Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, the executrix of the estate of Henry Cline, filed a complaint against Respondent, Dr. Kiren Kresa-Reahl, alleging that Respondent negligently failed to advise the decedent of the availability of certain medications to treat his stroke. Prior to filing her complaint, Petitioner refused to provide a pre-suit screening certificate of merit pursuant to the pre-suit requirements of the Medical Professional Liability Act. Petitioner asserted that her claim fell within the exception to such requirements as an "informed consent" claim. The circuit court disagreed, ruling that Petitioner's complaint did not state a recognized informed consent claim and that, therefore, her failure to provide a screening certificate of merit warranted dismissal without prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in applying the plain language of the statute and caselaw in dismissing the case without prejudice. View "Cline v. Kresa-Reahl " on Justia Law

Bobby Messer, a lineman, came into contact with an energized electric transmission line and suffered severe injuries. Petitioners, Bobby and Amanda Messer, filed a complaint alleging that several defendants, including Hampden Coal Company, acted with deliberate intent, resulting in the injury to Bobby. Petitioners settled with or voluntarily dismissed all parties except Hampden. Before trial, Petitioners moved to strike a prospective juror for cause because he had stated opinions that potentially conflicted with those of the Petitioners' electrical engineering expert and possessed such professional education and experience in the field of electrical engineering that his presence upon the jury would have caused his opinions to unduly influence the jury's deliberations on the case's central issue. The circuit court denied the motion, and the jury returned a verdict for Hampden. The court subsequently denied Petitioners' motion for a new trial based on the court's refusal to strike the prospective juror for cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's decision to deny Petitioners' motion to excuse the potential juror for cause did not constitute an abuse of discretion, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Petitioners' motion for a new trial View "Messer v. Hampden Coal Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Kyle Hoffman was a passenger in an automobile driven by William Piper (William) when an accident resulted in the deaths of Hoffman and William. Robin Prinz, administratrix of the estate of Kyle Hoffman, filed a complaint asserting a wrongful death claim against Julie Piper (Petitioner), administratrix of the estate of William, and a declaratory judgment claim against State Farm. The complaint alleged that William's grandfather maintained a personal liability policy through State Farm that provided coverage to William. The circuit court bifurcated the two claims and stayed the wrongful death action pending resolution of the declaratory judgment action. The circuit court found the State Farm policy provided liability coverage for the allegedly negligent actions of William. State Farm appealed. Petitioner filed a motion to stay the wrongful death action pending the Court's resolution of State Farm's appeal, which the circuit court denied. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order denying the stay. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to further stay the wrongful death proceedings; and (2) a writ of prohibition is not available to correct discretionary rulings. View "State ex rel. Piper v. Circuit Court (Sanders)" on Justia Law

Employee injured his back while working for Employer. Employee ultimately received a permanent partial disability award for his back injury. Employee then sought a psychiatric consultation, which resulted in Employee being assessed with major depressive disorder. The claims administrator denied Employee's request to add depression as a compensable injury of his workers' compensation claim, and the Workers' Compensation Office of Judges and Workers' Compensation Board of Review (BOR) affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a claimant must get prior authorization from a claims administrator before seeking an initial psychiatric consultation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) W. Va. S.C.R. 85-20-12.5(a), which states that an initial psychiatric evaluation must be authorized by a claims administrator, is an invalid administrative regulation; (2) W. Va. C.S.R. 85-12-12.4 sets forth a three-step process that must be followed when a claimant is seeking to add a psychiatric disorder as a compensable injury in his or her workers' compensation claim; and (3) in the instant case, Employee did not receive the process that he was entitled to under section 85-12-12.4. Remanded. View "Hale v. Office of Ins. Comm'r" on Justia Law

Steven Posey was injured after falling at the City of Buckhannon's solid waste transfer station while unloading garbage bags and other material. Posey and his wife filed a complaint against the City, alleging negligence. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the City was entitled to immunity from liability pursuant to the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act. The Poseys appealed, contending that transfer stations, such as the one conducted by the City, were not included in the governmental immunity provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that a transfer station conducted directly by a political subdivision as a temporary collection site for solid waste to be transported to a dump or sanitary landfill constitutes a "facility" within the meaning of the immunity provisions of the Act. View "Posey v. City of Buckhannon" on Justia Law

Employee of a railway company was accused by his Employer of stealing rail. After it was discovered that Employee was involved in the removal and sale of the rail, Employee's employment was terminated. An arbitration panel reinstated Employee's employment the next year. Employer then submitted the matter to an assistant prosecutor. Employee was never arrested or incarcerated. Employee subsequently sued Employer for malicious prosecution. During the trial, the circuit court granted Employee's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether Employer had procured his prosecution, which was one element of his required proof. The jury then returned a verdict in favor of Employee. The circuit court denied Employer's motions for judgment as a matter of law, new trial, or remittitur. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Employer's post-trial motions, holding that the circuit court committed reversible error by determining as a matter of law that Employer procured the malicious prosecution of Employee where testimony of the assistant prosecutor directly contradicted the proposition that Employer had a level of control over the prosecution amounting to procurement. Remanded for a new trial. View "Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Higginbotham " on Justia Law

Employee submitted a claim for workers' compensation under Employer's policy with Insurer, which claim was paid in full. Employee also filed a deliberate intent lawsuit against Employer. After assuming the attorney's fees and costs associated with defending and settling the action, Employer filed a complaint against Insurer, alleging various claims related to Insurer's denial of coverage in the defense of the deliberate intent action. The circuit court granted Employer's motion for partial summary judgment on its bad faith claim against Insurer and awarded damages to Employer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Insurer met its obligation under W. Va. Code 23-4C-6 to make deliberate intent coverage available to Employer upon the Employer's voluntary request; and (2) because the language of the policy was plain, and the exclusion of deliberate intent coverage was clear, the circuit court erred in concluding that the policy was ambiguous and therefore resulted in deliberate intent coverage being included in the policy under the doctrine of reasonable expectations. View "W. Va. Employers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Summit Point Raceway Assocs." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a constructor, was sued by several people living in new homes built by Petitioner (Residents). Residents claimed they were injured by radon gas leaking into their homes because of improper construction by Petitioner. Petitioner argued that the agreement to purchase the new homes required Residents to arbitrate their claims, whether they signed the agreement or not. The circuit court found the arbitration provision ambiguous and unconscionable and refused to compel Residents into arbitration. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to compel Residents to arbitrate their claims. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court was within its authority to refuse to enforce the arbitration clause against Residents because the arbitration provision was ambiguous, unconscionable, and unenforceable. View "State ex rel. Richmond Am. Homes v. Jefferson County Circuit Court (Sanders)" on Justia Law

The executor of the estates of a family who were killed in an accident filed a wrongful death action against an individual and trucking company. The trucking company was bankrupt, but insurance coverage for the accident was available through a policy issued to the company by Converium. Converium subsequently entered into an agreement with National Indemnity Company, which agreed to purchase all or certain portions of Converium. No representation of National Indemnity appeared at the court-ordered mediation. National Indemnity's vice president and legal counsel, Joseph Casaccio, failed to appear at the second mediation but appeared at the third mediation. The case was eventually settled. The circuit court subsequently imposed monetary sanctions against Petitioners, National Indemnity and Casaccio, for failing, without good cause, to appear at the mediation. The Supreme Court reversed the order imposing sanctions, holding (1) W.V. Trial Ct. R. 25.10 did authorize a trial court to sanction Petitioners, but (2) no sanctionable conduct occurred in this case. View "Casaccio v. Curtiss" on Justia Law

In three cases consolidated for review, the facts were similar. A person was admitted to a nursing home, and a family member signed an admission agreement containing an arbitration clause. After the person died, a family member filed suit against the nursing home, alleging the nursing home negligently caused injuries leading to the person's death. The nursing home sought to dismiss the lawsuit and compel the family member to participate in binding arbitration. The family members asserted the arbitration clauses were unenforceable, alleging (1) the clauses violated the West Virginia Nursing Home Act, and (2) were unconscionable under the common law. After reviewing the relevant laws, the Supreme Court held that (1) the Nursing Home Act, which states any that waiver by a nursing home resident of his right to sue for injuries sustained in a nursing home shall be void as contrary to public policy, is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act; and (2) in the context of pre-injury nursing home admission agreements, where a personal injury or wrongful death occurred after the signing of the contract, arbitration clauses are unenforceable to compel arbitration of a dispute concerning negligence that results in a personal injury or wrongful death. View "Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp." on Justia Law