Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2012, nineteen plaintiff families filed a single complaint alleging products liability and negligence claims against Defendants. In 2013, six plaintiff families filed a single complaint also alleging products liability and negligence claims against Defendants. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court referred Plaintiffs as two civil actions to the Mass Litigation Panel. The Panel entered an order that transformed the two civil actions into twenty-five separate actions. Plaintiffs sought a writ of prohibition to preclude enforcement of the order on the grounds that the Panel did not have the authority to alter their status as two civil actions. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the Panel did not have the authority to separate the cases. View "State ex rel. J.C. v. Judge Mazzone" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission (PFBC) filed a complaint against Consol Energy, Inc. and Consolidation Coal Company (collectively, Consol) alleging West Virginia common law tort claims and seeking damages for massive losses of fish and aquatic life allegedly caused by Consol’s discharges of waste water into a stream that flows between West Virginia and Pennsylvania. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that PFBC was only authorized to bring civil suits for damages as a result of violations of Pennsylvania law, and PFBC had no authority to bring a cause of action under West Virginia common law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that PFBC had sufficient interest in the fish and aquatic life under its control to give it standing to file suit in West Virginia and bring West Virginia common law tort claims against Consol to seek recovery of damages as a result of the fish kill. View "Commonwealth of Pa. v. Consol Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

This case had its origins in a property damage action brought by Jason and Gina Corrick against B&B Transit, Inc. B&B Transit filed a notice and coverage claim with its insurer, Montpelier US Insurance Company. Montpelier eventually settled the case against B&B Transit. While the Corricks’ complaint was still pending, Respondents, including B&B Transit, filed a first-party bad faith claim against Petitioners, including Montpelier and its national coverage counsel, Charlston, Revich & Wollitz (“CRW”). Respondents subsequently served discovery requests on Petitioners. After CRW opposed disclosure of certain requested documents, Respondents filed a motion to compel disclosure of the documents. The circuit court entered an order requiring CRW to disclose certain documents. Petitioners sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court’s discovery order. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition as moulded, concluding that part of the circuit court’s order permitting discovery of documents sought by Respondents was prohibited from enforcement because the documents were protected under the attorney-client privilege. View "State ex rel. Montpelier US Ins. Co. v. Hon. Bloom" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Boyd was driving a City of Parkersburg fire truck through an intersection with his lights and sirens activated during a red light when Michael Gray’s vehicle proceeded into the intersection. The fire truck struck Petitioner’s vehicle in the rear passenger side. Gray filed an action against the City and Boyd (together, Respondents), alleging negligent operation of the fire truck by Boyd. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed, rendering the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment erroneous. View "Gray v. Boyd" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed tort claims against Mine Safety Appliances Company (“MSA”). Plaintiffs settled with MSA under settlement agreements that assigned to Plaintiffs the right to recover the remainder of the settlement amount under an insurance policy that North River Insurance Company sold to MSA. MSA then amended their complaints to add claims against North River, and MSA filed cross-claims against North River. In the meantime, earlier-filed litigation between North River and MSA was pending in Pennsylvania and Delaware. North River filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for a stay of the proceedings, arguing that West Virginia was an inconvenient forum and the proceedings should be dismissed pending resolution of the out-of-state litigation. The circuit court denied the motions. The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition subsequently sought by North River, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) denying North River’s motion to dismiss where strong deference was according to Plaintiffs’ choice of forum and considerations relevant to a forum non conveniens analysis suggest no basis for dismissal of the action; and (2) denying the motion to stay the proceedings, as it would be unfair and prejudicial to Plaintiffs to delay the trials unnecessarily. View "State ex rel. N. River Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority (WVRJCFA), alleging that while housed at the Southern Regional Jail, she was raped by a correctional officer. The WVRJCFA moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The circuit court denied summary judgment, finding (1) disputed issues of material fact precluded a determination as to whether the WVRJCFA was vicariously liable for the alleged sexual assaults committed by the correctional officer; and (2) Plaintiff’s claims of negligent supervision, training, and retention did not encompass discretionary decisions in the administration of fundamental government policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the WVRJCFA was entitled to qualified immunity, and therefore, the circuit court erred in failing to grant summary judgment to the WVRJCFA. View "W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B." on Justia Law

Employee filed this action against Employer, alleging that his exposure to diesel exhaust fumes while employed by Employer caused him to develop cancer. Employee subsequently died, and his wife (Petitioner) was substituted as the plaintiff. Petitioner amended the complaint to allege that Employee's death was a result of his exposure to diesel exhaust fumes. Employer moved to exclude the testimony of Petitioner's three expert witnesses on the grounds that their methodology was not reliable. After a hearing, the circuit court excluded Petitioner's experts' testimony. The court then entered summary judgment in favor of Employer because Petitioner did not have an expert. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order excluding the testimony of Petitioner's experts and the grant of summary judgment, holding that the trial court exceeded the scope of its review of the reliability prong of W. Va. R. Evid. 702 in concluding that Petitioner's experts were not reliable. Remanded. View "Harris v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell down a staircase in a commercial parking lot that lacked handrails. Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Defendants, who constructed and maintained the stairs, asserting that Defendants were prima facie negligent because a local ordinance legally required the installation of at least one handrail. Defendants asserted that the missing handrail was an open and obvious danger, and therefore, Plaintiff was barred as a matter of law from recovering any damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Defendants, finding no actionable negligence because Defendants had no duty of care toward Plaintiff. The Supreme Court first abolished the open and obvious doctrine and then reversed the circuit court's orders in this case, holding (1) if a hazard is open is obvious on premises, it does not preclude a cause of action by a plaintiff for injuries caused by that hazard; and (2) instead, a jury may consider the obviousness of the hazard in determining the comparative negligence of the plaintiff against that of the owner of the premises. Remanded. View "Hersh v. E-T Enters., Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

Richard Young was killed while working for Apogee Coal Company (Apogee) after being allegedly instructed by his supervisor, James Browning, to remove a counterweight on an end loader that fell on top of him and killed him. Petitioner, administratrix of Young's estate, sued Apogee, Browning, and Apogee's alleged parent company (collectively, Respondents), alleging, inter alia, a deliberate intent cause of action against Browning and Apogee on the basis that Young had not been property trained on removal of the counterweight. Respondents removed the case to the U.S. district court, which certified a question of law to the West Virginia Supreme Court. The Court answered by holding that a non-employer "person," such as a supervisor or co-employee, may not be made a defendant in a deliberate intent cause of action pursuant to W. Va. Code 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii). View "Young v. Apogee Coal Co., LLC " on Justia Law

In 2009, GameStop, Inc., which operated retail stores that sold video games and video gaming software, hired Petitioner as an assistant manager. When she began her employment, Petitioner received a store associate handbook. In a document included with the handbook was an arbitration agreement. Petitioner signed and dated an acknowledgment of the handbook and rules including arbitration. In 2011, Petitioner sued GameStop and some of its managers (collectively, GameStop) for wrongful discharge, sexual harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, among other causes of action. The circuit court dismissed the complaint pending Petitioner's submission of her claims to final and binding arbitration. Petitioner appealed, arguing that she did not enter into a valid arbitration with GameStop or, in the alternative, the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner and GameStop entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate Petitioner's claims; and (2) the arbitration agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. View "New v. GameStop, Inc." on Justia Law