Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed a claim for workers’ compensation for her peripheral neuropathy that she developed due to toxic exposure to heavy metals at the workplace. The claim was ruled compensable. Petitioner subsequently began intravenous chelation therapy at her physician’s office, a treatment that was medically necessary to treat Petitioner’s compensable condition. Petitioner sought reimbursement for those medical expenses. An administrative law judge with the Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges concluded that reimbursement was appropriate. The Workers' Compensation Board of Review reversed, concluding that reimbursement for these medical expenses was precluded pursuant to West Virginia Code of State Rules 85-20-62.2, under which a claimant will be denied reimbursement for intravenous chelation therapy performed in an office. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 85-20-62.2 unreasonably denies reimbursement when such treatment is medically necessary, in contravention of W. Va. Code 23-4-3, and it is therefore invalid. Remanded for entry of an order directing that Petitioner’s reasonable expenses for medically necessary chelation therapy be reimbursed. View "Moore v. K-Mart Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner, the Acting Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (Commissioner), revoked Respondent’s driver’s license on the grounds of driving under the influence of alcohol and refusal to submit to a secondary chemical breath test. Respondent timely requested an administrative hearing before the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to challenge the order. Because the arresting officer failed to attend the first day of the hearing, the Commissioner sua sponte scheduled the license revocation matter for a further hearing. Respondent filed a petition for a writ of prohibition and an application for stay in the circuit court seeking to prohibit the DMV from conducting a second day of the hearing. The circuit court granted the petition, concluding that the Commissioner disregarded the procedural law for DMV hearings by scheduling a second hearing when the first hearing “[did] not proceed in a manner that benefits the Commissioner.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commissioner acted within his legitimate powers by adjourning and continuing the hearing to a later day in order to secure the officer’s testimony, and therefore, the circuit court erred in granting this writ of prohibition. View "Dale v. Sizemore" on Justia Law

Petitioners, individually and in their capacities as representatives of 162 firefighters, filed a petition with the Fireman’s Civil Service Commission for the City of Charleston (the Commission) challenging the City of Charleston’s (City) method of calculating overtime wages. The Commission found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Petitioners’ claims. Petitioners filed a complaint and petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court, alleging that the City should not be permitted to unilaterally alter its method of calculating overtime pay and asserting that the Commission should be compelled to assume jurisdiction in the matter. The circuit court dismissed the Commission and granted summary judgment to the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear the underlying matter; and (2) no legal principle prevented the City’s action. View "Boggess v. City of Charleston" on Justia Law

Petitioner, the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, revoked Respondent’s drivers license for driving under the influence of alcohol. Following an administrative hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), the chief hearing examiner affirmed the Commissioner’s order of revocation. The circuit court reversed the revocation ordered by the OAH, finding as fact that Respondent requested a blood test and was not provided one in violation of her constitutional and statutory rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondent did not satisfy her burden of showing that she properly asserted her statutory right to a blood test, and the circuit court’s order, to the extent that it made findings of fact and conclusions to the contrary, was in error. View "Dale v. Painter" on Justia Law

Employee was discharged from employment with Employer for picket line violence. Thereafter, Employee filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits. A Workforce West Virginia administrative law judge (ALJ) denied unemployment benefits, finding that Employee had been discharged for gross misconduct. The Workforce West Virginia’s Board of Review affirmed. The circuit court reversed and ruled that Employee was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits, concluding that the findings of fact of the ALJ, as adopted by the Board, were clearly wrong. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s final order and remanded to the circuit court with directions to reinstate the Workforce West Virginia decision denying unemployment compensation benefits, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that Employee’s acts did not constitute gross misconduct. Remanded. View "Alcan Rolled Prods. Ravenswood v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Dawn Hanna worked for the Board of Education of Webster County as a teacher from 1989 until 2012. After fundraiser proceeds went missing, Hanna was informed that she would be charged with felony embezzlement but that she could avoid prosecution by resigning from her position and paying back the missing funds. Pursuant to this discussion, Hanna resigned from her position. Hanna subsequently applied for unemployment benefits. The Board of Review of WorkForce West Virginia concluded that Hanna was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits because she voluntarily quit her job. The circuit court reversed, finding that Hanna acted under duress and that her decision to resign was not voluntary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that WorkForce was not clearly wrong when it found that Hanna resigned voluntarily, and therefore, the circuit court erred in reversing WorkForce’s findings. View "Bd. of Educ. of Webster County v. Hanna" on Justia Law

David Bunch, a real estate appraiser holding a license issued by the West Virginia Real Estate Licensing and Certification Board, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Circuit Court of Cabell County seeking to halt an administrative disciplinary proceeding initiated against him. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was a state agency, and, pursuant to W. Va. Code 14-2-2(a)(1), venue for the action was proper only in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that it was unclear whether the Board was a “state agency” for purposes of the venue statute. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ, holding that the Board is a state agency entitled to the special venue provisions of section 14-2-2(a)(1), and therefore, the circuit court erred when it allowed the action to proceed in the Circuit Court of Cabell County. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Real Estate Licensing & Cert. Bd. v. Hon. Christopher D. Chiles" on Justia Law

EB Dorev Holdings, Inc. purchased tax liens on certain properties from Kanawha County. The West Virginia Department of Administration, Real Estate Division (WVDOA) later filed a complaint against EB Dorev and Kanawha county seeking to prevent the issuances of the tax deeds to EB Dorev. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the WVDOA and voided the sale of the tax liens. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in ruling that the properties were entered exempt from 2009 real estate taxes upon the WVDOA’s purchase of the properties from private entities in August and September of 2008; but (2) the circuit court’s alternative finding that the tax liens at issue were extinguished through the doctrine of merger was not in error. View "EB Dorev Holdings v. W. Va. Dep’t of Admin., Real Estate Div." on Justia Law

The West Virginia Real Estate Appraiser Licensing and Certification Board filed disciplinary complaints against Linda York, a licensed real estate appraiser, alleging that York engaged in improper, wrongful or deficient conduct in her work as an appraiser. York filed a petition for writ of prohibition seeking to stop the Board's disciplinary proceedings against her, arguing that the Board lacked the authority to reopen previously dismissed complaints against her and that the Board grossly abused and exceeded its legitimate powers in regard to the remaining complaints. The Supreme Court issued the writ, holding that the Board (1) was without authority to reopen or reinstate the complaints that were duly dismissed; and (2) exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to conduct an administrative hearing on the complaints, and the Board’s failure to do so was in clear violation of State statutory and rule provisions. View "State ex rel. York v. Real Estate Appraiser Licensing & Certification Bd." on Justia Law

Respondent began employment with the Raleigh County Emergency Services Authority in 2002. In 2010, the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board notified Respondent that he was ineligible to participate in the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) because he had not worked the statutorily-required 1,040 hours per year necessary for participation in PERS. The Retirement Board upheld the denial. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the Board was equitably estopped from denying to Respondent participation in PERS. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board was not prevented from denying to Respondent the right to participate in PERS where (1) Respondent’s employer erroneously informed him that he was eligible to participate in PERS; and (2) Respondent did not rely on the Board’s representations about his PERS eligibility in accepting the position with the Authority. View "W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd. v. Jones" on Justia Law