Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When he was fifty-five years old, Plaintiff Albert Postlewait, Jr. applied for a job with the City of Wheeling as a mechanic. Although Plaintiff had the highest score on the City's application examination, the City instead hired an eighteen-year-old applicant. Plaintiff filed an age-discrimination lawsuit against the City, and the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The City filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that one of the jurors had not been forthright and truthful during voir dire. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the City's motion for a new trial was timely, and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion. View "Postlewait v. City of Wheeling" on Justia Law

Employee of a railway company was accused by his Employer of stealing rail. After it was discovered that Employee was involved in the removal and sale of the rail, Employee's employment was terminated. An arbitration panel reinstated Employee's employment the next year. Employer then submitted the matter to an assistant prosecutor. Employee was never arrested or incarcerated. Employee subsequently sued Employer for malicious prosecution. During the trial, the circuit court granted Employee's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether Employer had procured his prosecution, which was one element of his required proof. The jury then returned a verdict in favor of Employee. The circuit court denied Employer's motions for judgment as a matter of law, new trial, or remittitur. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Employer's post-trial motions, holding that the circuit court committed reversible error by determining as a matter of law that Employer procured the malicious prosecution of Employee where testimony of the assistant prosecutor directly contradicted the proposition that Employer had a level of control over the prosecution amounting to procurement. Remanded for a new trial. View "Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Higginbotham " on Justia Law

Employee submitted a claim for workers' compensation under Employer's policy with Insurer, which claim was paid in full. Employee also filed a deliberate intent lawsuit against Employer. After assuming the attorney's fees and costs associated with defending and settling the action, Employer filed a complaint against Insurer, alleging various claims related to Insurer's denial of coverage in the defense of the deliberate intent action. The circuit court granted Employer's motion for partial summary judgment on its bad faith claim against Insurer and awarded damages to Employer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Insurer met its obligation under W. Va. Code 23-4C-6 to make deliberate intent coverage available to Employer upon the Employer's voluntary request; and (2) because the language of the policy was plain, and the exclusion of deliberate intent coverage was clear, the circuit court erred in concluding that the policy was ambiguous and therefore resulted in deliberate intent coverage being included in the policy under the doctrine of reasonable expectations. View "W. Va. Employers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Summit Point Raceway Assocs." on Justia Law

The Racing Commission suspended certain jockeys' occupational permits for thirty days and imposed fines for the jockeys' failure to declare an overweight amount. Afterwards, PNGI Charles Town Gaming (PNGI), a non-party in the underlying action, excluded the jockeys from its facility. The circuit court (1) entered an injunction and stayed the imposition of sanctions by the Racing Commission until the conclusion of a hearing before the Commission; and (2) extended the injunction and the stay to include PNGI, preventing PNGI from excluding the jockeys from PGNI's premises pending the outcome of the jockeys' administrative appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an ejection of a permit holder by a racing association or its stewards is subject to review by the Commission, and therefore, the jockeys, as permit holders, had the right to appeal the ejection, and PNGI was bound by the Commission's decision, subject to judicial review; and (2) PNGI waived its assigned errors regarding the injunction and stay. View "PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

This matter involved two actions consolidated by the circuit court for appeal purposes concerning the application of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act (WPCA). Appellants, two employees whose positions were eliminated as a result of their employer's merger with United Bank, appealed circuit court orders granting summary judgment to Appellee, United Bank, and dismissing their claims for liquidated damages based on the provisions of the WPCA regarding late payment of compensation due at termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lower court did not err in categorizing the termination of employment of either Appellant as a lay-off rather than discharge and in thus finding Appellants were fully compensated for all pay due within the prescribed statutory period. View "Lehman v. United Bank, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several jail employees, lost their jobs after their positions were eliminated upon the closing of the Cabell County Jail. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against the County under the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act (the Act), seeking payment of their accumulated sick leave and alleging that they were entitled to liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. At issue on appeal was whether the County should have been granted judgment as a matter of law based on the following written provision of its sick leave policy: "When the services of an employee have been terminated, all sick leave credited shall be cancelled as of the last working day with the department." The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding that Plaintiffs' accumulated sick leave as of the date they were terminated with the County did not constitute unpaid wages to which they were entitled within the meaning of the Act. Remanded to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of the County. View "Wolfe v. Adkins" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Division of Highways (DOH) let out a public highway construction contract to Nicewonder Contracting. The Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation (ACT) filed a declaratory judgment action against the DOH and Nicewonder, alleging that the construction contract violated state and federal law because the DOH did not seek public bids for the project and there was no prevailing wage clause in the contract. Upon remand from the district court, the circuit court granted Nicewonder's motion for summary judgment, finding ACT lacked standing. The Supreme court reversed, holding that the appropriate standard to determine if an organization has representative standing to sue on behalf of its members is when the organization proves that (1) at least one of its members would have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. The Court found that ACT met all three prongs and thus had representative standing to seek the declarations contained in its petition. View "Affiliated Constr. Trades v. W. Va. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Appellants William and Denise Huggins filed a lawsuit against appellees sewer board, city, and mayor, alleging that a violation of the Workers' Compensation Act had occurred when Huggins' health insurance was terminated while he was off of work recovering from a compensable work-related injury, and, further, that he had been wrongfully terminated. The appellees filed a motion for summary judgment with the lower court, alleging that the plaintiffs had no basis in law for their complaint. The circuit court granted the motion, and the appellants appealed. At issue was whether Huggins was terminated while off work and receiving temporary total disability benefits due to his compensable injury, or, instead, whether Huggins resigned from employment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that appellees terminated Huggins in violation of the anti-discrimination policies set forth in the Act. However, the circuit court's determination that Huggins was not entitled to punitive damages against the mayor was affirmed. View "Huggins, et al. v. City of Westover Sanitary Sewer Board" on Justia Law

Jonathan Darby, who was employed by Kanawha County Board of Education (BOE) as a school bus driver, was terminated when the BOE concluded that Darby had violated the BOE's sexual harassment policy. Darby appealed his termination. After considering the evidence, the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board hearing examiner ordered the BOE to reinstate Darby to his previous position. The BOE appealed. The circuit court reversed, determining that the hearing examiner held the BOE to the wrong burden of proof. Darby appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the hearing examiner used the proper burden of proof in weighing the evidence; and (2) the circuit court improperly exceeded its scope of review, failed to give proper deference to the hearing examiner's factual findings, and wrongly substituted its own judgment on the credibility of the witnesses for that of the hearing officer. View "Darby v. Kanawha County Board of Education" on Justia Law