Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners asked the circuit court to declare that the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board could not impose disability re-certification requirements of an amended statute and new rule upon them. The circuit court determined that Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and, therefore, dismissed the case. Petitioners appealed, contending the circuit court erred in not reaching the merits of their petition because the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was inapplicable to the facts of their case. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court properly dismissed Petitioners' statute-based claims; but (2) Petitioners' rule-based and letter-based claims were properly before the circuit court. Remanded. View "Hicks v. Mani" on Justia Law

John Epling was arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The DUI charge against Epling was subsequently dismissed. Following an administrative hearing, the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles ordered that Epling's privilege to drive a motor vehicle be revoked. The circuit court remanded the case for a new full evidentiary hearing, with directions to perform a proper analysis under Muscatell v. Cline and Choma v. W. Va. Division of Motor Vehicles. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, and in so ruling, expressly overruled syllabus point three of Choma, holding (1) when a criminal action for driving while under the influence results in a dismissal or acquittal, such dismissal or acquittal has no preclusive effect on a subsequent proceeding to revoke the driver's license, and moreover, in the license revocation proceeding, evidence of the dismissal or acquittal is not admissible to establish the truth of any fact; (2) the circuit court did not err in remanding the matter for a proper Muscatell analysis; and (3) the circuit court erred in remanding the case to the Office of Administrative Hearings, as the Commissioner had jurisdiction to conduct the new evidentiary hearing. View "Miller v. Epling" on Justia Law

Infant was born with severe brain damage. Respondent, Infant's mother, on behalf of Infant, applied for and received Medicaid benefits from the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR). Respondent later filed a medical malpractice lawsuit on behalf of Infant. Subsequently, Respondent petitioned the circuit court for approval of the settlement, requesting that Medicaid not be reimbursed. DHHR intervened. The court granted the motion of Respondent for allocation of the $3,600,000 settlement, holding that, pursuant to Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, a proportional reduction of DHHR's recovery was required based on the ratio of the settlement to the "full value" of the case among the various damages categories. Using this allocation method, the court reduced DHHR's statutory reimbursement from the requested amount of $289,075 to $79,040 and directed that the net settlement proceeds be placed in a special needs trust for the benefit of Infant. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages was applicable in this case; and (2) under the formula applied in Ahlborn, the DHHR was entitled to approximately $98,080, less its pro rata share of attorney's fees and costs. Remanded. View "In re E.B." on Justia Law

These two consolidated appeals, brought by the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, challenged two separate orders of the circuit court holding that the nolo contendere pleas of Respondents did not constitute convictions, thus entitling Respondents to an administrative hearing prior to having their drivers' licenses revoked. The Commissioner argued that the circuit courts erred in granting extraordinary relief to Respondents and in prohibiting the Commission from automatically revoking Repondents' drivers licenses because the nolo contendere pleas constituted convictions under the applicable law. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding (1) under the applicable law, a plea of no contest does not constitute a conviction, and thus Respondents were not convicted of the charge of DUI; (2) thus, the Commissioner lacked the authority to revoke Respondents' drivers' licenses without affording them the opportunity to be heard at an administrative hearing; and (3) therefore, the circuit courts correctly ordered that the Commissioner afford Respondents a hearing on the merits of their revocations. Remanded. View "Miller v. Wood" on Justia Law

Petitioner was employed by the West Virginia Division of Culture and History (Division) as an at will employee. Petitioner was later terminated from his employment. Petitioner filed a grievance with the Public Employees Grievance Board. An ALJ denied the Division's motion to dismiss and authorized the filing of an amended grievance. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended grievance, which a succeeding ALJ dismissed. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Petitioner's grievance for failure to state a ground upon which relief may be granted, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by affirming the decision of the Board without a hearing before an ALJ; and (2) the second ALJ had authority to enter a dismissal order after the previous ALJ denied the Division's motion to dismiss. View "Armstrong v. Div. of Culture & History" on Justia Law

This appeal was brought by Appellant following two separate orders of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Allied Warehousing Services, Inc., the Appellee, dismissing Appellant's workers' compensation fraud and common law fraud claims and granting summary judgment to Appellee, finding it to be a special employer of Appellant for the purpose of workers' compensation immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on Appellant's workers' compensation and common law fraud claims because there was no basis to conclude that the alleged fraudulent conduct had any prejudicial effect on the decision of the ALJ regarding the suspension of Appellant's temporary total disability benefits; and (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to Appellee on Appellant's negligence claim on the basis that Appellee was Appellant's special employer, thus entitling Appellee to workers' compensation immunity from such a negligence claim. View "Bowens v. Allied Warehousing Servs." on Justia Law

Appellant Lola Watkins appealed a final order entered in the circuit court, which affirmed a decision by the ALJ of the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board denying Appellant's grievance of her termination from employment as a teacher. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ's denial of Appellant's grievance was not clearly wrong, as (1) the ALJ properly concluded that the Board proved by a preponderance of the evidence the basis for Appellant's termination; (2) Appellant was afforded adequate notice that the Board intended to present matters relating to her employment history at the grievance hearing; and (3) Appellant failed to make a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. View "Watkins v. McDowell County Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Defendant, Tudor's Biscuit World of America, appealed the circuit court's order denying its motion to alter or amend the court's order denying its motion to set aside the default judgment rendered against it in this workplace injury action. Tudor's asserted (1) the circuit court erred in its application of the "reasonable time" requirement set forth in W.V. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to its motion to set aside the default judgment, arguing that such timeliness requirement was inapplicable to void judgments; and (2) the circuit court improperly applied and weighed the factors set forth in Parsons v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corporation in denying its motion for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court should have properly set aside the default judgment, as (1) Tudor's motion to set aside the default judgment was filed within a reasonable period of time; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in its analysis of the Parsons factors to the extent that such analysis resulted in its denial of Plaintiff's motion for relief from default judgment, and therefore, to that extent, erred in denying Tudor's subsequent motion to alter or amend. View "Tudor's Biscuit World of Am. v. Critchley" on Justia Law

Ruling on a joint petition for declaratory order filed by Monongahela Power Company and Potomac Edison Company ("The Utilities"), The Public Service Commission of West Virginia held that the alternative and renewable energy resource credits attributable to energy purchases by the Utilities from Morgantown Energy Associates (MEA) and the City of New Martinsville ("the Generators"), were owned by the Utilities during the terms of electric energy purchase agreements between the entities. On appeal, the Generators contended that the Commission erred in its ruling and that the energy resource credits were owned by them. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err in finding the credits at issue were owned by the Utilities; and (2) the Commission did not err in holding that it would deem MEA's Morgantown project as a certified facility under the Alternative and Renewable Energy Portfolio Act upon the submission of sufficient evidence by the Utilities. View "City of New Martinsville v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n " on Justia Law

After being stopped and arrested for DUI at a safety checkpoint established by state police, David Smith's license was administratively revoked. On administrative appeal, the DMV Commissioner found that the initial traffic stop failed to comply with the requirements set forth in State v. Sigler, but that failure affected only the criminal portion of the proceedings and did not impact the authority of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to administratively revoke Smith's license in a separate civil proceeding. The circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding, inter alia, that the circuit court erroneously applied the exclusionary rule within the civil context. Remanded for entry of an order reinstating Smith's civil administrative license revocation. View "Miller v. Smith" on Justia Law