Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Michael Chenoweth was arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Thereafter, Commissioner Joe Miller of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles issued an order revoking Chenoweth's privilege to drive a motor vehicle. The circuit court reversed and vacated the revocation of Chenoweth's driver's license based on its finding that the trooper improperly stopped Chenoweth's vehicle without an articulable reasonable suspicion. In so doing, the circuit court applied the exclusionary rule to an administrative driver's license revocation proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no illegal stop, and thus it was not necessary to reach the issue of whether the circuit court properly applied the exclusionary rule in this case. View "Miller v. Chenoweth" on Justia Law

After police officer stopped motorist Joe White at a sobriety checkpoint and directed White to perform a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the officer arrested White for driving under the influence of alcohol. The Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles revoked White's license to operate a motor vehicle for six months, and the circuit court affirmed. White appealed, challenging the admissibility of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test as an indicator that he was intoxicated and the lawfulness of the sobriety checkpoint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence concerning the horizontal gaze nystagmus test as a field sobriety test was admissible; but (2) White was entitled to a new administrative hearing based upon his challenge to the sobriety checkpoint, as the finding of the Commissioner that the checkpoint was set up in accordance with standardized guidelines was clearly wrong. Remanded. View "White v. Miller" on Justia Law

Respondent Timothy Judge was charged with failure to register as a sex offender. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, which the trial court granted after concluding that Respondent did not violate the West Virginia Sex Offender Registration Act by failing to re-register as a sex offender after a one-night period of confinement in jail for an unrelated charge. The State appealed, contending that every dismissal from a penal institution, regardless of the nature of the offense or the length of confinement, requires a sex offender to initiate the registration process required by the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the indictment, holding that Respondent was in compliance with the registration requirements of the Act, and Respondent was not required by the provisions of the Act to re-register with the state police following his release from jail. View "State v. Judge" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, Petitioners Paul Hoston and Reese Riley were convicted of drug-related offenses. In their appeals, Petitioners challenged the circuit court's denial of their motions to suppress evidence obtained against them through the use of a body wire worn by a confidential informant into their homes that recorded the illegal drug transactions. The electronic interception was authorized in both cases by a magistrate. Petitioners contended that such electronic interception could only be authorized by one of five designated circuit court judges, and therefore, the evidence was illegally obtained and should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. The Supreme Court affirmed the final orders of the circuit court, holding (1) electronic interception by law enforcement authorities of a person's conduct or oral communications in his or her home is governed by W. Va. Code 62-1F-1 to -9; and 9; and (2) pursuant to W. Va. Code 62-1F-2(a), an order authorizing law enforcement authorities to conduct electronic interception of conduct or oral communications in the home can be obtained from either a magistrate or a judge of a circuit court within the county wherein the non-consenting party's home is located. View "State v. Hoston" on Justia Law

Kendra Sulick was convicted by a jury on three counts of criminal civil rights violations pursuant to W. Va. Code 61-6-21(b). Sulick appealed the circuit court's denial of her post-trial motions, raising several arguments that essentially challenged the constitutionality of section 61-6-21(b) on vagueness and proportionality grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to prove that Sulick committed the acts complained of, and the evidence proved that the acts met the requirements of the statute; and (2) section 61-6-21 is not unconstitutionally vague and does not allow for a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the offenses sought to be prosecuted. View "State v. Sulick" on Justia Law

Timothy Waldron was convicted by a jury of one count of delivery of a controlled substance and was sentenced to one to five years imprisonment. Waldron appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court committed error in admitting audio and video recordings of the drug transaction because the admission of certain statements on the recordings violated his right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the record provided on the issue, the trial court did not err in admitting the recordings of the drug transaction where Waldron failed to provide the Court with either the recordings of the drug transaction or the text of the statements he alleged violated Crawford v. Washington, nor did the trial transcript contain any testimony from the recordings, and, consequently, the Court was unable to determine whether those statements fell outside the application of the general rule that such statements are admissible the defendant when they are not offered for the truth of the matter they assert. View "State v. Waldron" on Justia Law

Defendant Rhonda Stewart was convicted for the first degree murder of her husband. At trial, the circuit court prohibited Defendant from presenting evidence that she had been battered and abused by her husband during their thirty-eight-year marriage and did not allow an expert witness to testify as to how this abuse may have affected Defendant's state of mind and reasoning as it related to premeditation, malice, or intent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on well-established precedent, Defendant was entitled to present evidence of Battered Woman's Syndrome and evidence of abuse through eyewitnesses and expert witnesses; and (2) because the jury could have reasonably found that Defendant's crime was not first degree murder, but second degree murder or manslaughter had the jury been allowed to hear the abuse evidence, Defendant did not receive a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

After Appellee was arrested for DUI, the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked Appellee's driver's license for two years. Appellee filed a request for an administrative hearing, which was conducted on May 6, 2008. By final order dated October 13, 2009, the DMV Commissioner ordered that Appellee's privilege to drive a motor vehicle be revoked for six months. Appellee appealed the revocation order, arguing that the seventeen-month delay between the administrative hearing and entry of the final order revoking his driver's license violated his procedural due process rights. The circuit court reversed the order, concluding that the excessive delay violated Appellee's due process rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellee was required to show actual and substantial prejudice as a result of the delay. Remanded to (1) give Appellee the opportunity to present evidence of prejudice and to give the Commissioner the opportunity to present evidence regarding the reasons for the delay; and (2) balance the resulting prejudice against the reasons for the delay in order to determine whether the delay violated Appellee's right to due process. View "Miller v. Moredock" on Justia Law

Appellant Elizabeth Thornton was sentenced in circuit court to three to fifteen years in the state penitentiary for her conviction of child neglect resulting in death. Appellant appealed, arguing that (1) the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant's delay in seeking medical treatment for her child caused his death, and (2) the circuit court erred in denying her motions for mistrial after the state allegedly violated the trial court's admonition to not reference child protective services proceedings or actions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by not granting the appellant's motion for mistrial upon the mere mention of child protective services before the jury. View "State v. Thornton" on Justia Law

Appellant David Kaufman was convicted of first degree murder in the circuit court. On appeal, appellant argued that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence the victim's diary and certain statements by the victim to others, both of which recounted alleged threats and acts of violence by appellant towards the victim during the weeks preceding her death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) the trial court's admission of the entire diary without an analysis of each declaration and remark from the diary was an abuse of discretion because when ruling upon the admission of a narrative under the hearsay rule of evidence, a trial court must break down the narrative and determine the separate admissibility of each single declaration or remark; and (2) the trial court committed error in admitting certain statements by the victim without setting forth any reasoning in support of its ruling that the victim's statements were admissible under State v. Sutphin. Remanded. View "State v. Kaufman" on Justia Law