Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

William Gill, a firefighter with the City of Charleston, had injured his back before being hired by the City. During his employment, he again injured his back. This injury was ruled compensable and diagnosed as lumbar and thoracic sprain. The Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges (the OOJ) later added four new diagnoses to Gill’s initial compensable claim. The Workers’ Compensation Board of Review reversed, concluding that the additional four diagnoses were noncompensable preexisting conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) no evidence supported the OOJ’s determination that Gill’s compensable injury aggravated his preexisting injuries; and (2) a noncompensable preexisting injury may not be added as a compensable component of a claim for workers’ compensation medical benefits merely because it may have been aggravated by a compensable injury. View "Gill v. City of Charleston" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a police officer with the Department of Natural Resources, lost his right eye as a result of a workplace injury. Petitioner was awarded thirty-three percent permanent partial disability for the “total and irrevocable loss of sight in one eye” under W. Va. Code 23-5-6(f) but was awarded nothing for the permanent impairment caused by his continuing problems with infections and related conditions in his eye socket or for the permanent disfigurement caused by his eye injury. The Office of Judges affirmed the Claims Administrator’s award of no additional permanent partial disability above and beyond the statutory thirty-three percent disability award. The West Virginia Worker Compensation Board of Review affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board erred as a matter of law in its application of section 23-5-6(f). Remanded for further development of medical evidence related to what, if any, additional award Petitioner should receive for permanent disability caused by the physical removal of his right eye beyond the loss of vision in that eye. View "Goff v. W. Va. Office of Ins. Comm’r" on Justia Law

After Respondent was terminated as Superintendent of Schools she challenged her termination from employment by filing suit in the circuit court, naming as Defendants the West Virginia Board of Education and its former president (collectively, Petitioners). Respondent alleged in her complaint that her due process rights under the state Constitution were violated and asserted claims for breach of contract, defamation, and false light. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that qualified immunity barred each of Respondent’s claims. The circuit court denied Petitioners’ motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Respondent’s complaint, holding that Respondent’s complaint failed to allege a cause of action sufficient to overcome Petitioners’ discretion to terminate her, and therefore, qualified immunity barred each of Respondent’s claims. View "W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Marple" on Justia Law

Petitioner served as general counsel to the West Virginia Department of Agriculture (WVDA) for approximately twenty-five years. The WVDA submitted employer and employee contributions to the Public Employees Retirement System (“PERS”) on Petitioner’s behalf for twenty-one years. In 2013, the the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board (“Board”) notified Petitioner that he was not eligible to participate in PERS because he was not a full-time employee. The Board subsequently entered a final order denying Petitioner’s request to participate in PERS on the grounds that he was not a full-time employee. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s final order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner was statutorily prohibited from participating in PERS because he never worked more than approximately three hundred hours in any one year. View "Curry v. W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd." on Justia Law

Patricia Jones (Patricia) and Danny Akers (Danny) divorced. Thereafter, Judy Vannoy Akers (Judy) and Danny married. After Danny died, the West Virginia Public Employees Retirement Board (Board) awarded Judy disability retirements. Patricia argued that she was entitled to Danny’s West Virginia Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) retirement benefits based on the provision for those benefits in her divorce decree. The Board denied benefits on the grounds that there was not an enforceable qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) in effect at the time when the survivor benefits were issued to Judy. Both Patricia and Judy challenged the Board’s rulings. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Board. The Supreme Court reversed after invoking its equitable powers to permit the posthumous entry of a QDRO that provided for distribution of Patricia’s equitable interest in the portion of Danny’s retirement assets recognized as marital property, holding (1) the Board erred in granting posthumous disability benefits to Judy rather than preretirement benefits; and (2) Patricia was entitled to seek Danny’s PERS benefits. View "Jones v. W. Va. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

Respondents brought an action against their employer and its CEO (collectively, Petitioners) alleging gender discrimination in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act and sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment. After a jury trial, Respondents were awarded $250,000 each for emotional distress as compensatory damages and $250,000 each in punitive damages. Petitioners filed post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial and requested a review of the punitive damages award. The circuit court denied Petitioners’ motions. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the order of the circuit court to the extent that it denied Petitioners’ motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial on Respondents’ award of compensatory damages for their hostile work environment claims, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support their claims for sexual harassment based on hostile work environment; but (2) reversed the circuit court’s order to the extent that it denied Petitioners’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on Respondents’ award of punitive damages, holding that there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the standards for the imposition of punitive damages. View "Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood v. Griffith" on Justia Law

Two individuals (Claimants) who sustained work-related injuries received workers’ compensation benefits. Claimants sought additional benefits as a result of further symptoms related to their original workplace injuries and timely requested that the new diagnoses be added to their original claims. In both cases, however, denials of compensability and/or medical treatment required extensive litigation through the workers’ compensation system. The Supreme Court ultimately found Claimants to be entitled to the compensability ruling/medical treatment they had requested, but as a result of the litigation delays, Claimants’ requests for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits associated with the newly added diagnoses were denied by the workers’ compensation system as untimely filed. The Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the Board of Review denying Claimants’ PPD evaluation requests as untimely and remanded, holding (1) Claimants’ requests for a PPD evaluation were timely pursuant to W. Va. Code 23-4-16(a)(2); and (2) to hold otherwise would effectively deny Claimants their statutory rights to receive a permanent disability evaluation and to be compensated for their workplace injuries. Remanded. View "Hammons v. W. Va. Office of Ins. Comm’r" on Justia Law

Larry Myers, a sales associate, worked at Outdoor Express, Inc., a recreational vehicle dealership. Myers received no pay if no sales were finalized during the preceding two-week period. Myers filed claims for, and received, unemployment compensation benefits for periods when he did not receive commission checks for sales of recreational vehicles. A deputy commissioner with Workforce West Virginia subsequently determined that the benefits were to be repaid by Myers, finding that Myers was neither totally nor partially unemployed during various periods between November 29, 2008 and March 17, 2012, and was, therefore, ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The circuit court affirmed the administrative decision and directed that Myers pay back $39,713 in benefits he received for the periods in question. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that Myers was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits because he was neither totally nor partially unemployed during the periods in question; but (2) the $39,713 was improperly calculated based on the statute of limitations pertaining to the overpayments in this case. View "Myers v. Outdoor Express, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1996, the Mason County Board of Education and Michael Whalen, the then-superintendent of schools, entered into a settlement agreement in which Whalen agreed to forego the final year of his superintendent contract in exchange for a lump sum payment of $60,000. Whalen retired in 1997. In 1998, the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board, as administrator of the West Virginia Public Employees Retirement System, ruled that a $60,000 payment received by Whalen did not constitute “salary” and therefore would not be included when calculating his retirement annuity benefit. In 2001, Whalen filed a complaint in the circuit court that was, in essence, an appeal of the Retirement Board’s 1998 final order. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Whalen. The Retirement Board then filed this complaint seeking a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Whalen’s appeal was not filed within the thirty-day period specified in W. Va. Code 29A-5-4(bb), and therefore, the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling that Whalen’s appeal was timely. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd. v. Hon. David W. Nibert" on Justia Law

Prior to his termination, Petitioner was employed by Respondent, a tin plate manufacturer, as a technician operator. After his termination, Petitioner and his wife (Petitioners) filed this action seeking damages for retaliatory discharge and loss of consortium, alleging that Petitioner was discharged for reporting violations of a permit issued under the West Virginia Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA) and making complaints to Respondent about those permit violations. Respondents removed the case to federal court on grounds of diversity. The federal district court then certified a question to the West Virginia supreme Court, which answered the question as follows: An employee who alleges that he was discharged for reporting violations of a permit issued under authority of the WPCA and making complaints to his employer about those permit violations has established the predicate substantial public policy required to prima facie prove that the employer’s motivation for the discharge was the contravention of public policy. View "Frohnapfel v. Arcelormittal USA LLC" on Justia Law