Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked Robin Riner’s drivers license due to her failure to submit to a secondary chemical test. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reversed the revocation for refusing to submit to the secondary chemical test, finding that the arresting officer failed to comply with the implied consent statute. The circuit court affirmed the OAH’s final order. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court to the extent it affirmed the OAH’s decision to reinstate Riner’s drivers license despite her refusal to submit to the secondary chemical test, holding that the arresting officer complied with his statutory duties under the implied consent statute. Remanded for the reinstatement of the revocation of Riner’s drivers license. View "Reed v. Riner" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who worked as a registered nurse at a Hospital, was terminated for allegedly violating the Hospital’s narcotic waste policies. Petitioner self-reported her termination to the West Virginia Board of Registered Professional Nurses. The Board issued a notice of complaint on April 2, 2013. On August 14, 2013, the Board issued an interim status report to the Hospital. A hearing was eventually set for January 20, 2015 but was continued until February 19, 2015. Petitioner filed this petition for a writ of prohibition asserting that the Board’s failure to resolve the complaint against her within one year from the date of the status report pursuant to W. Va. Code 30-1-5(c) divested it of jurisdiction to proceed on the complaint. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s requested relief, holding that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction in this case by failing to comply with the statutory mandates of section 30-1-5(c). View "State ex rel. Miles v. W. Va. Bd. of Registered Prof’l Nurses" on Justia Law

Patricia Jones (Patricia) and Danny Akers (Danny) divorced. Thereafter, Judy Vannoy Akers (Judy) and Danny married. After Danny died, the West Virginia Public Employees Retirement Board (Board) awarded Judy disability retirements. Patricia argued that she was entitled to Danny’s West Virginia Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) retirement benefits based on the provision for those benefits in her divorce decree. The Board denied benefits on the grounds that there was not an enforceable qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) in effect at the time when the survivor benefits were issued to Judy. Both Patricia and Judy challenged the Board’s rulings. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Board. The Supreme Court reversed after invoking its equitable powers to permit the posthumous entry of a QDRO that provided for distribution of Patricia’s equitable interest in the portion of Danny’s retirement assets recognized as marital property, holding (1) the Board erred in granting posthumous disability benefits to Judy rather than preretirement benefits; and (2) Patricia was entitled to seek Danny’s PERS benefits. View "Jones v. W. Va. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

Respondent was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and refused to submit to a secondary breath test. Respondent’s driver’s license was subsequently revoked by the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles for both DUI and the refusal to submit to the designated chemical test. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) rescinded the driver’s license revocation on the grounds that (1) Respondent was misled to believe that he had a choice as to whether he wanted to take a breath test or a blood test, and therefore, revocation for refusing the secondary chemical test was inappropriate; and (2) Respondent was effectively denied his right to obtain an independent blood test. The circuit court upheld the OAH’s order. The Supreme Court found that Respondent’s license revocations for refusal to submit to the secondary breath test were proper but his license revocations for DUI were erroneous, holding (1) the lower tribunals erroneously concluded that Respondent had a rational basis for perceiving that he had a choice between the breath test and the blood test, and therefore, revocation for refusing the secondary chemical test was appropriate; and (2) Respondent was denied his statutory and due process rights to have his blood tested independently. View "Reed v. Hall" on Justia Law

Two individuals (Claimants) who sustained work-related injuries received workers’ compensation benefits. Claimants sought additional benefits as a result of further symptoms related to their original workplace injuries and timely requested that the new diagnoses be added to their original claims. In both cases, however, denials of compensability and/or medical treatment required extensive litigation through the workers’ compensation system. The Supreme Court ultimately found Claimants to be entitled to the compensability ruling/medical treatment they had requested, but as a result of the litigation delays, Claimants’ requests for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits associated with the newly added diagnoses were denied by the workers’ compensation system as untimely filed. The Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the Board of Review denying Claimants’ PPD evaluation requests as untimely and remanded, holding (1) Claimants’ requests for a PPD evaluation were timely pursuant to W. Va. Code 23-4-16(a)(2); and (2) to hold otherwise would effectively deny Claimants their statutory rights to receive a permanent disability evaluation and to be compensated for their workplace injuries. Remanded. View "Hammons v. W. Va. Office of Ins. Comm’r" on Justia Law

The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services (DHHR) filed a petition in the circuit court initiating the underlying abuse and neglect case. The petition alleged that Respondent Stepfather sexually abused K.P. and that Respondent Mother failed to protect K.P. from Stepfather and committed acts of emotional abuse against K.P. The DHHR removed all minor children from the home. After a multi-day adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court dismissed the abuse and neglect petition, concluding that DHHR had not met its burden of proving that K.P. was abused by either respondent and that Stepfather’s refusal to testify and rebut the abuse charges could not be used as evidence against him. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Respondents were abusing parents with regard to K.P., and therefore, the health and welfare of the other children in the home was also at risk; and (2) accordingly, the circuit court erred by refusing to adjudicate all the minor children as abused children. View "In re K.P." on Justia Law

When an officer working at a sobriety checkpoint encountered Respondent, the officer administered a series of field sobriety tests. The officer then administered a preliminary breath test, which Respondent failed. A secondary chemical test of Respondent’s breath indicated that Respondent’s blood alcohol content was .157. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) subsequently revoked Respondent’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the State for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reversed the DMV’s order of revocation, finding that the sobriety checkpoint deviated from the police department’s “DUI Sobriety Checkpoint Operations Manual” and that those deviations rendered Respondent’s arrest unlawful. The circuit court affirmed the order of the OAH and reinstated Respondent’s driver’s license. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order and remanded for reinstatement of the DMV’s revocation order, holding that the sobriety checkpoint at issue was legally valid and that Respondent’s arrest for DUI was lawful. View "Reed v. Pettit" on Justia Law

Larry Myers, a sales associate, worked at Outdoor Express, Inc., a recreational vehicle dealership. Myers received no pay if no sales were finalized during the preceding two-week period. Myers filed claims for, and received, unemployment compensation benefits for periods when he did not receive commission checks for sales of recreational vehicles. A deputy commissioner with Workforce West Virginia subsequently determined that the benefits were to be repaid by Myers, finding that Myers was neither totally nor partially unemployed during various periods between November 29, 2008 and March 17, 2012, and was, therefore, ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The circuit court affirmed the administrative decision and directed that Myers pay back $39,713 in benefits he received for the periods in question. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that Myers was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits because he was neither totally nor partially unemployed during the periods in question; but (2) the $39,713 was improperly calculated based on the statute of limitations pertaining to the overpayments in this case. View "Myers v. Outdoor Express, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent requested a hearing before the Office of Administrative Appeals (OAH) to contest the Department of Motor Vehicle’s (DMV) revocation of his driver’s license. The OAH issued a final order (the “original final order”) reversing the DMV’s revocation of Respondent’s driver’s license. The DMV subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration requesting that the OAH revoke the original final order. The OAH granted the motion for reconsider and issued a revised final order (“revised final order”) that effectively reinstated the DMV’s revocation of Respondent’s driver’s license. The circuit court reversed the OAH’s revised final order and reinstated the OAH’s original final order, finding that the OAH had no statutory or regulatory authority to revoke its original final order and that Respondent never received notice regarding the DMV’s motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the OAH was without authority under statute or its administrative rules to reconsider, revoke, or amend its original final order. View "Reed v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In 1996, the Mason County Board of Education and Michael Whalen, the then-superintendent of schools, entered into a settlement agreement in which Whalen agreed to forego the final year of his superintendent contract in exchange for a lump sum payment of $60,000. Whalen retired in 1997. In 1998, the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board, as administrator of the West Virginia Public Employees Retirement System, ruled that a $60,000 payment received by Whalen did not constitute “salary” and therefore would not be included when calculating his retirement annuity benefit. In 2001, Whalen filed a complaint in the circuit court that was, in essence, an appeal of the Retirement Board’s 1998 final order. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Whalen. The Retirement Board then filed this complaint seeking a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Whalen’s appeal was not filed within the thirty-day period specified in W. Va. Code 29A-5-4(bb), and therefore, the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling that Whalen’s appeal was timely. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd. v. Hon. David W. Nibert" on Justia Law