Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The cases underlying these consolidated appeals involved the purchase of an automobile. Plaintiffs purchased vehicles and signed retail installment contracts with three separate dealers. The dealers assigned their rights in the contract and vehicles to Credit Acceptance Corporation, who financed the purchases. All of the contracts contained arbitration clauses. Plaintiffs later commenced civil actions against Credit Acceptance in circuit court, alleging, inter alia, violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection act (WVCCPA). Credit Acceptance filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss, which the circuit court denied, finding that the arbitration agreements were unconscionable based upon the unavailability of some of the arbitration forums named therein and because Plaintiffs in the agreements waived their respective rights to a jury trial. The Supreme Court reversed in both of the cases, holding that because one of the arbitration forums named in the arbitration agreements remained available to arbitrate the parties' disputes, and because an arbitration agreement is not unenforceable solely because a party to the contract waives her right to a jury trial, the causes must be remanded for entry of orders compelling arbitration. View "Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front" on Justia Law

Lisbeth Cherrington entered into a contract with the Pinnacle Group for the construction of a home. Anthony Mamone worked with Cherrington during the contract and construction process. After the construction was completed, Cherrington filed this action against Pinnacle and Mamone, alleging, inter alia, negligence, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. Pinnacle and Mamone requested Erie Insurance Property and Casualty Company, with whom they had insurance policies, to provide coverage and a defense. Because Erie denied both coverage and a duty to defend, Pinnacle and Mamone filed a third-party complaint against Erie seeking a declaration of the coverage provided by their policies. The circuit court granted Erie's motion for summary judgment, finding that the three policies issued to Pinnacle and Mamone did not provide coverage for the injuries and property damage allegedly sustained by Cherrington. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's finding that neither Mamone's homeowners policy nor his umbrella policy provided coverage under the facts of this case; but (2) reversed the circuit court's ruling finding no coverage to exist under Pinnacle's commercial general liability policy. Remanded. View "Cherrington v. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner here was Gaddy Engineering Company, and Respondents were an individual lawyer, Thomas Lane, and a law firm in which Lane was a partner (Bowles Rice). Petitioner contended that the Lane agreed to pay Petitioner one-third of all sums Bowles Rice received in connection with its legal representation of a group of land companies in a case to be filed against a company for alleged underpayment of gas royalties. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents as to all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that the trial court (1) correctly applied the doctrine of impracticability as to Petitioner's breach of contract claims; (2) did not err in ruling that no attorney-client relationship existed between Petitioner and Respondents, and thus the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on Petitioner's professional negligence claim; (3) correctly granted summary judgment on Petitioner's claim of fraud; and (4) did not err in granting summary judgment on Petitioner's claim seeking relief in quantum meruit. View "Gaddy Eng'g Co. v. Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, LLP" on Justia Law

Craig Payne died after choking on a hot dog fed to him at a D.E.A.F. Education and Advocacy Focus (DEAF) day rehabilitation center. Following Payne's death, investigations revealed that DEAF suffered from serious deficiencies. DEAF's license was subsequently revoked. Thereafter, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHR) issued DEAF a provisional license for six months, after which a regular renewal license was issued. Payne's parents (Respondents) filed suit against certain DHHR employees and agents, alleging the the DHHR defendants were negligent in their licensure of DEAF. The DHHR defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the DHHR defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Respondents' claims. Remanded. View "W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Payne" on Justia Law

Tobby Small and James Ramsey were involved in a traffic accident. Small filed an action against Ramsey and others in federal court, and Ramsey filed an action against Small and others in circuit court. Small filed a motion to dismiss the federal case on the grounds that Ramsey failed to file a compulsory counterclaim. The circuit court ordered Ramsey to file a counterclaim in Small's federal case, and ordered Small not to object to Ramsey's motion to amend his answer so he could file a counterclaim. Ramsey eventually settled with Small, but the other defendants did not. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Small, Small unsuccessfully filed a motion for summary judgment in Ramsey's circuit court case. The circuit court ruled that Small waived the asserted issues because he had disobeyed the court's order not to contest Ramsey's motion to amend his answer. Small then filed for this writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the circuit court exceeded its authority in prohibiting Small from raising a defense to Ramsey's counterclaim in the federal litigation and in sanctioning him for exercising his right to assert a defense; and (2) the doctrine of res judicata barred Ramsey's action against Small. View "State ex rel. Small v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were six custodial parents of children who were owed child support from the noncustodial parent suing on behalf of their respective children. Defendants included the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR), the Support Enforcement Commission (SEC), and the Bureau for Child Support Enforcement (BCSE). In each case, child support orders were entered requiring the noncustodial parents to pay a certain amount of child support each month, but the orders were not preserved, and significant portions of the child support payments in arrears were barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants failed to reduce their respective support arrearages to judgment and/or to renew such judgments, thus causing their claims to become time-barred. The circuit court concluded that further factual development was necessary to determine whether Plaintiffs had a private cause of action under the statutes governing child support enforcement. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that Plaintiffs did not have a private cause of action under the statutes governing collection of child support by the BCSE. View "Fucillo v. Kerner" on Justia Law

William Piper was killed in a motor vehicle accident in which he was driving. His passenger, Kyle Hoffman, was also killed. The Estate of Hoffman subsequently filed suit against the Estate of Piper. The case was bifurcated into two parts for trial. Relevant to this appeal was the declaratory judgment action of insurance coverage involving State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. The declaratory judgment coverage action involved the question of whether Piper was a resident of the home of his grandparents at the time of his death. If he was, there would be coverage under a State Farm personal liability umbrella policy issued to Piper's grandfather. The jury returned a verdict finding Piper lived with his grandparents, thus finding in favor of Hoffman's Estate on the coverage issue. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court erroneously applied the Dead Man's Statute in prohibiting the testimony of Piper's family members and the introduction of documentary evidence regarding where Piper was residing on the date of his death. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the Dead Man's Statute is invalid, as it conflicts with the paramount authority of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. View "State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Prinz" on Justia Law

Petitioner homeowners filed suit against Respondent, an entity that had been hired to perform emergency services for damages to Petitioners' home as the result of a sewage backup, asserting claims for personal injury and property damage arising from Respondent's alleged negligence in failing to detect and/or remediate mold in their home following the sewer backup that flooded the home with water and waste. The circuit court held that the contract between the parties, which included a mold/mildew/bacteria waiver, was a complete bar to Petitioners' claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the contract was not substantively unconscionable; and (2) allowing Respondent to disclaim liability for mold damage did not violate public policy. View "Pingley v. Perfection Plus Turbo-Dry, LLC" on Justia Law

Decedent died intestate as a result of a motor vehicle accident. Petitioner, the former spouse of Decedent, sought a share in the settlement proceeds from a wrongful death action based on her monthly receipt of payments from Decedent for a child support arrearage. The circuit court ruled that Petitioner was not entitled to a portion of the subject settlement funds because Petitioner could not demonstrate she was financially dependent on Decedent at the time of trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to a share of the wrongful death settlement proceeds, as Petitioner's receipt of monthly arrearage payments was not sufficient to demonstrate the statutory requirement of financial dependence. View "Ellis v. Swisher" on Justia Law

Petitioner was hired by Employer as a general laborer to work on a pipeline project. When some unsecured pipe struck Petitioner in the back, Petitioner sustained back and other injuries. Petitioner subsequently applied for and received workers' compensation benefits for his injury. Employer subsequently refused to rehire Petitioner, and petitioner was awarded unemployment compensation benefits. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the instant action claiming workers' compensation discrimination and alleging that Employer acted with "deliberate intention" to cause Petitioner's injury. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer. Petitioner appealed, arguing that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Employer acted with deliberate intention to cause Petitioner's injury and whether Employer refused to rehire Petitioner in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment for Employer, as (1) Petitioner failed to demonstrate the statutory predicate for a deliberate intention claim; and (2) Petitioner failed to adduce prima facie evidence giving rise to a genuine issue of material fact with regard to his claim of workers' compensation discrimination. View "Smith v. Apex Pipeline Servs." on Justia Law