Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner claimed to be Child's psychological parent. Child's biological mother had virtually no contact with Child. When Child's biological, custodial father (Respondent) pleaded guilty to several crimes, Petitioner filed a motion to intervene in an existing family court action and sought either shared parenting with Respondent or guardianship of Child if Father was sentenced to prison. Father petitioned the circuit court for a writ of prohibition, claiming that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider a motion for shared parenting or guardianship. The circuit court granted the writ, thus halting the family court's consideration of Petitioner's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the family court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's motion, and therefore, the circuit court erred in issuing its order granting a writ of prohibition. View "Brooke B. v. Ray C." on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Resources appealed a circuit court's order dismissing a petition alleging a father had abused and neglected his daughter. After vesting legal custody of the child with the child's grandmother - a disposition the Department supported - the circuit court determined that further hearings on the petition would not be in the best interests of the child. The Department asserted on appeal that the circuit court was still required to formally determine whether abuse or neglect occurred before the petition could be dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its finding that full adjudication of the petition was not in the best interests of the child. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the circuit court's order granting permanent guardianship of her two children to Respondent, their paternal grandmother. Petitioner asserted that the circuit court erred in exercising jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and by transferring custody from a biological mother without a finding of unfitness. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order awarding guardianship to Respondent, restored Petitioner's custodial rights, and remanded the matter, holding (1) it was error for the circuit court to exercise jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the UCCJEA; and (2) the circuit court erred in refusing to consider the evidence of abuse and neglect underlying this guardianship proceeding and in transferring custody of the minor children from a natural parent without a finding of unfitness. View "In re K.R." on Justia Law

This was an appeal by Petitioner from an order of the circuit court accepting the voluntary relinquishment of parental rights by Father to his two eldest children and dismissing his two youngest children from the case. Petitioner was the mother of the two youngest children, who lived in Maryland. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's order, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) accepting Father's voluntary relinquishment of parental rights to two of his children and dismissing two other children without holding a full evidentiary hearing to address the specific allegations of abuse and neglect; (2) failing to grant the motion for the appointment of a separate guardian ad litem for Father's children residing in Maryland; (3) refusing to conduct an in camera hearing with the two oldest children so the children could inform the court about the specific conduct of their father as well as their wishes regarding the termination of their father's parental rights; and (4) dismissing the two children residing in Maryland and failing to hold a hearing regarding the abuse and neglect issues involving those children. Remanded. View "In re T.W." on Justia Law

This was an appeal by Petitioner from an order of the circuit court placing Petitioner's grandson, Aaron H., a minor, in the home of his foster parents for the purpose of adoption. Petitioner contended he should have been considered as an adoptive placement for Aaron H. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court erred in placing the child with his foster parents for adoption rather than with his grandfather in view of the statutory preference for grandparent placement. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court and ordered that Aaron H. be placed for adoption in the home of the foster parents, holding that the circuit court did not err in approving the adoption of Aaron H. by his foster parents, as the grandparent placement failed to serve the best interests of the child. View "In re Aaron H." on Justia Law

Petitioner was the mother of six children, three of whom were minors. Respondents were Mother's ex-husbands and fathers to the minor children. Upon her divorces, Mother received primary custody of the minor children. Fathers later filed motions for modification of custody, which the family court denied. The circuit court reversed, finding the family court had abused its discretion, and placed the three children in the primary custody of their fathers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court erred in concluding that a substantial change in circumstances was not present under the facts of the case, and the circuit court did not err by reversing the family court's order. View "T.H. v. D.K." on Justia Law

After an approximately twenty-one year marriage, Constance Mayle and Mark Mayle were divorced. The family court ordered Mark to pay Constance permanent spousal support in the amount of $5,500 per month, with an additional $1,500 per month for six months designated as rehabilitative support. After a period of ten years, the family court ordered that the monthly spousal support be reduced to $1,500 per month. The family court denied Constance's request for reimbursement spousal support and for attorney fees and costs. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) there was no error in the award of rehabilitative spousal support for six months or in the amount of the permanent spousal support for the first ten years; but (2) the circuit court and family court erred in (a) reducing the amount of spousal support to $1,500 after ten years, and (b) denying Constance's request for attorney fees. Remanded. View "Mayle v. Mayle" on Justia Law

Karen Tanner appealed an order the circuit court that granted her parole with the condition that she not be in the presence or accompaniment of anyone convicted of a felony, including her husband. Tanner contended (1) the circuit court was without authority to grant parole insofar as parole is an executive function, and (2) the condition that she not associate with her husband was an unreasonable burden on her right of marriage. After discussing the reasons for imposing parole conditions, including the aim of reducing recidivism, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the West Virginia Home Incarceration Act imparts authority to circuit courts to grant parole under the conditions specified therein; and (2) the circuit court properly exercised its discretion and did not act in an unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary manner when it imposed upon Tanner's parole the condition that she not associate with her husband. View "State v. Tanner" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from an order entered by the circuit court affirming a family court order, which modified primary residential custody of the parties' minor child from Mother to respondent Father. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that based upon the parties' written submissions and oral arguments, the record designated for the Court's consideration, and the pertinent authorities, the circuit court's affirmation of the custodial decisions made by the family court should be reversed and the transfer of custody should be stayed. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing to consider what custodial arrangement would promote the best interests of the child. View "Brittany S. v. Amos F." on Justia Law

After finding that Mother was an abusive and neglectful parent, the circuit court terminated Mother's parental rights to Child, a sixteen-year-old minor, despite the recommendation of the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) that only Mother's custodial rights be terminated. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in terminating Mother's parental rights because it (1) failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 34 of the rules of procedure for child abuse and neglect proceedings; and (2) failed to acquire and consider the wishes of Child as to the termination of Mother's parental rights, as required by W. Va. Code 49-6-5(a)(6). View "In re Ashton M." on Justia Law