Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The decedent died while participating in the Tough Mudder Mid-Atlantic event in Gerrardstown, Berkeley County, West Virginia. Plaintiff, the decedent’s mother and personal representative, filed a wrongful death action in Marshall County against several Tough Mudder defendants. Defendants objected to the venue and requested that the matter be transferred to Berkeley County. The circuit court concluded that venue was proper in Marshall County. Defendants filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent enforcement of the circuit court’s order. The Supreme Court granted the writ and directed the circuit court of Marshall County to transfer the case to the circuit court of Berkeley County, holding that venue did not lie in Marshall County. View "State ex rel. Airsquid Ventures, Inc. v. Hon. David W. Hummel, Jr." on Justia Law

The case involved an alleged fraudulent scheme involving United Bank and McQuade Appraisal Services (collectively, Respondents) to inflate the value of property in a residential development called Walnut Springs Mountain Reserve (Walnut Springs). Walnut Springs ultimately failed and was abandoned by the developer. Petitioners were owners of lots in Walnut Springs. The circuit court dismissed Petitioners’ claims, concluding, inter alia, that the majority of the claims were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims for fraud in the inducement and aiding and abetting fraud in the inducement, negligence, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, respondent superior, and punitive damages, as the claims were not time-barred; and (2) affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, holding that the court’s judgment regarding these claims was not in error. View "Evans v. United Bank, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a verbal contract with Jerry Morrison for the construction of a log home on her property. Plaintiff entered into a second verbal contract with James Phillips to build the basement walls and a chimney with two fireplaces. Concerned about the number of apparent defects in the construction and excessive costs of the labor and materials, Plaintiff fired Morrison. Plaintiff later filed suit against Morrison and Phillips (together, Defendants), alleging fraud and misrepresentation, breach of contract, and negligence, among other claims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff only with respect to her negligence claim against Morrison. The jury further found that Plaintiff had failed to mitigate her damages and/or was comparatively negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) limiting the time the parties had to present the case to the jury; (2) placing limitations on expert testimony; (3) granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Phillips; (4) denying Plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to her negligence and breach of warranty claims against Morrison; (5) instructing the jury on comparative negligence; (6) instructing the jury on outrageous conduct; and (7) denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. View "Sneberger v. Morrison" on Justia Law

The parties in this litigation were involved in an automobile collision at an intersection. Each driver claimed to have the right-of-way at the time of the collision. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant alleging negligence. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying Plaintiff’s motion for a mistrial or recess based upon the admission of a 911 call regarding the accident; and (2) denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial based upon both the admission of the 911 call and the exclusion of the opinion of the police officer dispatched to the accident on fault in the accident report. View "Browning v. Hickman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually on and behalf of the Estate of Sharon Hanna (the decedent), brought an action against HCR ManorCare, LLC and other entities and individuals engaged in the operation of nursing homes and assisted living facilities (collectively, ManorCare) alleging that the decedent died as a result of substandard care she received at Heartland of Charleston, a ManorCare nursing home. This appeal concerned Plaintiff’s request for production seeking “Center Visit Summaries,” which concerned the treatment of patients at Heartland during the decedent’s residency, and “Briefing Packets,” which consisted of reports and meeting minutes received by the board of directors of each ManorCare corporate entity relating to the decedent’s residency at Heartland. The circuit court directed ManorCare to produce the documents requested. Defendants asked the Supreme Court for relief in prohibition to prevent the enforcement of the circuit court’s orders. The Supreme Court granted the requested relief as moulded, holding (1) ManorCare’s requested relief concerning the Center Visit Summaries was without merit; but (2) the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the production of the board of director Briefing Packets, as the court should have conducted an in camera proceeding to make an independent determination as to whether the Briefing Packets were excluded from discovery pursuant to the attorney-client privilege. View "State ex rel. HCR Manorcare, LLC v. Hon. Stucky" on Justia Law

A driver for Medford Trucking, LLC was injured while his truck was being loaded with coal by employees of Elk Run Coal Co. The driver sued Elk Run. A hauling and delivery agreement between Elk Run and Medford contained an indemnification clause that required Medford to purchase insurance. Accordingly, Medford purchased insurance from four different insurance companies. Elk Run asserted a third-party complaint against the insurers seeking a declaration that there was insurance coverage for the plaintiff’s claim against Elk Run under the policies. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment for the insurance companies, and Elk Run’s third-party complaints against the insurers were dismissed with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded, holding that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to two of the insurers. Remanded. View "Elk Run Coal Co. v. Canopius US Ins., Inc." on Justia Law

Jarrett Smith was injured when his vehicle collided with a truck owned by Modular Building Consultants of West Virginia, Inc. and operated by Billy Joe McLaughlin. Prior to the collision, McLaughlin had arrived at a job site to retrieve a Modular storage container being leased and utilized by Poerio, Inc. Smith filed suit against Modular, alleging negligence. Modular brought a third-party complaint against Poerio, seeking contribution and indemnification pursuant to the lease agreement. Before trial, Modular settled with Smith. Trial as to Modular’s third-party complaint proceeded. A jury found that Poerio did not breach the lease agreement but found that Poerio, Modular, and Smith were all comparatively negligent. The circuit court subsequently entered judgment in Poerio’s favor on its contribution claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury’s finding that Poerio was negligent was not inconsistent with its finding that Poerio did not breach the lease agreement; (2) the circuit court erred in ruling that Modular’s contribution claim was extinguished by its good faith settlement with Smith as a matter of law; but (3) the jury’s verdict was neither inconsistent nor impermissibly considered the comparative fault of Smith. View "Modular Building Consultants of W. Va., Inc. v. Poerio, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ car and a work-truck owned by Energy Corporation of America (ECA) were involved in a wreck that occurred in Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs filed a tort claim in Harrison County against ECA. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for improper venue. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a bad faith claim in Harrison County against their insurer and joined ECA as a co-defendant, seeking tort damages for the wreck. ECA filed a motion to sever for improper joinder and dismiss for improper venue. The circuit court denied relief, concluding (1) joinder of ECA and Plaintiffs’ insurer was improper under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 20; and (2) Harrison County was a proper venue for ECA based on the “venue-giving defendant” principle. ECA petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ as moulded, holding (1) the joinder of Plaintiffs’ insurer and ECA was improper because it failed to satisfy the requirements under Rule 20(a); and (2) once Plaintiffs’ insurer is properly severed from the claim against ECA, there will be no venue-giving defendant in this action, and therefore, Harrison County was not a proper venue for ECA. View "State ex rel. Energy Corp. of Am. v. Hon. John Lewis Marks" on Justia Law

Twenty-nine individual Respondents filed eight separate civil actions alleging that Petitioners - three pharmacies and a physician - and other medical providers negligently prescribed and dispensed controlled substances causing Respondents to become addicted to and abuse the controlled substances. Petitioners moved for summary judgment asserting that Respondents’ claims were barred as a matter of law on the basis of Respondents’ admissions of their own criminal activity associated with the prescription and dispensation of controlled substances by Petitioners. Specifically, Petitioners maintained that Respondents’ actions were barred by the “wrongful conduct” rule and/or the doctrine of in pari delicto. The circuit court concluded that the actions were not barred but certified questions regarding the issue to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that any wrongdoing on the part of Respondents must be assessed under the Court’s precepts of comparative negligence and does not per se operate as a complete bar to Respondents’ causes of action. View "Tug Valley Pharmacy, LLC v. All Plaintiffs Below" on Justia Law

Nineteen unrelated mothers brought in the Circuit Court of Wayne County claims against Pfizer, Inc. and related entities (collectively, Respondents) on behalf of their respective minor children, alleging that their ingestion of Zoloft during their pregnancies caused their children to suffer birth defects. Petitioners hailed from fifteen different states. Respondents moved to refer the litigation to the Mass Litigation Panel. After the motion was denied, a virtually identical complaint was filed in the Wayne County Circuit Court by six unrelated plaintiff families against Respondents. The circuit court consolidated the two civil actions. The twenty-five plaintiff families then moved to refer the litigation to the Panel. The chief justice transferred the two civil actions to the Panel. Respondents filed a motion seeking to dismiss twenty-two non-resident plaintiff families on the basis of forum non conveniens. The Panel granted, in part, the motion to dismiss and dismissed twenty of the twenty-two plaintiff families. Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the Panel’s dismissal order. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that there was no basis to prevent the Panel from enforcing its dismissal order. View "State ex rel. J.C. v. Hon. James P. Mazzone" on Justia Law