Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Appellee was arrested for DUI, the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked Appellee's driver's license for two years. Appellee filed a request for an administrative hearing, which was conducted on May 6, 2008. By final order dated October 13, 2009, the DMV Commissioner ordered that Appellee's privilege to drive a motor vehicle be revoked for six months. Appellee appealed the revocation order, arguing that the seventeen-month delay between the administrative hearing and entry of the final order revoking his driver's license violated his procedural due process rights. The circuit court reversed the order, concluding that the excessive delay violated Appellee's due process rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellee was required to show actual and substantial prejudice as a result of the delay. Remanded to (1) give Appellee the opportunity to present evidence of prejudice and to give the Commissioner the opportunity to present evidence regarding the reasons for the delay; and (2) balance the resulting prejudice against the reasons for the delay in order to determine whether the delay violated Appellee's right to due process. View "Miller v. Moredock" on Justia Law

Petitioners were fifteen employees of the county Board of Education, who filed a grievance regarding changes made to the subsequent year's extracurricular coaching contracts, claiming they were entitled to receive notice and a hearing prior to the adoption of the changes and that they received neither. The ALJ and the circuit court denied the grievance. Petitioners appealed, contending that W. Va. Code 18A-2-7 gave them the right to receive a hearing before the Board could unilaterally alter the terms of the coaching contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Petitioners' grievance, holding that the circuit court's decision was not clearly wrong nor was it arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law. View "Martin v. Barbour County Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Craig Griffith, state tax commissioner, appealed from an order entered by a circuit court that reversed an earlier order of the Office of Tax Appeals and found that Frontier West Virginia was entitled to a refund of its telecommunications tax for the 2004 year in the amount of over nine million dollars. The Supreme Court reinstated the order of the Office of Tax Appeals and (1) affirmed the circuit court's ruling finding the subject statute, W. Va. Code 11.13B02(b)(5), was plain and unambiguous; (2) reversed the circuit court's ruling finding the governing rule, W. Va. C.S.R. 110-13B-2.6, invalid; and (3) reversed the circuit court's determination that the West Virginia Public Service Commission's (PSC) list of competitive services that were exempt from the telecommunications tax applied to define a taxpayer's gross income for the calendar year in which the PSC issued its list. Rather, the Court held that the PSC's list operated to define a taxpayer's gross income for the calendar year following the issuance of the list. View "Griffith v. Frontier West Virginia, Inc." on Justia Law

After finding that the County Commission of Greenbrier County acted arbitrarily and capriciously by reducing the budget of the Sheriff of the County, the trial court directed the Commission to, among other things, allocate sufficient funds in the next fiscal year budget for the Sheriff to fill any necessary vacant positions. The Commission subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of the trial court's directives. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the writ of mandamus to the Sheriff where the record was devoid of any evidentiary basis for the trial court's conclusion that the budget cuts at issue would necessarily interfere with the Sheriff's ability to fulfill his constitutional and statutory duties. View "Greenbrier County Commission v. Circuit Court (Cummings)" on Justia Law

Appellant Charter Communications and appellee Community Antenna, a smaller company, were competing cable services providers. For over a decade the parties had been litigating the issue of whether Charter was offering discounted rates to some but not all of its customers in violation of the West Virginia Cable Television Systems Act (Act) that prohibits unduly discriminatory rates for over a decade. On the parties' third time before the Supreme Court, at issue was a counterclaim filed by Community Antenna in the underlying lawsuit alleging that Charter was engaged in rate discrimination calculated to harm Community Antenna's business. The trial court concluded that Charter's buy-back plans constituted unduly discriminatory rates in violation of state law and that Charter tortiously interfered with Community Antenna's business relationships with its customers. The jury awarded Community Antenna compensatory and punitive damages. Charter appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is a private cause of action under the Act against cable operators that illegally offer unduly discriminatory cable rates, (2) there was sufficient evidence that Charter's conduct was the proximate cause of harm to Community Antenna, and (3) the jury's award of damages was supported by the evidence. View "Cmty. Antenna Servs., Inc. v. Charter Commc'ns VI, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Jefferson Utilities, Inc. (JUI), a privately-held public utility authorized to provide water service to several areas of Jefferson County, filed a request with the Public Service Commission of West Virginia for a rate increase of approximately 72.2 percent. The ALJ recommended a rate increase of 22.4 percent, and the Commission reduced the rate increase recommended by the ALJ to 4.4 percent. JUI appealed, contending that the Commission erred by rejecting the recommended decision of the ALJ regarding the rate increase. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the evidence in this case was controverted, it was clear that the Commission's decision was not arbitrary, did not result from a misapplication of legal principles, and was supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Jefferson Utils., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va." on Justia Law

Janet Hornbeck appealed an order of the circuit court, arguing that the court erred by affirming the family court's ruling that the Bureau of Child Support Enforcement (BCSE) method of distributing child support arrearage payments between principal and interest is appropriate even though it deviates from the way those allocations are generally made for court-ordered money judgments not involving support. At issue was the validity of a procedure established and followed by an administrative agency. After concluding the procedure to be an interpretive rule under the APA, the Supreme Court held that the BCSE rule is within the authority granted the agency in W. Va. Code 48-11-105. Affirmed. View "Hornbeck v. Caplinger, et al." on Justia Law

Jonathan Darby, who was employed by Kanawha County Board of Education (BOE) as a school bus driver, was terminated when the BOE concluded that Darby had violated the BOE's sexual harassment policy. Darby appealed his termination. After considering the evidence, the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board hearing examiner ordered the BOE to reinstate Darby to his previous position. The BOE appealed. The circuit court reversed, determining that the hearing examiner held the BOE to the wrong burden of proof. Darby appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the hearing examiner used the proper burden of proof in weighing the evidence; and (2) the circuit court improperly exceeded its scope of review, failed to give proper deference to the hearing examiner's factual findings, and wrongly substituted its own judgment on the credibility of the witnesses for that of the hearing officer. View "Darby v. Kanawha County Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Clerk of the McDowell County Commission appealed an order of the Circuit Court of McDowell County pertaining to mandamus proceedings. The Commission was directed to reimburse the attorney fees of A. Ray Bailey who was the prevailing party in an election contest. The Commission argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the Commission to pay Mr. Bailey's fees when the Commission was not a party to the election contest. Furthermore, The Commission argued that there was no statutory authority to support the award. Upon review of the arguments and law governing this matter, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's order directing payment of attorney fees by the Commission.

Appellant Harpers Ferry appealed a circuit court order in favor of Appellee Ralph Taylor. Mr. Taylor asked the City for permission to create a path along a street so that a truck he used could access his property. At the time of Mr. Taylor's request, City Councilman Robert DuBose lived near the proposed path. The City approved Mr. Taylor's request on the condition that he got an authorization from the Mayor. Mr. DuBose abstained from voting on the request, but he participated in all discussions. Two days after the City approved Mr. Taylor's request, Mr. DuBose sent emails complaining about the request. In response, the Mayor imposed additional conditions to the request. Council held a special meeting for the sole purpose of discussing Mr. Taylor's project. At the meeting, Council added more conditions. Mr. Taylor filed a declaratory judgment against the City, arguing that the additional conditions were discriminatory. Mr. Taylor won the case, and the court awarded him attorney's fees. The City argued to the Supreme Court on appeal that Mr. Taylor was not entitled to attorney's fees. After careful review of the briefs, the record submitted on appeal and the oral arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.