Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder without mercy and concealment of a deceased human body. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) determining that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the first degree murder conviction; (2) refusing to disqualify the prosecuting attorney’s office when the assistant prosecutor who tried the case became a potential witness during her trial preparation of a potential witness; (3) failing to conduct an in camera hearing due to alleged juror misconduct and by failing to order a mistrial regarding this issue; (4) allowing the State to play a video recording to the jury of the Petitioner at the sheriff’s department; and (5) allowing the co-defendant’s plea agreement to be admitted for purposes of assessing the witness’s credibility. View "State v. Murray" on Justia Law

After a trial, the circuit court convicted Petitioner of operating or attempting to operate a clandestine drug laboratory and conspiracy to operate or attempt to operate a clandestine drug laboratory. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, as both counts one and two in the indictment each charged Petitioner with a single offense, and not two separate offenses as Petitioner argued, so there was no violation of W. Va. R. Crim. P. 8; (2) failing to give the entirety of Petitioner’s proposed instruction concerning the burden of proof for actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance; (3) denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress; and (4) determining that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions. View "State v. Brock" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Shanton was indicted in a fifty-four count indictment connected to her use of a purchasing card (P-card) issued pursuant to West Virginia’s Purchasing Card Program. The circuit court dismissed fifty-three counts, each of which alleged that Shanton used the P-card in violation of W. Va. code 12-3-10b. The circuit court determined that the inclusion of these counts in the indictment violated principles of double jeopardy because (1) each swipe of the P-Card was part of a continuing offense, and therefore, Shanton could only be charged with one violation of section 12-3-10b; and (2) the elements of the crime described in the fifty-three dismissed counts overlapped completely with the elements of the remaining count. The State sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its order dismissing the fifty-three counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred by (i) collapsing counts 2 through 54 into a single count, thereby effectively dismissing all but one of those counts, and (ii) dismissing the condensed count, thereby dismissing all counts in the indictment alleging violations of section 12-3-10b; and (2) the State was entitled to the writ it sought. View "State ex rel. Lorenzetti v. Hon. Sanders" on Justia Law

When an officer working at a sobriety checkpoint encountered Respondent, the officer administered a series of field sobriety tests. The officer then administered a preliminary breath test, which Respondent failed. A secondary chemical test of Respondent’s breath indicated that Respondent’s blood alcohol content was .157. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) subsequently revoked Respondent’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the State for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reversed the DMV’s order of revocation, finding that the sobriety checkpoint deviated from the police department’s “DUI Sobriety Checkpoint Operations Manual” and that those deviations rendered Respondent’s arrest unlawful. The circuit court affirmed the order of the OAH and reinstated Respondent’s driver’s license. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order and remanded for reinstatement of the DMV’s revocation order, holding that the sobriety checkpoint at issue was legally valid and that Respondent’s arrest for DUI was lawful. View "Reed v. Pettit" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Petitioner was found guilty of battery. The court found that the battery was sexually motivated and ordered Petitioner to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed the battery conviction but reversed the finding that the offense was sexually motivated, holding (1) Petitioner’s due process rights were violated by the State’s failure to provide pretrial notice of its intent to seek a finding of sexual motivation, and the trial court’s finding of sexual motivation and concomitant registration requirements constituted plain error requiring reversal; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that Petitioner committed battery. View "State v. Seen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Respondent was convicted of one felony count of abduction with intent to defile and one misdemeanor count of battery. Respondent later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that his right to a fair trial was violated because he was briefly placed in handcuffs in view of some members of the jury. The circuit court agreed, granted the writ, and vacated Respondent’s convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondent being handcuffed in view of “at least some of the jurors” for a brief period of time was not sufficient to establish reversible error, nor grounds for a mistrial. View "Ballard v. Meckling" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Respondent was convicted for sexual abuse in the first degree and sexual abuse by a custodian for his acts involving an eleven-year-old boy. Respondent later filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his federal and state due process rights were violated because of unfair prejudice resulting from references to him, by the prosecutor and through testimony during trial, as a pedophile. The habeas court granted relief and vacated Respondent’s convictions and sentence, concluding that the testimony constituted inadmissible character evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) while the references to pedophilia were improper, the error was harmless; and (2) the State overwhelmingly established Respondent’s guilt of the crimes charged. View "Ballard v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to one count of sexual assault in the third degree and to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Prior to sentencing, Petitioner moved to withdraw his plea on the basis that at the time he accepted the State’s plea offer, he was not advised that his plea subjected him to a potential life sentence as a habitual offender. The circuit court denied the motion. Thereafter, a jury found Petitioner guilty of being a habitual offender, and Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court and prosecuting attorney had no duty to inform Petitioner of enhanced sentencing before Petitioner entered his guilty plea; and (2) therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. View "State v. Keith D." on Justia Law

Tracie Dennis pleaded guilty to embezzlement. The circuit court sentenced Dennis to an indeterminate term of incarceration and directed that the sentence be suspended for a period of probation. While Dennis awaited transfer from the South Central Regional Jail to the Lakin Correctional Facility for women, the circuit court granted Dennis’s motion for work release during her incarceration in the Regional Jail. The work release was granted for period of time between the entry of the order granting work release and the commencement of Dennis’s probation. The Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Corrections filed a petition for a writ of prohibition challenging the work release order, arguing that, by granting Dennis work release after she had been placed in the Division’s custody, the circuit court exceeded its authority and interfered with the Division’s responsibilities to its inmates and to the public. The Supreme Court denied the Division’s request for relief in prohibition, holding that the circuit court had the authority and the discretion to grant Dennis work release for the purpose of paying restitution. View "State ex rel. Rubenstein v. Hon. Louis H. Bloom" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty to first degree felony murder. The circuit court accepted Petitioner’s plea, finding that Petitioner had freely and voluntarily entered his guilty plea with the advice and consultation of competent legal counsel, and sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) Petitioner’s guilty plea to first degree felony murder was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a harsher sentence upon Petitioner than the sentences imposed upon his co-defendants. View "State v. Holstein" on Justia Law