Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In purchasing a vehicle, Robin Hinkle and her former husband purchased GAP Insurance issued by Safe-Guard Products International, LLC (Safe-Guard). The Hinkles were told that the GAP Insurance would relieve them of payment owed on the vehicle if it was declared a total loss as a result of an accident and more was owed for the vehicle than the value assigned to it at the time it was totaled. Robin was later involved in an accident that resulted in her vehicle being declared a total loss. To pay off the balance owed on the vehicle, Robin submitted a claim to Safe-Guard under the GAP Insurance. Safe-Guard denied coverage. Robin subsequently filed this action against Safe-Guard, alleging breach of contract and bad faith. Robin filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the GAP Insurance constituted insurance under state law for purposes of this litigation. The circuit court granted the motion. Thereafter, Safe-Guard initiated the instant proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition to preclude enforcement of the partial summary judgment order. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Safe-Guard’s GAP Insurance constituted insurance under the laws of West Virginia. View "State ex rel. Safe-Guard Prods. Int’l LLC v. Hon. Miki Thompson" on Justia Law

Lexon Insurance Company (“Lexon”) issued two performance bonds to DLM, LLC. Both bonds named Berkeley County as the obligee. DLM later defaulted under both bonds. Berkeley County filed this action against Lexon and DLM, seeking “specific performance of the Surety’s obligations according to the terms of the subject bonds” in addition to its costs and expenses. Berkeley County subsequently filed a motion for default judgment, pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1), against Lexon. The circuit court entered default judgment against Lexon for the total face value of the two bonds at issue, plus post judgment interest. The circuit court denied Lexon’s motion to set aside default judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order denying Lexon’s motion to set aside default judgment, holding (1) because the damages sought in this case were not a “sum certain” as required by Rule 55(b)(1), default judgment was improperly granted under that rule; and (2) default judgment was improperly entered under the unique circumstances of this case where the parties failed to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to the extension of the time for filing an answer. View "Lexon Ins. v. County Council of Berkeley County" on Justia Law

Petitioners, the West Virginia Investment Management Board (IMB) and the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board (Board), instituted a declaratory judgment action against the Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company (VALIC) requesting judicial resolution of Petitioners’ entitlement to a full surrender of two annuity contracts without delays in payment or surrender charges. The trial court granted VALIC’s motion for summary judgment, resolving Petitioners’ claims on grounds of standing, the absence of a justiciable controversy, and the lack of ambiguity concerning the language of a policy endorsement in dispute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in finding that no justiciable controversy existed between the parties and that Petitioners lacked standing in relation to the contracts; and (2) the policy endorsement language under review was of such doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might disagree as to its meaning. View "W. Va. Inv. Mgmt. Bd. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins." on Justia Law

Petitioner, West Virginia Mutual Insurance Company, Inc. (WVMIC), was a professional medical liability insurer that insured physicians, medical practices and others in West Virginia. The medical malpractice claims underlying the current dispute were asserted by Respondents against their surgeon’s former employer, United Health Professional, Inc. (UHP), a medical corporation insured under a medical malpractice policy issued by WVMIC for the year 2010. Under the terms of a global settlement agreement, WVMIC tendered $3 million to Respondents under an extended reporting endorsement insuring the surgeon. The settlement further provided that Respondents and WVMIC would abide by a judicial determination as to whether additional insurance limits were available for Respondents’ vicarious liability claims against UHP. The circuit court concluded that there was an additional $6 million in policy limits available for Respondents’ claims against UHP. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that UHP has a total of $3 million in separate policy limits under the 2010 policy for Respondents’ claims asserted against it, which amount was in addition to the $3 million that WVMIC previously tendered under the global settlement agreement for the claims asserted against the surgeon. Remanded. View "W. Va. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Adkins" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was W. Va. Code 33-6-36, which, in certain circumstances, requires insurance companies to continue motor vehicle liability coverage for a spouse after the death of, or separation or divorce from, the named insured. Francis McComas separated from and then divorced a United Service Automobile Association (USAA) named insured. USAA removed McComas from the named insured’s policy. Seven days after the divorce, McComas lost control of his vehicle and collided with Kimberly Lucas’s vehicle. McComas died in the collision. Lucas, who was seriously injured, filed a lawsuit against McComas’s estate. Plaintiff included a declaratory judgment count against USAA, contending that the USAA motor vehicle policy with McComas’s former spouse provided liability coverage for McComas’s negligence. The circuit court granted judgment for Plaintiff, determining that USAA was required by section 33-6-36 to notify McComas of his right to buy a separate liability insurance policy upon canceling McComas’s liability coverage, and because that notice was not given to McComas, USAA was required to provide liability coverage to McComas’s estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, 33-6-36 required USAA to notify McComas of the termination of his coverage and his right to request a separate policy.View "United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Lucas" on Justia Law

In this insurance coverage dispute, an injured electrician sued Morlan Enterprises, Inc. and Paul Kerns, an electrician who subcontracted for Morlan. Kerns, an Ohio resident, was covered under a commercial general liability policy issued by Owners Insurance Company that was obtained in Ohio. Morlan was named on a “Certificate of Insurance Coverage” as an additional insured under the policy, but Owners denied coverage. The circuit court concluded that West Virginia substantive law rather that Ohio substantive law applied to the insurance coverage issue, allowed Morlan to proceed against Owners on a first-party bad faith claim, and prohibited Owners from presenting evidence of the payment of attorney fees sought by Morlan that were paid by another source. Owners subsequently sought a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent enforcement of the circuit court’s order. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that it was premature to issue the requested writ based upon the circuit court’s interlocutory order. View "State ex rel. Owners Ins. Co. v. Hon. Warren R. McGraw " on Justia Law

Paul Lightner filed a consumer complaint on behalf of himself and other policyholders before the Insurance Commissioner against CitiFinancial and Triton Insurance Company challenging the rates for certain insurance products. Following the Commissioner’s investigation and consideration of Lightner’s complaint, the Commissioner denied Lightner’s request for a hearing and found the challenged rates were reasonable. Lightner filed a petition appealing the Commissioner’s order denying his request for a hearing. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in upholding the Commissioner’s order denying a hearing because this case did not present any factual disputes warranting a hearing in this case; and (2) properly concluded that the Commissioner’s handling of the rate issues raised in Lightner’s complaint met statutory, regulatory, and constitutional standards. View "Lightner v. Riley" on Justia Law

Insurer issued a commercial general liability insurance policy to Nightclub. After an altercation resulted in three Nightclub patrons receiving gunshot wounds, one of the injured patrons notified Nightclub that he intended to sue. Insurer subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action to determine coverage. The circuit court granted declaratory judgment to Insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in finding that the policy permitted Insurer to terminate its duty to defend once the policy limits were exhausted through the expenditure of attorney’s fees and costs related to the defense of the underlying tort actions; and (2) the circuit court did not err in ruling that the “Limited Assault and Battery Coverage” endorsement to the policy applied to the facts of this case and that coverage for the alleged injuries and damages was limited to $25,000. Remanded. View "Flowers v. Max Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case had its origins in a property damage action brought by Jason and Gina Corrick against B&B Transit, Inc. B&B Transit filed a notice and coverage claim with its insurer, Montpelier US Insurance Company. Montpelier eventually settled the case against B&B Transit. While the Corricks’ complaint was still pending, Respondents, including B&B Transit, filed a first-party bad faith claim against Petitioners, including Montpelier and its national coverage counsel, Charlston, Revich & Wollitz (“CRW”). Respondents subsequently served discovery requests on Petitioners. After CRW opposed disclosure of certain requested documents, Respondents filed a motion to compel disclosure of the documents. The circuit court entered an order requiring CRW to disclose certain documents. Petitioners sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court’s discovery order. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition as moulded, concluding that part of the circuit court’s order permitting discovery of documents sought by Respondents was prohibited from enforcement because the documents were protected under the attorney-client privilege. View "State ex rel. Montpelier US Ins. Co. v. Hon. Bloom" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed tort claims against Mine Safety Appliances Company (“MSA”). Plaintiffs settled with MSA under settlement agreements that assigned to Plaintiffs the right to recover the remainder of the settlement amount under an insurance policy that North River Insurance Company sold to MSA. MSA then amended their complaints to add claims against North River, and MSA filed cross-claims against North River. In the meantime, earlier-filed litigation between North River and MSA was pending in Pennsylvania and Delaware. North River filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for a stay of the proceedings, arguing that West Virginia was an inconvenient forum and the proceedings should be dismissed pending resolution of the out-of-state litigation. The circuit court denied the motions. The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition subsequently sought by North River, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) denying North River’s motion to dismiss where strong deference was according to Plaintiffs’ choice of forum and considerations relevant to a forum non conveniens analysis suggest no basis for dismissal of the action; and (2) denying the motion to stay the proceedings, as it would be unfair and prejudicial to Plaintiffs to delay the trials unnecessarily. View "State ex rel. N. River Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law