Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was a guest passenger in a vehicle insured by Progressive Classic Insurance Company when the vehicle was rear-ended by a truck. Petitioner received medical payments coverage under the Progressive policy for some of the medical expenses she incurred for the treatment of her injuries. Petitioner later successfully sued the truck owner and driver and received damages. Progressive subsequently asserted a subrogation lien on the recovery for the amount it paid under the medical payments coverage. Petitioner filed this complaint against Progressive, alleging common law and statutory bad faith claims. The circuit court dismissed the action, determining that because Petitioner was not a named insured under the Progressive policy and paid no premiums for the policy, Petitioner was a third-party insured and was, therefore, precluded from pursuing her bad faith claims against Progressive. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioner was a first-party insured under the Progressive policy because the policy included within the definition of an insured person "any other person while occupying a covered vehicle"; and (2) therefore, Petitioner may pursue an action against Progressive for common law and statutory bad faith. View "Dorsey v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner's decedent, Freda Bradley, purchased a named perils homeowners insurance policy from Farmers and Mechanics Mutual Insurance Company of West Virginia (Farmers). Bradley filed a claim under the policy for damage to her kitchen and bathroom floor. Farmers denied the claim citing a policy exclusion for water damage below the surface of the ground, fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria. Bradley filed a complaint against Farmers alleging several causes of action stemming from Farmers' denial of coverage under an insurance policy Bradley had purchased from Farmers. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers, concluding (1) damage done to Bradley's kitchen floor did not constitute a "collapse" as required by the policy; and (2) the alleged collapse was not caused by "hidden decay." Petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in finding that the term "collapse" in the insurance policy was not ambiguous and that Bradley's kitchen floor did not collapse; and (2) whether Bradley should have known that decay was causing her kitchen floor to sink was a genuine issue of material fact to be decided by a jury. Remanded. View "Chafin v. Farmers & Mechanics Mut. Ins. Co. of W. Va." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought underinsured motorists (UIM) coverage from Respondent, Plaintiff's insurance carrier, after he was involved in an accident. Plaintiff and his wife eventually filed suit against Respondent seeking to recover the benefits. Plaintiff and Respondent settled the claim. Plaintiffs then amended their complaint against Respondent to allege a bad faith claim for violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, alleging that Respondent acted in bad faith by not paying their first-party claim for UIM. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then moved for attorney fees and costs for substantially prevailing in the underlying bad faith award. The circuit court denied the costs and fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that there was no factual basis upon which to award fees on the bad faith claim. View "Lemasters v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Hess Oil Company asserted an unfair trade practices claim against two insurance companies. The jury returned a verdict against the insurance companies and awarded punitive damages. The circuit court, however, reduced the amount of the award by means of remittitur. The insurance companies appealed, contending that the trial court erred by giving conflicting jury instructions, introducing improper evidence of future remediation costs, and awarding punitive damages. Hess also appealed, challenging the court's reduction of its punitive damages award. The Supreme Court set aside the jury verdict and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court committed multiple errors, and the errors affected the jury's verdict in a manner prejudicial to the insurance companies. View "AIG Domestic Claims, Inc. v. Hess Oil Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners, who had a liability policy with State Farm, were involved in a motor vehicle accident. Petitioners filed an underinsured motorist claim with State Farm. Based on the absence of underinsurance coverage in Petitioners' policy, State Farm denied coverage. Petitioners filed a complaint against State Farm, asserting that a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of underinsurance coverage had not occurred. The circuit court granted Petitioners' motion for partial summary judgment, concluding (1) State Farm's underinsured motorist selection/rejection form did not precisely comply with the state Insurance Commissioner's prescribed form; and (2) State Farm's failure to use the Commissioner's prescribed forms resulted in underinsured motorists coverage being added to the policy as a matter of law. The Supreme Court answered the circuit court's certified question by holding that an insurance company's failure to use the Commissioner's prescribed forms pursuant to W. Va. Code 33-6-31(d) results in the loss of the statutory presumption that the insured provided a reasonable offer which was knowingly rejected and a reversion to the lower standards set forth in Bias v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. View "Thomas v. McDermitt" on Justia Law

Fluker filed a lawsuit against Cava Toyota World on April 3, 2009, alleging that he was wrongfully terminated from his employment. The defendants reported the lawsuit to their insurance carrier, National Union, four days later, but National Union did not respond until November 11, 2009, when it sent a denial of coverage letter. The defendants defended the lawsuit without the assistance of their insurance carrier and sought to file a third-party complaint against National Union, asserting common law “bad faith” and violations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act , arising from the denial of coverage. The third-party complaint did not seek a finding that there was coverage under the National Union policy or request that the court find coverage and order National Union to defend the lawsuit. The trial court entered summary judgment for National Union, finding that the claims contained in the third-party complaint were not derivative of the claims asserted in the underlying lawsuit. The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cava, v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

Lisbeth Cherrington entered into a contract with the Pinnacle Group for the construction of a home. Anthony Mamone worked with Cherrington during the contract and construction process. After the construction was completed, Cherrington filed this action against Pinnacle and Mamone, alleging, inter alia, negligence, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. Pinnacle and Mamone requested Erie Insurance Property and Casualty Company, with whom they had insurance policies, to provide coverage and a defense. Because Erie denied both coverage and a duty to defend, Pinnacle and Mamone filed a third-party complaint against Erie seeking a declaration of the coverage provided by their policies. The circuit court granted Erie's motion for summary judgment, finding that the three policies issued to Pinnacle and Mamone did not provide coverage for the injuries and property damage allegedly sustained by Cherrington. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's finding that neither Mamone's homeowners policy nor his umbrella policy provided coverage under the facts of this case; but (2) reversed the circuit court's ruling finding no coverage to exist under Pinnacle's commercial general liability policy. Remanded. View "Cherrington v. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

The Bunch Company filed consumer complaint, alleging that when BrickStreet Mutual Insurance Company became its insurer, BrickStreet wrongfully included a charge for the expense of an agent commission in the workers' compensation premium. The West Virginia Insurance Commissioner denied relief, upholding the previously approved rates. The circuit court reversed and vacated the Commissioner's administrative order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commissioner did not err in allowing BrickStreet to charge Bunch for a non-incurred agent commission; (2) the Commission properly found the insurance rates at issue were reasonable, and the trial court encroached upon a matter that has been expressly delegated to the executive branch by ignoring the deference the Commissioner was entitled to in connection with the interpretation of its own regulation; and (3) this case did not present any factual disputes requiring the Commissioner to hold a hearing. View "W. Va. Employers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bunch Co." on Justia Law

These two consolidated cases involved a bond for which Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford) was the surety. Each bond principal was sued, and both cases resulted in the entry of default judgments. Hartford was not given notice of either lawsuit against its principals or notice that default judgments were being sought. Hartford learned of the default judgments only after the plaintiffs in those cases sought payment on the bonds. In each case, Hartford ultimately was found liable on the bond. Hartford appealed, asserting that the circuit courts erred in finding the bonds to be judgment bonds and in holding Hartford liable on the bonds under the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the two bonds at issue were judgment bonds, and therefore, the circuit courts correctly found that default judgments entered against the bond principals were conclusive and binding against Hartford. View "Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Curtis" on Justia Law

William Piper was killed in a motor vehicle accident in which he was driving. His passenger, Kyle Hoffman, was also killed. The Estate of Hoffman subsequently filed suit against the Estate of Piper. The case was bifurcated into two parts for trial. Relevant to this appeal was the declaratory judgment action of insurance coverage involving State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. The declaratory judgment coverage action involved the question of whether Piper was a resident of the home of his grandparents at the time of his death. If he was, there would be coverage under a State Farm personal liability umbrella policy issued to Piper's grandfather. The jury returned a verdict finding Piper lived with his grandparents, thus finding in favor of Hoffman's Estate on the coverage issue. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court erroneously applied the Dead Man's Statute in prohibiting the testimony of Piper's family members and the introduction of documentary evidence regarding where Piper was residing on the date of his death. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the Dead Man's Statute is invalid, as it conflicts with the paramount authority of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. View "State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Prinz" on Justia Law