Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Marcella Dunbar appealed from an order of the circuit court accepting Petitioner's plea to the charge of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentencing Petitioner to incarceration for not less than one nor more than fifteen years. Petitioner contended that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress the evidence gathered pursuant to a traffic stop of the vehicle in which he was riding as a passenger. The Supreme Court reversed Petitioner's conviction, holding that the traffic stop initiated in this case was improper, and consequently, the evidence leading to Petitioner's arrest for drug violations was not admissible evidence and should have been suppressed. Remanded. View "State v. Dunbar" on Justia Law

Petitioner Charles Thompson was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree, sexual abuse by a custodian, and sexual abuse in the third degree. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's direct appeal. Petitioner then filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus, which the circuit court denied after two evidentiary proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State produced sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner; (2) Thompson's argument that certain testimony should have been excluded was not recognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding; and (3) Petitioner failed to prove his claims of ineffective assistance by a preponderance of the evidence. View "State ex rel. Thompson v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Petitioner was prosecuting attorney for Kanawha County. Respondent was a circuit judge in Kanawha County. Respondent was a defendant in a murder prosecution pending in the County. Petitioner requested a writ of prohibition to challenge a ruling of the Kanawha County circuit court barring the introduction of certain shell casings found at the scene of the crime and firearms and ammunition seized from a residence associated with Respondent. The evidence was suppressed as a sanction for the State's admitted failure to make the shell casings available to the defense for inspection and possible testing. The Supreme Court granted the request and prohibited the enforcement of the circuit court order excluding the materials at issue from evidence, holding that while the State's conduct was troublesome, the circuit court failed properly to analyze the necessary factors for sanctions against the State pursuant to its holdings in State ex rel. Rusen v. Hill. View "State ex rel. Plants v. Circuit Court (Webster) " on Justia Law

Petitioner David Griffy pleaded guilty to two counts of grand larceny and was sentenced to two indeterminate one-to-ten year terms of imprisonment. Griffy subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence and a motion to withdraw plea. The circuit court denied the motions. Griffy appealed, asserting that the circuit court committed reversible error by failing to comply with W.Va. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was evident that Griffy did not understand when he pled guilty that he would not be allowed to later withdraw his plea if his sentence did not meet his expectations, and there was no evidence that Griffy was ever given a Rule 11(2)(e) warning; and (2) the substantial rights of Griffy were affected by the circuit court's failure to give the Rule 11(e)(2) warning. Remanded with instructions that Griffy be given an opportunity to either plead anew or to grant specific performance so that the sentence comported with the reasonable understanding and expectations of Griffy as to the sentence for which he bargained. View "State v. Griffy" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner Samuel Scarbro was convicted in the circuit court of the felony offense of fraudulent use of a bank conveyance or access device. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court erred in excluding from the evidence at trial a prior inconsistent statement of the State's key witness. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the witness's pre-trial statement should have been admitted at Petitioner's trial, and the circuit court's refusal to do so constituted error; and (2) the error in excluding the evidence was not harmless, as the improper exclusion of the witness's prior inconsistent statement placed the fairness of Petitioner's trial in doubt. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Scarbro" on Justia Law

After being stopped and arrested for DUI at a safety checkpoint established by state police, David Smith's license was administratively revoked. On administrative appeal, the DMV Commissioner found that the initial traffic stop failed to comply with the requirements set forth in State v. Sigler, but that failure affected only the criminal portion of the proceedings and did not impact the authority of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to administratively revoke Smith's license in a separate civil proceeding. The circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding, inter alia, that the circuit court erroneously applied the exclusionary rule within the civil context. Remanded for entry of an order reinstating Smith's civil administrative license revocation. View "Miller v. Smith" on Justia Law

Petitioner Tony Myers was convicted of three counts of first degree robbery and was sentenced to three concurrent terms of incarceration of sixty years each. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) allowing the admission of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless arrest, search, and seizure; (2) permitting witnesses called by the State to identify Petitioner despite being subjected to a prior identification procedure; (3) charging, trying, and convicting Petitioner of three counts of robbery; and (3) denying Defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal or a new trial based upon the insufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. View "State v. Myers" on Justia Law

In the underlying action in this case, Respondent Michael Brown was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. Respondent filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and the circuit court set aside the convictions and granted Respondent a new trial. The basis of the circuit court's ruling was that a juror in the criminal trial failed to answer certain questions during voir dire. The court concluded that in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Dellinger, the juror's lack of candor deprived the circuit court and the parties of the ability to determine the juror's fitness to serve, which foreclosed Respondent's constitutional right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the relevant statutory and case law and the material from the habeas corpus proceedings and the criminal trial, the circuit court committed reversible error in granting Respondent a new trial. Remanded. View "Coleman v. Brown " on Justia Law

Karen Tanner appealed an order the circuit court that granted her parole with the condition that she not be in the presence or accompaniment of anyone convicted of a felony, including her husband. Tanner contended (1) the circuit court was without authority to grant parole insofar as parole is an executive function, and (2) the condition that she not associate with her husband was an unreasonable burden on her right of marriage. After discussing the reasons for imposing parole conditions, including the aim of reducing recidivism, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the West Virginia Home Incarceration Act imparts authority to circuit courts to grant parole under the conditions specified therein; and (2) the circuit court properly exercised its discretion and did not act in an unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary manner when it imposed upon Tanner's parole the condition that she not associate with her husband. View "State v. Tanner" on Justia Law

Tyrone Crouch was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced by the circuit court to ten years imprisonment. Crouch appealed, contending that the circuit court improperly instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because of the clearly inconsistent and confusing definition of involuntary manslaughter given by the trial court, it was not certain that the jury understood how they could reach a verdict on that lesser included offense; and (2) the Court was unable to determine independently from the record that the inconsistent instructions were harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Crouch" on Justia Law