Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed a claim for workers’ compensation for her peripheral neuropathy that she developed due to toxic exposure to heavy metals at the workplace. The claim was ruled compensable. Petitioner subsequently began intravenous chelation therapy at her physician’s office, a treatment that was medically necessary to treat Petitioner’s compensable condition. Petitioner sought reimbursement for those medical expenses. An administrative law judge with the Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges concluded that reimbursement was appropriate. The Workers' Compensation Board of Review reversed, concluding that reimbursement for these medical expenses was precluded pursuant to West Virginia Code of State Rules 85-20-62.2, under which a claimant will be denied reimbursement for intravenous chelation therapy performed in an office. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 85-20-62.2 unreasonably denies reimbursement when such treatment is medically necessary, in contravention of W. Va. Code 23-4-3, and it is therefore invalid. Remanded for entry of an order directing that Petitioner’s reasonable expenses for medically necessary chelation therapy be reimbursed. View "Moore v. K-Mart Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner prevailed in a workers’ compensation claim before the Supreme Court in which she sought medical benefits. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition seeking attorney fees and costs. At issue before the Supreme Court was the application of W. Va. Code 23-5-16(c), which provides a financial incentive for lawyers to represent workers’ compensation claimants seeking medical benefits. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) section 23-5-16(c) does not apply retroactively; but (2) the application of section 23-5-16(c) to Petitioner’s request for attorney fees and costs is not a retroactive application of the statute. Remanded. View "Cassella v. Mylan Pharms." on Justia Law

An Employee filed a class action complaint against her Employer alleging that the Employer violated the state’s Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours Standards (MWMHS) by failing to pay her for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week at a rate of one and one-half times her regular rate. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Employer, determining that the MWMHS only applies to “employees” and “employers” as defined under the MWMHS and that the Employer in this case did not meet the statutory definition of “employer.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Employer was regulated by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, and therefore, the Employer did not meet the definition of an “employer” under the state’s MWMHS for purposes of the Employee’s overtime compensation claim. View "King v. West Virginia's Choice, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners were seven electricians who were employed by Eastern Electric, LLC, an electrical contractor, on several public works projects. Petitioners filed this civil action to recover statutory wages and liquidated damages under the Prevailing Wage Act and Wage Payment and Collection Act. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Eastern Electric. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court erred in dismissing Petitioners’ Prevailing Wage Act claims as untimely, and disputed issues of material fact existed with regard to Eastern Electric’s “honest mistake or error” affirmative defense; and (2) the circuit court correctly dismissed Petitioners’ Wage Payment and Collection Act claims. View "Grim v. Eastern Electric, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners, individually and in their capacities as representatives of 162 firefighters, filed a petition with the Fireman’s Civil Service Commission for the City of Charleston (the Commission) challenging the City of Charleston’s (City) method of calculating overtime wages. The Commission found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Petitioners’ claims. Petitioners filed a complaint and petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court, alleging that the City should not be permitted to unilaterally alter its method of calculating overtime pay and asserting that the Commission should be compelled to assume jurisdiction in the matter. The circuit court dismissed the Commission and granted summary judgment to the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear the underlying matter; and (2) no legal principle prevented the City’s action. View "Boggess v. City of Charleston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former employee of Defendant, filed this action brought pursuant to the Wage Payment and Collection Act (WPCA), alleging that Defendant violated the WPCA by failing to pay him the commissions which he was due and owing by the next regular payday upon his resignation. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Defendant, finding that Defendant did not violate the WPCA because Defendant’s employment agreement with Plaintiff contemplated that Plaintiff was paid commissions upon shipment of products. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the parties disagreed as to how commissions were calculated, the circuit court improperly focused on when the commissions were paid and therefore incorrectly determined that there were no genuine issues of fact. View "Adkins v. Am. Mine Research, Inc." on Justia Law

Employee was discharged from employment with Employer for picket line violence. Thereafter, Employee filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits. A Workforce West Virginia administrative law judge (ALJ) denied unemployment benefits, finding that Employee had been discharged for gross misconduct. The Workforce West Virginia’s Board of Review affirmed. The circuit court reversed and ruled that Employee was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits, concluding that the findings of fact of the ALJ, as adopted by the Board, were clearly wrong. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s final order and remanded to the circuit court with directions to reinstate the Workforce West Virginia decision denying unemployment compensation benefits, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that Employee’s acts did not constitute gross misconduct. Remanded. View "Alcan Rolled Prods. Ravenswood v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Dawn Hanna worked for the Board of Education of Webster County as a teacher from 1989 until 2012. After fundraiser proceeds went missing, Hanna was informed that she would be charged with felony embezzlement but that she could avoid prosecution by resigning from her position and paying back the missing funds. Pursuant to this discussion, Hanna resigned from her position. Hanna subsequently applied for unemployment benefits. The Board of Review of WorkForce West Virginia concluded that Hanna was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits because she voluntarily quit her job. The circuit court reversed, finding that Hanna acted under duress and that her decision to resign was not voluntary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that WorkForce was not clearly wrong when it found that Hanna resigned voluntarily, and therefore, the circuit court erred in reversing WorkForce’s findings. View "Bd. of Educ. of Webster County v. Hanna" on Justia Law

Respondent began employment with the Raleigh County Emergency Services Authority in 2002. In 2010, the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board notified Respondent that he was ineligible to participate in the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) because he had not worked the statutorily-required 1,040 hours per year necessary for participation in PERS. The Retirement Board upheld the denial. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the Board was equitably estopped from denying to Respondent participation in PERS. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board was not prevented from denying to Respondent the right to participate in PERS where (1) Respondent’s employer erroneously informed him that he was eligible to participate in PERS; and (2) Respondent did not rely on the Board’s representations about his PERS eligibility in accepting the position with the Authority. View "W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Respondents were five employees of the State covered by the Public Employees Retirement System who actively served in the United States military during several recognized periods of armed conflict and were honorably discharged from the military. Respondents sought military service credit available through W. Va. Code 5-10-15 based on their military service. The West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board denied Respondents’ requests for military service credit for service occurring periods of armed conflict other than limited exceptions. On appeal, the circuit court ruled in favor of Respondents and granted each of their military service credit requests in full. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in holding that Respondents were entitled to the military service credit they sought. View "W. Va. Consolidated Pub. Ret. Bd. v. Wood" on Justia Law