Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was on supervised release from federal custody when he pleaded guilty to second degree robbery in state court. In exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend that any sentence imposed by the circuit court run concurrent to any federal sentence imposed by the U.S. district court for violation of his supervised release. After the circuit court sentenced Defendant, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his guilty plea was defective because it contained a promise - that his state and federal sentences would run concurrently - which was not fulfilled. The circuit court denied the petition. While Defendant's appeal was pending, Defendant was paroled from the West Virginia Department of Corrections and was no longer in the custody of the State. At the time of this appeal, Defendant was in federal custody. The Court was informed that federal authorities credited Defendant for the time he served in State custody. Thus Defendant's state and federal sentences were effectively served concurrent to each other. The Supreme Court declared the instant appeal moot, as Defendant was no longer in State custody and had obtained the relief he sought. View "Leeper-El v. Hoke" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of simple battery as a lesser included offense of malicious assault. The circuit court resentenced Defendant to one year incarceration. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting his medical records into evidence during his trial. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) it was error for the trial court to allow the prosecutor to introduce evidence of Defendant's medical records, as the prosecutor could not support issuance of a subpoena duces tecum under W. Va. R. Crim. P. 71, and W. Va. Code 57-5-4 could not be relied upon as authority for issuance of the subpoena; but (2) this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. McGill" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust and third degree sexual assault. Due to Petitioner's health concerns, the trial court permitted Petitioner to serve his sentences by the alternate means of electronically-monitored home incarceration. Petitioner subsequently sought habeas corpus relief for sentencing and post-sentencing matters. The trial court modified the terms of Petitioner's home incarceration to afford Petitioner, among other things, one hour per day of recreational time outside the physical confines of his house and to permit travel outside the state for necessary medical appointments. Petitioner appealed, seeking immediate release from any further incarceration in light of his continuing deterioration due to Parkinson's disease. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no basis for habeas corpus relief or for further modification of the terms of Petitioner's sentencing. View "Elder v. Scolapia" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of ten counts of sexual abuse by a guardian. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The circuit found that Defendant's indictment conflicted with constitutional due process requirements by failing to apprise Defendant of the charges against him for purposes of preparing a defense and that the indictment exposed Defendant to double jeopardy based on the possibility that the same evidence would be used to convict him on multiple, identical counts. The circuit court ordered that Defendant's conviction and sentence on nine of the ten counts be vacated and set aside. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was not denied due process because he was provided with adequate notice of the charges against him; and (2) Defendant was not convicted in violation of double jeopardy principles. View "Ballard v. Dilworth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit the felony offense of robbery in the first degree. Defendant appealed, contending that the circuit court committed reversible error by refusing to give the jury an instruction for misdemeanor assault and/or an instruction for battery as a lesser included offense to the charge of robbery in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not commit error in refusing to give Defendant's requested instructions for assault and battery, as misdemeanor assault and battery are not lesser included offenses of first degree robbery. View "State v. Wilkerson" on Justia Law

In 2002, the circuit court entered an order finding Defendant not guilty of first degree arson by reason of mental illness. The court ordered Defendant to be committed to a mental health facility in West Virginia. The placement failed effectively to treat Defendant's mental illness, as did Defendant's placement in another West Virginia psychiatric hospital. The circuit court subsequently transferred Defendant to a South Carolina psychiatric hospital, determining that the placement was the best available treatment option for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the order transferring Defendant to South Carolina did not violate the clause "no person shall be transported out of, or forced to leave the State for any offense committed within the same" contained in the West Virginia Constitution; (2) the circuit court did not err in concluding that Defendant's placement in the South Carolina facility was consistent with the statutory directive requiring Defendant to be placed in the "least restrictive environment" to manage his mental illness; and (3) the transfer was not in violation of the Interstate Compact on the Mentally Disordered. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Defendant was convicted of robbery in the second degree and attempted robbery in the second degree. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for robbery in the second degree. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of Defendant's prior convictions for crimes committed in 2000 and in admitting evidence that Defendant was on parole when the instant crimes occurred, as (1) Defendant did not open the door for the introduction of the evidence; (2) the State failed to offer any relevant contention to refute the trial court's pretrial determination that Defendant's prior convictions were not admissible under W.Va. R. Evid. 404(b); (3) the State failed to prove that Defendant's prior convictions for wanton endangerment in 2000 were intrinsic to the charges of robbery and attempted robbery in 2009; (4) the marginal value of evidence of Defendant's parole status was far outweighed by its prejudicial impact; and (5) the improperly admitted evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Baker" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of operating or attempting to operate a clandestine drug laboratory. Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of two to ten years and was later re-sentenced for appeal purposes. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by admitting into evidence Petitioner's statement made two years after the events alleged in the indictment and by denying Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that Petitioner's statement was relevant to the charges against him and was not unduly prejudicial; and (2) sufficient evidence existed to sustain Petitioner's conviction of operating or attempting to operate a clandestine drug laboratory. View "State v. Hypes" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of burglary (against his father), battery of an elder person (against his father), and domestic assault (against his stepmother). All three convictions were the result of one trial and based upon the same criminal acts by Petitioner. In this appeal, Petitioner asserted that the circuit court erred by granting the State's motion to join a subsequently filed information (the domestic assault against Petitioner's stepmother) with a previously returned indictment (which included the burglary and battery charges against Petitioner's father) where the basis for joinder was that they arose out of a common nexus of fact. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court was correct in allowing consolidation of the indictment with the later filed information charge, as the State did not amend the indictment, nor was there any allegation that the original indictment was flawed in any way. View "State v. Hartman" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison with mercy. This was Petitioner's second appeal of that conviction; his conviction was first upheld on direct appeal to the Supreme Court. In his initial appeal, among other assignments of error, Petitioner asserted that admission of an autopsy report without the accompanying testimony of the authoring pathologist violated his Confrontation Clause rights. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Mechling, which overruled Kennedy I as to the Court's holding on the Confrontation Clause issue, Petitioner filed another motion for a new trial. The circuit court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the admission of the autopsy report and testimony reiterating its contents violated the Confrontation Clause under current caselaw, the errors found by virtue of applying the new rule of Mechling were not redressable by Petitioner, and therefore did not afford him a new trial. View "State v. Kennedy" on Justia Law