Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involved an automobile accident which resulted in the death of fourteen-year-old Samantha Staubs and serious injury to her sister, thirteen-year-old Jessica Staubs. Both were passengers in a vehicle stolen and driven by fourteen-year-old Misty Johnson, who was intoxicated. Respondent Lori Ann Staubs, the mother of Samantha and Jessica, filed suit against Petitioner Jonathan Marcus and others, alleging that Petitioner negligently provided alcohol to the minors. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent on the issue of liability and concluded that Petitioner was at least one percent negligent and Jessica was less than fifty percent negligent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erroneously granted summary judgment because disputed issues of material fact pervaded the matter. Remanded. View "Marcus v. Staubs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with Stephen Stanton. At the time, Plaintiff was operating a vehicle owned by his employer, Bambardier Aerospace Corporation, and Stanton was driving a vehicle owned by his employer, the City of Elkins. Plaintiff and his wife filed an action against the City and Stanton to recover for injuries. Plaintiffs' personal automobile insurer, Westfield Insurance, filed a crossclaim against the City and Stanton and a third party claim against Bombardier and National Union Fire Insurance. The trial court entered an order finding (1) the City, Stanton, and National were immune from liability; (2) Bombardier and Westfield were subject to a payment of damages of not more than $20,000 each; and (3) Plaintiffs were not entitled to auto medical coverage under the policy covering Bombardier and the policy issued by Westfield. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court's order to the extent it held the uninsured motorist policies for Bombardier and Westfield were not enforceable above the mandatory limits of uninsured motorist coverage required by W. Va. Code 33-6-31; (2) reversed the court's order to the extent it denied Plaintiffs auto medical payment benefits under Bombardier's policy; and (3) affirmed the remainder of the court's judgment. View "Jenkins v. City of Elkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the grandchildren of Larry Hose, filed the instant action against Anthony Hose, individually and as administrator of the estate of Larry Hose, alleging that Plaintiffs were sexually and physically abused by Larry Hose, and that the estate of Larry Hose was closed through fraudulent conduct without an accounting for the claim Plaintiffs had against the estate. After the complaint was filed, three other individuals were added as defendants. The circuit court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs on the issue of liability. The circuit court then certified to the Supreme Court the questions asking the Court to determine whether an affidavit was sufficient to give notice of a claim against the estate of Larry Hose and whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint filed in this case. The Court found that the affidavit was sufficient in giving notice of a claim against the estate and that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint. View "Hose v. Estate of Hose" on Justia Law

This action arose from modifications resulting from landfill activity made to real property that was adjacent to the property of Respondents. Respondents filed a complaint against the Town of Pratt and others, alleging that the modifications allegedly caused a change in the normal water flow on Respondents' property and resulted in property damage. The Town filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment, asserting it was entitled to be dismissed based on sovereign immunity. The circuit court denied the Town's motion as premature, finding that the parties should conduct discovery prior to the court making a determination regarding the Town's immunity arguments. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's order denying the Town's motion and granted the Town's requested writ of prohibition, finding that the Town's immunity was purely a question of law and ripe for summary disposition at the circuit court level through a motion to dismiss. View "State ex rel. Town of Pratt v. Circuit Court (Stucky)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a dump truck driver employed by Independence Coal Company when he suffered a work-related injury. Plaintiff filed a deliberate intent action alleging that Independence created three unsafe work conditions that contributed to Plaintiff's injuries. The circuit court granted Independence's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff did not prove proximate cause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in not allowing Plaintiff to rely on three witnesses who worked for Independence to show that an issue of material fact existed; and (2) the circuit court had evidence tending to show that an unsafe working condition was a proximate cause of the incident. Therefore, Plaintiff demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of fact. Remanded. View "Meadows v. Massey Coal Servs." on Justia Law

This appeal was brought by Appellant following two separate orders of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Allied Warehousing Services, Inc., the Appellee, dismissing Appellant's workers' compensation fraud and common law fraud claims and granting summary judgment to Appellee, finding it to be a special employer of Appellant for the purpose of workers' compensation immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on Appellant's workers' compensation and common law fraud claims because there was no basis to conclude that the alleged fraudulent conduct had any prejudicial effect on the decision of the ALJ regarding the suspension of Appellant's temporary total disability benefits; and (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to Appellee on Appellant's negligence claim on the basis that Appellee was Appellant's special employer, thus entitling Appellee to workers' compensation immunity from such a negligence claim. View "Bowens v. Allied Warehousing Servs." on Justia Law

Defendant, Tudor's Biscuit World of America, appealed the circuit court's order denying its motion to alter or amend the court's order denying its motion to set aside the default judgment rendered against it in this workplace injury action. Tudor's asserted (1) the circuit court erred in its application of the "reasonable time" requirement set forth in W.V. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to its motion to set aside the default judgment, arguing that such timeliness requirement was inapplicable to void judgments; and (2) the circuit court improperly applied and weighed the factors set forth in Parsons v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corporation in denying its motion for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court should have properly set aside the default judgment, as (1) Tudor's motion to set aside the default judgment was filed within a reasonable period of time; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in its analysis of the Parsons factors to the extent that such analysis resulted in its denial of Plaintiff's motion for relief from default judgment, and therefore, to that extent, erred in denying Tudor's subsequent motion to alter or amend. View "Tudor's Biscuit World of Am. v. Critchley" on Justia Law

This case was a consolidation of three separate wrongful death lawsuits. Each lawsuit arose from a nursing home's attempt to compel a plaintiff to participate in arbitration pursuant to a clause in a nursing home admission contract. The Supreme Court (1) ruled that the arbitration clauses were unconscionable and unenforceable in two of the cases, and (2) held that the Nursing Home Act could not be relied upon to bar enforcement of the arbitration clause in the third case. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded to consider whether the arbitration clauses were enforceable under state common law principles that were not specific to arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA. On remand, the Supreme Court (1) held that the doctrine of unconscionability that the Court explicated in Brown I was a general, state, common-law, contract principle that was not specific to arbitration and did not implicate the FAA; (2) reversed the trial courts' prior orders compelling arbitration in two of the cases and permitted the parties to raise arguments regarding unconscionability anew before the trial court; and (3) found the issue of unconscionability in the third case was not considered by the trial court but may be raised on remand. View "Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioners Robert and Rickie Bansbach sought injunctive relief in connection with allegations that their neighbors, Respondents Daniel Harbin and Mary Fanok, were engaging in conduct which constituted both a nuisance and harassment. The trial court ruled that Petitioners had failed to demonstrate that Respondents' conduct constituted a private nuisance or that Respondents' speech, both verbal and written, was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in ruling (1) Respondents' storing of materials on the Fanok property did not create a nuisance that must be abated by the Court; (2) Respondents' posting of signs and shouting profanities at Petitioners did not amount to fighting words for First Amendment purposes; and (3) Respondents' behavior was not so outrageous that it required injunctive relief. View "Bansbach v. Harbin" on Justia Law

After Vicki Savard drowned in a whitewater rafting accident, Petitioner, the personal representative of Savard's estate, filed a wrongful death complaint against a rafting company, its CEO, and three river guides, including Travis Cobb. A process server gave a summons and complaint to Cobb's father at the Jefferson County address where Cobb was believed to reside. Defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for insufficiency of service of process, and for lack of venue. The circuit court of Jefferson County granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, finding (1) Cobb was not a resident of Jefferson County, and therefore, attempted substituted service was not proper; and (2) the court did not have venue to hear the case because no other named defendant resided in Jefferson County, nor did the accident occur in Jefferson County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court had personal jurisdiction to proceed with the action because Cobb's usual place of abode, when the summons and complaint were served, was the Jefferson County address; and (2) accordingly, the court had venue to hear Petitioner's complaint. View "Savard v. Cheat River Outfitters, Inc." on Justia Law