Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Respondent David King, as administrator of the estate of Wilma Ann King, brought an action against the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) alleging that the DMV was negligent in approving the driver’s license application of the driver who killed Wilma King in an automobile accident without first submitting the driver’s medical information to the Driver’s Licensing Advisory Board (advisory board). The DMV filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to qualified immunity on the basis that referral to the advisory board is discretionary. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that referral is nondiscretionary, and therefore, there was no qualified immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the governmental act or omission that gave rise to Respondent’s action against the DMV constituted a discretionary governmental function, and therefore, the DMV was immune to Respondent’s action. View "Department of Transportation v. King" on Justia Law

In 2013, fourteen plaintiffs, including ten from West Virginia and four from New York, filed products liability and negligence claims agist Pfizer, Inc. regarding their use of the medication, Lipitor, a drug manufactured by Pfizer. An amended complaint was later filed adding twenty-six plaintiffs from Texas. Ultimately, the circuit court granted Pfizer’s motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens and dismissed the non-West Virginia plaintiffs from the underlying civil action. Plaintiffs sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order granting Pfizer’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court acted within its authority in granting the motion to dismiss. View "State ex rel. Almond v. Honorable Rudolph Murensky" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against the City of Wheeling, alleging that the City negligently failed to inspect, maintain, and operate its waterworks and fire hydrant system, resulting in the total loss of her home due to a fire. The City filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in which it asserted statutory immunity for fire protection services. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss based on its determination that both statutory and common law immunity barred the civil action. Petitioner appealed, arguing that her complaint was based solely on the City’s aqueduct system and not on the provision of fire protection services. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in applying statutory immunity as a bar to further prosecution in Petitioner’s case. View "Albert v. City of Wheeling" on Justia Law

Petitioners entered into a written agreement with Bastian Homes and Lion Enterprises, Inc. (collectively, “Bastian Homes”) for the construction of a new home. The agreement contained an arbitration clause. After a water leak allegedly substantially damaged major portions of the partially-constructed home, Petitioners sued Bastian Homes. Bastian Homes filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the arbitration clause in the construction contract required the matter to be submitted to arbitration. Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss, contending that the arbitration clause in this case was not bargained for and was therefore invalid. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) because the construction contract was properly formed and supported by sufficient consideration, there was no requirement that the arbitration clause be independently “bargained for”; and (2) because the circuit court decided the arbitration clause not unconscionable without the issue being fairly argued by the parties and without any factual development, this issue needed to be remanded for further development of the record.View "Kirby v. Lion Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a retention pond constructed in a subdivision for the purpose of catching water runoff. Patrick and Melinda Sterner, who owned property in the subdivision, contracted with WHR Group (WHR) to handle the sale of their home. Petitioners subsequently entered into a contract to purchase the property. Petitioners later filed an action against WHR, the Sterners, and Sahley Realty Company, the subdivision developer (collectively, Respondents), asserting claims for fraud, constructive fraud, negligence, and breach of implied contract, alleging that a “slip” occurred on the retention bond prior to their purchase of the lot, which allowed the pond to cross the common boundary line onto their property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this action, the circuit court acted properly in granting Respondents’ motions for summary judgment. View "Dickens v. Sahley Realty Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was W. Va. Code 33-6-36, which, in certain circumstances, requires insurance companies to continue motor vehicle liability coverage for a spouse after the death of, or separation or divorce from, the named insured. Francis McComas separated from and then divorced a United Service Automobile Association (USAA) named insured. USAA removed McComas from the named insured’s policy. Seven days after the divorce, McComas lost control of his vehicle and collided with Kimberly Lucas’s vehicle. McComas died in the collision. Lucas, who was seriously injured, filed a lawsuit against McComas’s estate. Plaintiff included a declaratory judgment count against USAA, contending that the USAA motor vehicle policy with McComas’s former spouse provided liability coverage for McComas’s negligence. The circuit court granted judgment for Plaintiff, determining that USAA was required by section 33-6-36 to notify McComas of his right to buy a separate liability insurance policy upon canceling McComas’s liability coverage, and because that notice was not given to McComas, USAA was required to provide liability coverage to McComas’s estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, 33-6-36 required USAA to notify McComas of the termination of his coverage and his right to request a separate policy.View "United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Lucas" on Justia Law

Thomas and Lori Likens filed a complaint against Petitioners in the circuit court, alleging several claims, including the allegation that Skyline had negligently designed and built their manufactured home. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the Likenses were required to file an administrative complaint with the West Virginia Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Board (the Board) as a prerequisite to the filing of their civil complaint. The circuit court denied Petitioners’ motion to dismiss, concluding that W. Va. Code 21-9-11a did not require the Likenses to first file an administrative complaint seeking relief with the Board before asserting their claim seeking damages. Petitioners requested the Supreme Court to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order. The Court granted the requested writ, concluding that W. Va. Code 21-9-11a(b) requires an aggrieved party to file an administrative complaint with the Board before he or she may file a civil lawsuit for monetary damages. View " State ex rel. Skyline Corp. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law