Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, The Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation (ACT), filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that a public highway construction contract awarded to Respondent, Nicewonder Contracting, Inc., by Respondent, West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH), violated state competitive bidding and prevailing wage laws. The circuit court dismissed ACT's action, finding it lacked standing to challenge the highway construction contract. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that ACT had representative standing to seek the declarations. On remand, the circuit court determined that the Court's opinion in ACT I did not completely decide the issue of ACT's standing and ordered that ACT join the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) as a defendant in the action. The Supreme Court subsequently granted ACT's requested writ of prohibition because the circuit court did not give effect to the mandate of the Court in ACT I, holding (1) ACT, as a matter of law, had standing to prosecute its lawsuit; and (2) FHWA was not an indispensable party to the lawsuit. View "State ex rel. Affiliated Constr. Trades v. Circuit Court (Stucky)" on Justia Law

Petitioner was employed by the West Virginia Division of Culture and History (Division) as an at will employee. Petitioner was later terminated from his employment. Petitioner filed a grievance with the Public Employees Grievance Board. An ALJ denied the Division's motion to dismiss and authorized the filing of an amended grievance. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended grievance, which a succeeding ALJ dismissed. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Petitioner's grievance for failure to state a ground upon which relief may be granted, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by affirming the decision of the Board without a hearing before an ALJ; and (2) the second ALJ had authority to enter a dismissal order after the previous ALJ denied the Division's motion to dismiss. View "Armstrong v. Div. of Culture & History" on Justia Law

This appeal was brought by Appellant following two separate orders of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Allied Warehousing Services, Inc., the Appellee, dismissing Appellant's workers' compensation fraud and common law fraud claims and granting summary judgment to Appellee, finding it to be a special employer of Appellant for the purpose of workers' compensation immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on Appellant's workers' compensation and common law fraud claims because there was no basis to conclude that the alleged fraudulent conduct had any prejudicial effect on the decision of the ALJ regarding the suspension of Appellant's temporary total disability benefits; and (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to Appellee on Appellant's negligence claim on the basis that Appellee was Appellant's special employer, thus entitling Appellee to workers' compensation immunity from such a negligence claim. View "Bowens v. Allied Warehousing Servs." on Justia Law

Appellant Lola Watkins appealed a final order entered in the circuit court, which affirmed a decision by the ALJ of the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board denying Appellant's grievance of her termination from employment as a teacher. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ's denial of Appellant's grievance was not clearly wrong, as (1) the ALJ properly concluded that the Board proved by a preponderance of the evidence the basis for Appellant's termination; (2) Appellant was afforded adequate notice that the Board intended to present matters relating to her employment history at the grievance hearing; and (3) Appellant failed to make a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. View "Watkins v. McDowell County Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Defendant, Tudor's Biscuit World of America, appealed the circuit court's order denying its motion to alter or amend the court's order denying its motion to set aside the default judgment rendered against it in this workplace injury action. Tudor's asserted (1) the circuit court erred in its application of the "reasonable time" requirement set forth in W.V. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to its motion to set aside the default judgment, arguing that such timeliness requirement was inapplicable to void judgments; and (2) the circuit court improperly applied and weighed the factors set forth in Parsons v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corporation in denying its motion for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court should have properly set aside the default judgment, as (1) Tudor's motion to set aside the default judgment was filed within a reasonable period of time; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in its analysis of the Parsons factors to the extent that such analysis resulted in its denial of Plaintiff's motion for relief from default judgment, and therefore, to that extent, erred in denying Tudor's subsequent motion to alter or amend. View "Tudor's Biscuit World of Am. v. Critchley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Angela Smith filed a complaint against her employer, CSX Transportation, Inc., alleging sexual harassment, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment, and negligent retention of an employee. The jury returned a verdict for Smith and awarded Smith $1,557,600 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. The circuit court denied CSX's motion for post-trial relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by denying CSX's request for post-trial relief, as (1) Smith presented sufficient evidence to prove her hostile work environment claim; (2) the jury was instructed correctly on the law of retaliatory discharge; and (3) the evidence supported the jury's award of punitive damages. View "CSX Transp., Inc. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Bobby Messer, a lineman, came into contact with an energized electric transmission line and suffered severe injuries. Petitioners, Bobby and Amanda Messer, filed a complaint alleging that several defendants, including Hampden Coal Company, acted with deliberate intent, resulting in the injury to Bobby. Petitioners settled with or voluntarily dismissed all parties except Hampden. Before trial, Petitioners moved to strike a prospective juror for cause because he had stated opinions that potentially conflicted with those of the Petitioners' electrical engineering expert and possessed such professional education and experience in the field of electrical engineering that his presence upon the jury would have caused his opinions to unduly influence the jury's deliberations on the case's central issue. The circuit court denied the motion, and the jury returned a verdict for Hampden. The court subsequently denied Petitioners' motion for a new trial based on the court's refusal to strike the prospective juror for cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's decision to deny Petitioners' motion to excuse the potential juror for cause did not constitute an abuse of discretion, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Petitioners' motion for a new trial View "Messer v. Hampden Coal Co., LLC" on Justia Law

This case involved a decision by the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH) to provide a wage increase for current and newly hired employees in three counties that were part of its District 5 operations. Appellants, who worked in DOH's District 1 counties, filed administrative grievances contending that they were victims of unlawful discrimination because of DOH's failure to provide them with a wage increase. The West Virginia public employees grievance board and the circuit court found no merit to Appellants' contention. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants did not provide the Court with a basis on which to find that the board's findings were arbitrary or capricious so as to represent an abuse of discretion. View "Hammond v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Michelle Falquero was employed by the state Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) when she filed a grievance alleging (1) that she had been constructively discharged due to a hostile work environment which spurred her to tender a letter of resignation, and (2) that when her working conditions improved she was wrongly denied the opportunity to rescind the voluntary resignation even though DEP had not formally accepted it. The state Public Employee's Grievance Board found merit in Falquero's contention that her job at DEP should not have been terminated because she could and did rescind her voluntary resignation before DEP had accepted it and ordered DEP to reinstate Falquero with back pay. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding (1) acceptance of a tender of resignation of public employment may occur when the employer (i) clearly indicates acceptance through communication with the employee, or (ii) acts in good faith reliance on the tender; and (2) because the evidence showed that acceptance of the resignation did not occur, the circuit court did not err in upholding the ruling of the Grievance Board. View "W. Va. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Falquero" on Justia Law

Employee injured his back while working for Employer. Employee ultimately received a permanent partial disability award for his back injury. Employee then sought a psychiatric consultation, which resulted in Employee being assessed with major depressive disorder. The claims administrator denied Employee's request to add depression as a compensable injury of his workers' compensation claim, and the Workers' Compensation Office of Judges and Workers' Compensation Board of Review (BOR) affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a claimant must get prior authorization from a claims administrator before seeking an initial psychiatric consultation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) W. Va. S.C.R. 85-20-12.5(a), which states that an initial psychiatric evaluation must be authorized by a claims administrator, is an invalid administrative regulation; (2) W. Va. C.S.R. 85-12-12.4 sets forth a three-step process that must be followed when a claimant is seeking to add a psychiatric disorder as a compensable injury in his or her workers' compensation claim; and (3) in the instant case, Employee did not receive the process that he was entitled to under section 85-12-12.4. Remanded. View "Hale v. Office of Ins. Comm'r" on Justia Law