Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stephen Swain filed claims for workers’ compensation benefits for his occupational hearing loss. An administrative law judge (ALJ) with the Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges identified Pioneer Pipe, Inc. and two other employers as being potentially chargeable for Swain’s claim. The ALJ then ruled that Pioneer Pipe was the sole chargeable employer responsible for paying Swain’s hearing loss claim under W.Va. Code 23-4-6b(g). The Workers Compensation Board of Review affirmed. Pioneer Pipe appealed, contending, inter alia, that the language of W. Va. Code 23-4-6b(g) requires the Insurance Commissioner to allocate and divide the charges for a hearing loss claim if the claimant was injured while employed by multiple employers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) by using the term “may” in the statute, the Legislature afforded the Insurance Commissioner discretion in deciding whether to allocate and divide charges for a hearing loss claim between various employers or to charge only one employer; and (2) the statute does not require sixty days of exposure to hazardous noise before the Insurance Commissioner may hold an employer solely responsible for a hearing loss claim. View "Pioneer Pipe, Inc. v. Swain" on Justia Law

In 2004, Edward Birch received a workplace injury. In 2011, a claims administrator granted Birch and eight percent permanent partial disability (PPD) award. The Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges (OOJ) granted an additional five percent PPD award for a total of thirteen percent PPD. The West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review (BOR) affirmed. At issue on appeal was the correct methodology for apportioning the level of impairment in workers’ compensation cases involving preexisting conditions. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the BOR and reinstated the claims administrator’s order granting Birch an eight percent PPD award, holding that the BOR’s affirmation of the OOJ’s decision was clearly the result of an erroneous conclusion of law. View "SWVA, Inc. v. Birch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in accident while working for Speed Mining LLC. Plaintiff and his wife (together, Plaintiffs) filed suit against Speed Mining. Plaintiffs also named as defendants related companies and individuals (collectively, the Baughan defendants). At the time of the accident, Speed Mining was a named insured on a workers’ compensation policy of insurance issued by Old Republic. Plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits under Speed Mining’s workers’ compensation policy. Plaintiffs later amended their complaint to add a declaratory judgment action against Old Republic, as it had asserted a statutory subrogation lien with respect to any settlement obtained by Plaintiffs from the Baughan defendants. Old Republic asserted its own declaratory judgment action against Plaintiffs. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Old Republic subsequently filed a W. Va. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from entry of judgment order. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in denying Old Republic’s Rule 60 motion; but (2) the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs because Old Republic’s claim for subrogation failed. View "Old Republic Ins. Co. v. O'Neal" on Justia Law

Petitioner has been employed by the Raleigh County Board of Education as a physical therapist since 1987. Her initial “Teacher’s Probationary Contract of Employment” provided that she would be paid an annual salary “for an annual employment term of 120 days.” In 1989, petitioner executed a “Continuing Contract of Employment,” which likewise provided that she was to be employed “for an employment term of 120 days.” She requested enrollment in the Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS). Contributions on petitioner’s behalf were made to TRS continuously from 1987 through 1991, when she enrolled in the newly-created Teachers’ Defined Contribution System and froze her TRS contributions. In 1999, she transferred her TRS funds and service credit into TDC. In 2008, petitioner transferred back to the TRS. The Board ascertained that petitioner was ineligible to participate in either plan because she was only working 120 days a year and indicated that the money contributed would be returned to her and her employer. Petitioner testified that she believed that those working less than 200 days were not ineligible, but would merely receive fractional service credit for the year. The hearing examiner determined that West Virginia Code 18-7A-3 requires a 200-day contract before one may participate in TRS, but that there was no such 200-day requirement to participate in TDC. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that it was “sympathetic," but could not confer statutory eligibility where none exists. View "Ringel-Williams v. W.V. Consol. Pub. Retirement Bd." on Justia Law

L.A. Pipeline Construction Company, an Ohio corporation, admitted liability for failing to fully pay some of its employees - a group of engineers who worked on a pipeline job in West Virginia. L.A. Pipeline sought to avoid paying on that liability by claiming that a wage bond securing its employees’ wages had expired. Specifically, L.A. Pipeline asserted that a “Perpetual Irrevocable Letter of Credit/Wage Bond” that it obtained pursuant to the West Virginia Wage Payment Collection Act’s (WPCA) wage bond requirement was no longer in effect. The federal district court certified a question on the letter of credit/wage bond’s duration to the Supreme Court. Noting that the letter of credit/wage bond’s duration was governed by the WPCA and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the Court answered (1) to the extent they conflict, the WPCA prevails over the UCC on the duration of a letter of credit/wage bond obtained pursuant to the WPCA; and (2) therefore, under West Virginia law, the letter of credit/wage bond at issue in this case remains in effect until terminated with the approval of the Commissioner of the Division of Labor. View "Int’l Union of Operating Engineers v. L.A. Pipeline Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners alleged, in addition to claims of gender discrimination and invasion of privacy, that they were discharged from their employment with West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services (DHHR) for discovering and alerting others to alleged errors or irregularities with the procurement process utilized by DHHR. The trial court granted summary judgment to DHHR and two DHHR officials (collectively, Respondents) on the entirety of Petitioners’ claims, concluding that Petitioners failed to create a genuine issue of material fact surrounding their claims and that Respondents were entitled to qualified immunity on Petitioenrs' claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in granting summary judgment as to Petitioners’ retaliatory discharge, gender discrimination, and false light invasion of privacy claims; but (2) erred in concluding that Petitioners failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on their whistle-blower claim and concluding, as a matter of law, that Petitioners’ evidence could not satisfy the statutory requirements. View "Taylor v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was employed by Defendant, signed an employment agreement providing that all disputes with Defendant shall be resolved through arbitration. After Plaintiff’s employment ended, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant did not timely pay him his final wages as required by the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act. After a seven-month delay, Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court granted the motion, dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, and compelled the parties to participate in arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not waive its right to arbitrate through its acts and language. View "Parsons v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

William Gill, a firefighter with the City of Charleston, had injured his back before being hired by the City. During his employment, he again injured his back. This injury was ruled compensable and diagnosed as lumbar and thoracic sprain. The Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges (the OOJ) later added four new diagnoses to Gill’s initial compensable claim. The Workers’ Compensation Board of Review reversed, concluding that the additional four diagnoses were noncompensable preexisting conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) no evidence supported the OOJ’s determination that Gill’s compensable injury aggravated his preexisting injuries; and (2) a noncompensable preexisting injury may not be added as a compensable component of a claim for workers’ compensation medical benefits merely because it may have been aggravated by a compensable injury. View "Gill v. City of Charleston" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a police officer with the Department of Natural Resources, lost his right eye as a result of a workplace injury. Petitioner was awarded thirty-three percent permanent partial disability for the “total and irrevocable loss of sight in one eye” under W. Va. Code 23-5-6(f) but was awarded nothing for the permanent impairment caused by his continuing problems with infections and related conditions in his eye socket or for the permanent disfigurement caused by his eye injury. The Office of Judges affirmed the Claims Administrator’s award of no additional permanent partial disability above and beyond the statutory thirty-three percent disability award. The West Virginia Worker Compensation Board of Review affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board erred as a matter of law in its application of section 23-5-6(f). Remanded for further development of medical evidence related to what, if any, additional award Petitioner should receive for permanent disability caused by the physical removal of his right eye beyond the loss of vision in that eye. View "Goff v. W. Va. Office of Ins. Comm’r" on Justia Law

After Respondent was terminated as Superintendent of Schools she challenged her termination from employment by filing suit in the circuit court, naming as Defendants the West Virginia Board of Education and its former president (collectively, Petitioners). Respondent alleged in her complaint that her due process rights under the state Constitution were violated and asserted claims for breach of contract, defamation, and false light. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that qualified immunity barred each of Respondent’s claims. The circuit court denied Petitioners’ motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Respondent’s complaint, holding that Respondent’s complaint failed to allege a cause of action sufficient to overcome Petitioners’ discretion to terminate her, and therefore, qualified immunity barred each of Respondent’s claims. View "W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Marple" on Justia Law