Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was charged with first degree murder and found mentally incompetent to stand trial. Petitioner subsequently requested a bench trial to give him the opportunity to establish defenses to the charged offense. At the conclusion of a hearing held pursuant to W. Va. Code 27-6A-6, the trial court ruled that the evidence adduced, were it to go to trial, could result in a verdict of second degree murder. The court determined that it retained jurisdiction over Petitioner for forty years based on the maximum sentence specified for a conviction of second degree murder and remanded him to the custody of William R. Sharpe Hospital for the duration of that period of time. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court, holding (1) Petitioner was not unconstitutionally denied his right to a jury trial because the right to a jury trial does not attach to a hearing requested pursuant to section 27-6A-6; and (2) the evidence presented at the hearing was sufficient for the trial court to rule that the State had demonstrated Petitioner committed second degree murder for commitment purposes. View "State v. Gum" on Justia Law

Dorothy Douglas died from severe dehydration not long after leaving Heartland Nursing Home, where she stayed for nineteen days. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of Douglas’s estate, brought claims of negligence, violations of the West Virginia Nursing Home Act (NHA), and breach of fiduciary duty against Defendants, several corporate entities related to Heartland. After a jury trial, Plaintiff was awarded $11.5 million in compensatory damages and $80 million in punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in concluding that the NHA was not governed by the Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA), and due to a lack of evidence that the pre-suit requirements of the MPLA were met, the claim is dismissed and the accompanying $1.5 million award is vacated; (2) the circuit court erred in recognizing a breach of fiduciary duty claim against a nursing home, and therefore, the claim is dismissed and the accompanying $5 million award is vacated; and (3) the punitive damages award is reduced proportionate to the reduction in compensatory damages. Remanded. View "Manor Care Inc. v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an action individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated against Respondents, Charleston Area Medical Center (CAMC) and CAMC Health Education and Research Institute, asserting causes of action for breach of duty of confidentiality, invasion of privacy, and negligence for placing Plaintiffs’ personal and medical information on a specific CAMC electronic database and website that was accessible to the public. The circuit court denied class certification, finding that Plaintiffs did not meet the prerequisites for class certification and that Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue Respondents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that Petitioners lacked standing and abused its discretion in ruling that Petitioners failed to meet the requirements for class certification. Remanded. View "Tabata v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Hospital sought full tax refunds in relation to Hospital's attempt to reclassify certain services from either "inpatient" or "outpatient" hospital services to "physicians' services" for purposes of the West Virginia Health Care Provider Tax Act. The Office of Tax Appeals denied Hospital's request, and the circuit court affirmed. In seeking to reclassify items of overhead as "physicians' services," Hospital focused on its use of certain billing codes that were required by federal law. The Tax Commission argued that Hospital's reliance on these billing codes to identify what qualifies as "physicians' services" under the Act was misplaced. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the overhead items at issue did not qualify as "physicians' services" under the Act. View "Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v. Lorensen" on Justia Law

Nancy Belcher was the designated health care surrogate of decedent Beulah Wyatt. Belcher signed an arbitration agreement that was presented to her when she sought to admit Wyatt to the McDowell Nursing and Rehabilitation Center (McDowell Nursing). Wyatt died after living ten months in the nursing home. Lelia Baker subsequently filed a wrongful death suit against McDowell Nursing alleging that its negligent care of Wyatt caused and/or contributed to her death. McDowell Nursing filed a motion to dismiss and to enforce the arbitration agreement. The circuit court denied the motion and concluded that the agreement was unenforceable because Belcher did not have the authority to waive Wyatt's right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court denied McDowell Nursing's subsequent request for a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order, holding that Belcher, as a health care surrogate, did not have the authority to enter the arbitration agreement because it was not a health care decision and was not required for Wyatt's receipt of nursing home services from McDowell Nursing. View "State ex rel. AMFM, LLC v. Circuit Court (King)" on Justia Law

In the instant case, the Supreme Court was once again asked to consider whether medical protective orders are valid and enforceable to limit the dissemination and retention of medical records obtained through discovery. Such orders had been entered in lawsuits filed by plaintiffs seeking compensation for the injuries they sustained in motor vehicle accidents caused by other motorists. Repeatedly, the insurers from whom such compensation had been sought requested the West Virginia Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court, and a federal district court to invalidate these protective orders as burdensome, restrictive, and/or unconstitutional. Each time the reviewing Court examined these medical protective orders, it upheld the order as substantively valid and enforceable as a proper exercise of the issuing court's supervisory authority over discovery. In the instant case, the Court again declined insurance companies' invitation to invalidate the subject medical protective orders, finding that the insurance companies' arguments were insufficient to overturn precedent. View "State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff learned his confidential medical and psychological information at St. Mary's Medical Center had been improperly accessed, Plaintiff filed several state-law claims against St. Mary's. The circuit court granted St. Mary's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Plaintiff's state-law claims based upon its conclusion that the claims were preempted by the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). In addition, St. Mary's asserted a cross assignment of error arguing that the circuit court erred by finding that Plaintiff's claims did not fall under the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) and concluding, therefore, that Plaintiff was not required to file a notice of claim and screening certificate of merit. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court's order insofar as it granted St. Mary's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based upon its conclusion that Plaintiff's state-law claims were preempted by HIPAA, holding that Plaintiff's state-law claims for the wrongful disclosure of his medical and personal health information were not preempted by HIPAA; and (2) affirmed the order to the extent it found Plaintiff's claims did not fall under the MPLA. Remanded. View "R.K. v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

Infant was born with severe brain damage. Respondent, Infant's mother, on behalf of Infant, applied for and received Medicaid benefits from the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR). Respondent later filed a medical malpractice lawsuit on behalf of Infant. Subsequently, Respondent petitioned the circuit court for approval of the settlement, requesting that Medicaid not be reimbursed. DHHR intervened. The court granted the motion of Respondent for allocation of the $3,600,000 settlement, holding that, pursuant to Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, a proportional reduction of DHHR's recovery was required based on the ratio of the settlement to the "full value" of the case among the various damages categories. Using this allocation method, the court reduced DHHR's statutory reimbursement from the requested amount of $289,075 to $79,040 and directed that the net settlement proceeds be placed in a special needs trust for the benefit of Infant. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages was applicable in this case; and (2) under the formula applied in Ahlborn, the DHHR was entitled to approximately $98,080, less its pro rata share of attorney's fees and costs. Remanded. View "In re E.B." on Justia Law

Petitioner, the executrix of the estate of Henry Cline, filed a complaint against Respondent, Dr. Kiren Kresa-Reahl, alleging that Respondent negligently failed to advise the decedent of the availability of certain medications to treat his stroke. Prior to filing her complaint, Petitioner refused to provide a pre-suit screening certificate of merit pursuant to the pre-suit requirements of the Medical Professional Liability Act. Petitioner asserted that her claim fell within the exception to such requirements as an "informed consent" claim. The circuit court disagreed, ruling that Petitioner's complaint did not state a recognized informed consent claim and that, therefore, her failure to provide a screening certificate of merit warranted dismissal without prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in applying the plain language of the statute and caselaw in dismissing the case without prejudice. View "Cline v. Kresa-Reahl " on Justia Law

Respondent, who had a diagnosis of autism with obsessive compulsive disorder traits and hyperactive traits, had participated for several years in the federal Mentally Retarded / Developmentally Delayed Home and Community-Based Waiver Program, which provided in-home and community-based services for persons with mental retardation or a delayed development condition. The state Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) subsequently terminated Respondent's benefits. The circuit court reversed the DHHR's decision based on the DHHR's failure to present evidence that Respondent's condition had improved since he first began receiving benefits. DHHR appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in placing the burden of proof on it rather than on Respondent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when the DHHR seeks to reduce or terminate benefits that a claimant is receiving under the Waiver Program, the DHHR has the burden of proof to show a change in circumstances warranting such action, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in determining that the DHHUR had the burden to show some medical improvement in Respondent's condition; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the DHHR had failed to meet its burden of proof. View "Hardy v. B.H." on Justia Law