Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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W. Va. Code 11-15A-10a affords taxpayers a credit for sales taxes paid to other states, which offsets the West Virginia Motor Fuel Use Tax (“use tax”) a fuel importer must pay under W. Va. Code 11-15A-13a. After it was assessed a use tax on the fuel it uses in West Virginia, CSX Transportation sought a refund of the sales taxes it had paid on its motor fuel purchases to cities, counties, and localities of other sales pursuant to section 11-15A-10a. The Tax Commissioner rejected the refund request. The Office of Tax Appeals (OTA) granted CSX’s refund request and vacated the assessment, finding that CSX was entitled to a credit under section 11-15A-10a for the sales taxes it paid to other states’ subdivisions on its purchases of motor fuel therein. The circuit court affirmed. The Tax Commissioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by not limiting the credit to sales taxes paid only to other states upon the purchase of a motor fuel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sales tax credit afforded by section 11-15A-10a applies both to sales taxes paid to other states and to sales taxes paid to the municipalities of other states. View "Matkovich v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

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This proceeding consisted of four consolidated appeals. The issue in two of the appeals was whether the alternative-energy infrastructures installed by Petitioners for their businesses met the statutory definition of “qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling infrastructure” for the purpose of receiving an alternative-fuel infrastructure tax credit. The issue in the other two appeals was whether the alternative-energy infrastructures installed by Petitioners for their residences met the statutory definition of “qualified alternative fuel vehicle home refueling infrastructure” for the purpose of receiving an alternative fuel-infrastructure tax credit. The circuit court affirmed the final orders of the West Virginia Office of Tax Appeals that denied Petitioners’ requests for alternative-fuel infrastructure tax credits under W. Va. Code 11-6d-4(c). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Martin Distributing Co. v. Matkovich" on Justia Law

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In 2012, Petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). The West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) sent Petitioner an order of revocation revoking Petitioner’s driving privileges and enhancing her penalty based on a 2003 license revocation. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) affirmed the revocation of Petitioner’s driver’s license. Petitioner filed a petition for review and writ of prohibition alleging that the 2003 DUI denied her due process rights because notice was mailed to an address from which she had moved. The circuit court granted Petitioner’s writ of prohibition to exclude the previous DUI offense from enhancing the current penalty, concluding that the 2003 DUI “controverts justice.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Petitioner failed timely to contest the 2003 revocation order, the circuit court erred as a matter of law by granting Petitioner’s writ of prohibition to prevent the DMV from enhancing her 2012 DUI penalty based on her 2003 revocation. View "Reed v. Haynes" on Justia Law

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This dispute arose from the use of educational interventionists to assist elementary and middle school students in Monongalia County who need educational support beyond that provided by the regular classroom teacher. The interventionists utilized by the Monongalia County Board of Education (MCBOE) were obtained through a contract it has with its Regional Education Service Agency (RESA), were required to be certified teachers, and were employees of the West Virginia Board of Education. The circuit court concluded that an interventionist met the statutory definition of “classroom teacher” and, therefore, must be directly hired by MCBOE. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutory definition of “classroom teacher” is not intended to include within its meaning an “interventionist”; and (2) a county board of education may contract with its RESA to provide interventionist services to county students. View "Monongalia County Board of Education v. American Federation of Teachers" on Justia Law

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In September 2014, M.B. filed a complaint with the West Virginia Board of Medicine alleging that Petitioner had engaged in an improper sexual relationship with her while he was her treating physician and that he failed correctly to treat her. A deadline of March 16, 2016 was established for the Board to issue a final ruling on M.B.’s complaint. In February 2016, the Board obtained M.B.’s consent to extend the time for a final ruling on her complaint under September 2016. Petitioner then filed this petition for writ of prohibition, contending that the Board had failed to proceed in a timely manner. The Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of prohibition, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate an error of law or that the Board acted in excess of its jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. O.H. v. West Virginia Board of Medicine" on Justia Law

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Respondent was driving an unlicensed all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on family-owned farm land when he wrecked the ATV and was injured. At the hospital, tests allegedly showed Respondent’s blood alcohol content was 0.17 percent. The Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles revoked Respondent’s privilege to drive for forty-five days. Respondent appealed, arguing that his license could not be revoked because he was driving the ATV only upon private, family-owned land, and there was no evidence he was driving on a public street or highway. The Office of Administrative Hearings upheld the Commissioner’s revocation order. The circuit court reversed, concluding that because Respondent’s actions occurred solely upon private land, the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to revoke Respondent’s driving privileges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a person may lose his or her driver’s license if they are found driving a vehicle anywhere within the physical boundaries of the state while under the influence of alcohol, even if the vehicle is driven only upon private property not open to the general public. View "Reed v. Beckett" on Justia Law

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University Park at Evansdale, LLC (UPE) was the lessor of certain property owned by the West Virginia University Board of Governors commonly known as “University Park.” The Monongalia County Assessor assessed UPE’s leasehold interest in University Park at just over $9 million for the tax year 2015. UPE challenged the assessment, arguing that its leasehold interest was $0 because the leasehold was neither freely assignable nor a bargain lease. The Board of Equalization and Review (BER) affirmed, determining that UPE’s protest presented an issue of taxability, rather than valuation, reviewable only by the Tax Commissioner. The circuit court affirmed, concluding that UPE advanced a challenge that the BER had no jurisdiction to review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that UPE’s protest presented an issue of taxability. Remanded. View "University Park at Evansdale, LLC v. Musick" on Justia Law

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The State Tax Commissioner and the Berkeley County Assessor denied an ad valorem property tax exemption to University Healthcare Foundation, Inc. for its property known as the Dorothy McCormack Cancer Treatment & Rehabilitation Center. The circuit court overruled the denial, concluding that the healthcare and recreational services provided in the Center were primarily and immediately related to the joint charitable purposes of the Center and the Berkeley Medical Center. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the Center was being used exclusively for charitable purposes. View "Matkovich v. Univ. Healthcare Found., Inc." on Justia Law

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Stephen Swain filed claims for workers’ compensation benefits for his occupational hearing loss. An administrative law judge (ALJ) with the Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges identified Pioneer Pipe, Inc. and two other employers as being potentially chargeable for Swain’s claim. The ALJ then ruled that Pioneer Pipe was the sole chargeable employer responsible for paying Swain’s hearing loss claim under W.Va. Code 23-4-6b(g). The Workers Compensation Board of Review affirmed. Pioneer Pipe appealed, contending, inter alia, that the language of W. Va. Code 23-4-6b(g) requires the Insurance Commissioner to allocate and divide the charges for a hearing loss claim if the claimant was injured while employed by multiple employers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) by using the term “may” in the statute, the Legislature afforded the Insurance Commissioner discretion in deciding whether to allocate and divide charges for a hearing loss claim between various employers or to charge only one employer; and (2) the statute does not require sixty days of exposure to hazardous noise before the Insurance Commissioner may hold an employer solely responsible for a hearing loss claim. View "Pioneer Pipe, Inc. v. Swain" on Justia Law

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Mother and Father were the biological parents of D.M. D.M. was removed from Mother and Father and placed in the custody of the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (the DHHR). After a dispositional hearing, the circuit court entered a final order finding D.M. to be an abused and neglected child and terminating the parental rights of both Mother and Father. The court denied Mother’s and Father’s motions for a post-adjudicatory improvement period and ordered that custody of D.M. will remain with the DHHR. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in determining that D.M. was an abused and neglected child and that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse could be substantially corrected in the near future; and (2) properly determined that neither Mother nor Father established a likelihood of full participation in a post-adjudicatory improvement period. View "In re D.M." on Justia Law