Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a registered nurse, was hired in 2008 by the defendant hospital. In 2009, Plaintiff was fired. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging retaliatory discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act. The jury found that Defendant wrongfully discharged Plaintiff in a manner designed to undermine public policy and, as a result, Defendant had intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon Plaintiff and had defamed her. Further, the jury found that Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff her full wages. The Supreme Court reversed the jury verdict against Defendant, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict on the wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress counts; (2) Plaintiff’s claim for defamation was barred by the applicable statute of limitation; and (3) the circuit court’s conduct and rulings during trial undermined the reliability of the jury’s verdict on unpaid wages. View "Herbert J. Thomas Memorial Hospital Ass’n v. Nutter" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked in coal mining operations under Consolidated Coal Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of CONSOL Energy, Inc. In 2013, CONSOL sold Consolidated Coal Company to Murray Energy Corporation. Prior to the sale, Plaintiffs’ terms of employment included CONSOL’s Equity Incentive Plan that provided for the award of CONSOL common stock to Plaintiffs in Restricted Stock Units (RSUs). The award of RSUs was subject to a vesting schedule. Pursuant to an Award Agreement, the vesting of RSUs would accelerate upon the occurrence of certain events. The acceleration event in controversy was the phrase “change in control.” At the time of the sale, Plaintiffs had been awarded RSUs. Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to accelerated vesting of the unvested portion of the RSUs pursuant to the Award Agreement because a “change in control” occurred when CONSOL sold Consolidated Coal Company. CONSOL failed to accelerate the RSUs and asserted that Plaintiffs’ unvested RSUs were forfeited. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the phrase “change in control” under the Award Agreement necessarily included CONSOL’s subsidiary, Consolidated Coal Company; and (2) the sale of Consolidated Coal Company to Murray Energy Corporation triggered the accelerated vesting of Plaintiffs’ RSUs. View "Consol Energy, Inc. v. Hummel" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a petition in the magistrate court seeking to have Respondent evicted from one of their apartments. The magistrate court dismissed Petitioners’ claim as moot after a hearing. Respondent appealed. Thereafter, Respondent filed a complaint against Petitioners for, inter alia, unpaid wages and wrongful termination. The circuit court entered an order consolidating Respondent’s magistrate court appeal with his circuit court original complaint. Petitioners moved to dismiss three counts of the complaint on the grounds that the issues involved were litigated in the magistrate court proceeding. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioners then brought this writ of prohibition proceeding. The Supreme Court granted the writ as moulded, holding that the circuit court was prohibited from exercising original jurisdiction over the challenged counts in the complaint, as (1) W. Va. R. Civ. P. 42(a) allows consolidation of a magistrate court appeal with an action pending under the original jurisdiction of a circuit court; (2) Respondent’s claims for unpaid wages were not barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, but those counts may go forward in circuit court as amendments to the magistrate court pleadings; and (3) Plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim was a new cause of action not embraced by the magistrate cause of action for unpaid wages. View "State ex rel. Veard v. Hon. Lawrance S. Miller" on Justia Law

Stephen Swain filed claims for workers’ compensation benefits for his occupational hearing loss. An administrative law judge (ALJ) with the Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges identified Pioneer Pipe, Inc. and two other employers as being potentially chargeable for Swain’s claim. The ALJ then ruled that Pioneer Pipe was the sole chargeable employer responsible for paying Swain’s hearing loss claim under W.Va. Code 23-4-6b(g). The Workers Compensation Board of Review affirmed. Pioneer Pipe appealed, contending, inter alia, that the language of W. Va. Code 23-4-6b(g) requires the Insurance Commissioner to allocate and divide the charges for a hearing loss claim if the claimant was injured while employed by multiple employers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) by using the term “may” in the statute, the Legislature afforded the Insurance Commissioner discretion in deciding whether to allocate and divide charges for a hearing loss claim between various employers or to charge only one employer; and (2) the statute does not require sixty days of exposure to hazardous noise before the Insurance Commissioner may hold an employer solely responsible for a hearing loss claim. View "Pioneer Pipe, Inc. v. Swain" on Justia Law

In 2004, Edward Birch received a workplace injury. In 2011, a claims administrator granted Birch and eight percent permanent partial disability (PPD) award. The Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges (OOJ) granted an additional five percent PPD award for a total of thirteen percent PPD. The West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review (BOR) affirmed. At issue on appeal was the correct methodology for apportioning the level of impairment in workers’ compensation cases involving preexisting conditions. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the BOR and reinstated the claims administrator’s order granting Birch an eight percent PPD award, holding that the BOR’s affirmation of the OOJ’s decision was clearly the result of an erroneous conclusion of law. View "SWVA, Inc. v. Birch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in accident while working for Speed Mining LLC. Plaintiff and his wife (together, Plaintiffs) filed suit against Speed Mining. Plaintiffs also named as defendants related companies and individuals (collectively, the Baughan defendants). At the time of the accident, Speed Mining was a named insured on a workers’ compensation policy of insurance issued by Old Republic. Plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits under Speed Mining’s workers’ compensation policy. Plaintiffs later amended their complaint to add a declaratory judgment action against Old Republic, as it had asserted a statutory subrogation lien with respect to any settlement obtained by Plaintiffs from the Baughan defendants. Old Republic asserted its own declaratory judgment action against Plaintiffs. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Old Republic subsequently filed a W. Va. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from entry of judgment order. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in denying Old Republic’s Rule 60 motion; but (2) the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs because Old Republic’s claim for subrogation failed. View "Old Republic Ins. Co. v. O'Neal" on Justia Law

Petitioner has been employed by the Raleigh County Board of Education as a physical therapist since 1987. Her initial “Teacher’s Probationary Contract of Employment” provided that she would be paid an annual salary “for an annual employment term of 120 days.” In 1989, petitioner executed a “Continuing Contract of Employment,” which likewise provided that she was to be employed “for an employment term of 120 days.” She requested enrollment in the Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS). Contributions on petitioner’s behalf were made to TRS continuously from 1987 through 1991, when she enrolled in the newly-created Teachers’ Defined Contribution System and froze her TRS contributions. In 1999, she transferred her TRS funds and service credit into TDC. In 2008, petitioner transferred back to the TRS. The Board ascertained that petitioner was ineligible to participate in either plan because she was only working 120 days a year and indicated that the money contributed would be returned to her and her employer. Petitioner testified that she believed that those working less than 200 days were not ineligible, but would merely receive fractional service credit for the year. The hearing examiner determined that West Virginia Code 18-7A-3 requires a 200-day contract before one may participate in TRS, but that there was no such 200-day requirement to participate in TDC. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that it was “sympathetic," but could not confer statutory eligibility where none exists. View "Ringel-Williams v. W.V. Consol. Pub. Retirement Bd." on Justia Law

L.A. Pipeline Construction Company, an Ohio corporation, admitted liability for failing to fully pay some of its employees - a group of engineers who worked on a pipeline job in West Virginia. L.A. Pipeline sought to avoid paying on that liability by claiming that a wage bond securing its employees’ wages had expired. Specifically, L.A. Pipeline asserted that a “Perpetual Irrevocable Letter of Credit/Wage Bond” that it obtained pursuant to the West Virginia Wage Payment Collection Act’s (WPCA) wage bond requirement was no longer in effect. The federal district court certified a question on the letter of credit/wage bond’s duration to the Supreme Court. Noting that the letter of credit/wage bond’s duration was governed by the WPCA and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the Court answered (1) to the extent they conflict, the WPCA prevails over the UCC on the duration of a letter of credit/wage bond obtained pursuant to the WPCA; and (2) therefore, under West Virginia law, the letter of credit/wage bond at issue in this case remains in effect until terminated with the approval of the Commissioner of the Division of Labor. View "Int’l Union of Operating Engineers v. L.A. Pipeline Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners alleged, in addition to claims of gender discrimination and invasion of privacy, that they were discharged from their employment with West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services (DHHR) for discovering and alerting others to alleged errors or irregularities with the procurement process utilized by DHHR. The trial court granted summary judgment to DHHR and two DHHR officials (collectively, Respondents) on the entirety of Petitioners’ claims, concluding that Petitioners failed to create a genuine issue of material fact surrounding their claims and that Respondents were entitled to qualified immunity on Petitioenrs' claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in granting summary judgment as to Petitioners’ retaliatory discharge, gender discrimination, and false light invasion of privacy claims; but (2) erred in concluding that Petitioners failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on their whistle-blower claim and concluding, as a matter of law, that Petitioners’ evidence could not satisfy the statutory requirements. View "Taylor v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was employed by Defendant, signed an employment agreement providing that all disputes with Defendant shall be resolved through arbitration. After Plaintiff’s employment ended, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant did not timely pay him his final wages as required by the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act. After a seven-month delay, Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court granted the motion, dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, and compelled the parties to participate in arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not waive its right to arbitrate through its acts and language. View "Parsons v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc." on Justia Law