolman with the Town of Belle's Police Department, brought this complaint alleging that Respondent had made a defamatory statement against him, knew the statement was false, and made the statement intending to harm Petitioner's reputation. The circuit court dismissed the defamation claim on grounds of qualified privilege. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the order dismissing the defamation claim against Respondent, individually, holding that it was error to find that Respondent acted in good faith, despite Petitioner's clear allegation to the contrary, and so to dismiss Petitioner's defamation claim against Respondent. View "Haught v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted as moulded a writ of prohibition challenging the rulings of the circuit court denying West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc.'s (WVUH) petition for declaratory judgment and WVUH's motion to dismiss Respondents' amended complaint, holding that the circuit court committed clear legal error.Respondents filed a complaint alleging corporate negligence and other claims against WVUH. WVUH filed a combined answer and petition for declaratory judgment asking the circuit court to declare that the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act, W. Va. Code 55-7B-1 to -12 (MPLA) applied to Respondents' corporate negligence allegations. Before the circuit court ruled on the petition for declaratory judgment, Respondents filed an amended complaint adding new corporate negligence claims but did not fulfill the MPLA's pre-suit notice requirements. At issue was the circuit court's denial of both WVUH's petition for declaratory judgment and motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, holding (1) the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the corporate negligence claims added in the amended complaint due to Respondents' failure to comply with the MPLA's pre-suit notice requirements for these claims; and (2) litigation of the corporate negligence claims that were asserted in the original complaint, and for which the pre-suit notice requirements were satisfied, were governed by the MPLA. View "State ex rel. W. Va. University Hospitals, Inc. v. Honorable Scott" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Mutual Benefit Group and against Eric Parks in this action brought by Mutual Benefit as a result of an automobile accident, holding that the circuit court erred.Mutual Benefit brought this action to recover monies it paid in another action stemming from an automobile accident involving Parks. The magistrate court found in favor of Mutual Benefit. After a trial de novo, the circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law to Mutual Benefit on the grounds that Parks had failed to respond to requests for admissions that Mutual Benefit had served upon him in the magistrate court. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure for Magistrate Courts provide the exclusive means of discovery in magistrate courts and do not provide for parties to serve requests for admission. View "Parks v. Mutual Benefit Group" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the ordered entered by the circuit court granting the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant, the Harrison County Board of Education, and dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint seeking damages for their student's injuries caused by an Assistant Principal's actions and the Board's response thereto, holding that the circuit court erred in part.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for negligent hiring and negligent supervision; (2) the circuit court did not err by dismissing a portion Plaintiffs' claim for negligence per se, but the allegations of negligence per se that Petitioners set forth in their third iteration of the claim sufficiently stated a caused of action for negligence to defeat the Board's motion to dismiss; and (3) the circuit court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' claim for negligent retention because Plaintiffs stated a claim for negligent retention sufficient to survive the Board's motion to dismiss this claim. View "C.C. v. Harrison County Board of Education" on Justia Law

In these appeals arising from adverse jury verdicts rendered in separate trials following an automobile accident involving Joseph Jenkins and Tessa Jordan, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court erred in part.The first trial resulted in the jury's calculation of damages sustained by Jenkins and his wife as a result of the accident, which the parties stipulated was caused through the fault of Jordan. The Jenkins also sued Safeco Insurance Company of America and liberty Mutual Insurance Company (collectively, Safeco) for conversion. After a second trial on the Jenkins' claims for compensatory and punitive damages Safeco appealed the jury's determination that the Jenkins were entitled to punitive damages. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court's order denying the Jordans' motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial and remanded that case for a new trial, holding that the jury should have been instructed on Jenkins' duty to mitigate the loss of his vehicle; and (2) reversed the court's order denying Safeco's motion to reduce the punitive damages award, holding that remand was necessary to review the punitive damages award for excessiveness. View "Jordan v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Morgantown Health and Rehabilitation Center, a nursing home, holding that the circuit court erred in applying the statute of limitations contained in the Wrongful Death Act, W. Va. Code 55-7-6, instead of that contained in the Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA), W. Va. Code 55-7B-4(b).More than one year after Jacqulin Cowell, a resident of Morgantown Health, died, her daughter and administratrix of her estate sued Morgantown Health, alleging that poor care, neglect, and abuse resulted in Cowell's death. Morgantown Health filed a motion, arguing that the one-year statute of limitations in section 55-7B-4(b) had lapsed and, therefore, the complaint was untimely. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the statute of limitations in the Wrongful Death Act, rather than that contained in the MPLA, applied. Morgantown Health requested a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in applying the Wrongful Death Act's statute of limitations to Plaintiff's wrongful death claim. View "State ex rel. Morgantown Operating Co. LLC v. Gaujot" on Justia Law

In this premises liability case, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint, holding that the circuit court plainly erred in making factual determinations based upon assertions in Defendant's motion to dismiss.Plaintiff asserted that, during a visit to Defendant's house, an object on Defendant's front porch stairs caused him to slip, fall, and be injured. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that because the complaint did not allege facts demonstrating that Plaintiff was not a trespasser on Defendant's porch, then Plaintiff was a trespasser who was owed no duty of care. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court plainly erred in making factual determinations based upon assertions in Defendant's motion to dismiss; and (2) the complaint stated a claim, and dismissal was improper. View "Gable v. Gable" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition directing the circuit court to transfer venue of this third-party medical negligence action from Tucker County to Monongalia County, holding that this cause of action arose in Monongalia County, and therefore venue for the underlying action, as pleaded, lay solely in Monongalia County.Emily Heckler stabbed her stepmother Marion to death two days after she was discharged from Chestnut Ridge Center in Morgantown, where she had received psychiatric treatment. Mark Heckler, Emily's father and the administrator of Marion's estate, brought this claim in Tucker County under W. Va. Code 55-7B-9b of the Medical Professional Liability Act against Petitioners - West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. and West Virginia University Board of Governors. Heckler filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue or, in the alternative, to transfer venue to Monongalia County. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) under W. Va Code 55-7B-9b, venue is established on where the cause of action arose; and (2) venue is only proper in the county in which the healthcare was rendered with allegedly willful and wanton or reckless disregard of a foreseeable risk of harm to third persons. View "State ex rel. W. Va. University Hospitals, Inc. v. Honorable Nelson" on Justia Law