Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted and sentence for first-degree sexual assault and sexual abuse by a parent or guardian. The Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in circuit court alleging that his sentence for first-degree sexual assault was illegal. The circuit court determined that the issue was properly resolved under W. Va. R. Crim. P. 35. During a hearing, Petitioner argued that he was entitled to a de novo resentencing hearing. The trial court disagreed and corrected the sentence at the hearing. The court sentenced Petitioner to an indeterminate sentence of not less than fifteen years nor more than thirty-five years for first-degree sexual assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for a de novo resentencing hearing. View "State v. Tex B.S." on Justia Law

Petitioner, the principal owner of a vacation facility open to the public (“the resort”), was convicted of two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree. Petitioner’s sentence included placement on supervised release for twenty-five years. After serving consecutive terms in the penitentiary and being placed on parole, Petitioner was discharged from parole and placed on supervised release. Petitioner challenged the conditions of the terms of his supervised release that he not be employed at the resort and that he not visit the resort. The circuit court denied Petitioner’s motion to strike those conditions from the terms of his supervised release. The circuit court also, sua sponte, entered an order setting forth additional conditions governing Petitioner’s conduct, including a condition banning him from his farm. The Supreme Court (1) upheld the two conditions banning Petitioner from the resort; and (2) upheld the additional conditions imposed sua sponte by the circuit court, except for the condition banning Petitioner from his farm, as this prohibition warranted a more detailed analysis by the circuit court. Remanded. View "State v. Hedrick" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three sexual offenses against an infant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress inculpatory statements Defendant made to the police; (2) the evidence was sufficient to find Defendant guilty of the offenses set out in the indictment; (3) Defendant’s juvenile record was properly used to impeach Defendant’s trial testimony; and (4) although polygraph-related evidence has been deemed inadmissible in this State, the improper admission of such evidence does not automatically warrant a new trial, and in this case, testimony mentioning that Petitioner took a polygraph test was error, but the error was harmless. View "State v. Tyler G." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree. Petitioner was sentenced to life without mercy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even if deemed gruesome, the probative value of autopsy and crime scene photographs is greater at the mercy phase of a bifurcated trial than at the guilt phase of such trial; (2) the circuit court in this case did not err in admitting autopsy and crime scene photographs during the mercy phase; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that alleged jury misconduct did not prejudice Petitioner; (4) the circuit court did gave a proper reading to jury of West Virginia Slayer Statute; (5) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during the mercy phase closing argument; (6) Petitioner waived her argument regarding the admission into evidence of a summary chart; and (7) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. View "State v. Trail" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in granting the State’s motion in limine preventing Defendant from cross-examining a State witness about the terms of a pretrial diversion agreement she had entered into with the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the State’s motion in limine, as there was no factual basis for Defendant’s assertion that the witness’s pretrial diversion agreement could have led to her being pressured or induced into giving a statement to the investigating officer in Defendant’s case. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, without a recommendation of mercy. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence supported instructions on theories of felony-murder and lying-in-wait murder theories, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s request to force the State to make an election between the murder theories, and while the instruction on lying-in-wait murder was incorrect, this error was harmless; (2) the trial court correctly refused to give a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction; (3) the examination of a rebuttal witness by the State was not improper; (4) the trial court did not err in admitting a recording of a psychiatric interview of Defendant; (5) the trial court did not improperly restrict the testimony of Defendant’s expert; and (6) the trial court did not err in allowing the State to cross-examine Defendant’s expert in certain areas. View "State v. Lambert" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder and conspiracy to commit burglary. Defendant was sentenced to life with mercy on his conviction of felony murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s statements to a police officer in a police cruiser on the way to jail were voluntarily made and thus properly admitted into evidence; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a witness’s hearsay statements, as the statements were not testimonial and were admissible under a firmly rooted hearsay exception; (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting phone call statements Defendant made from jail, which were recorded by jail authorities; (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting either exemplar shoes purchased by the State as a demonstrative aid or an investigator’s opinion testimony concerning the shoes; and (5) the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the convictions. View "State v. Bouie" on Justia Law

Defendant entered an Alford plea of guilty to unlawful assault. Defendant was subsequently notified that he would be processed for deportation to Jamaica because of his felony conviction. When Defendant was discharged from his sentence he was turned over to the federal government for deportation proceedings. Defendant filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, alleging that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to inform him that his guilty plea could result in his being deported. The circuit court denied relief, concluding (1) the writ of error coram nobis did not exist in West Virginia, (2) a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not a recognized ground for relief under the writ, and (3) Defendant failed to show that his counsel did not inform him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in West Virginia, the common law writ of error coram nobis is available in criminal proceedings; and (2) courts permit a constitutional legal error claim to be brought under the writ of error coram nobis so long as the framework adopted in this opinion for asserting a constitutional legal error is followed. Remanded for the circuit court to apply the test to the facts of this case. View "State v. Hutton" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Derek S. was convicted of eighty-one counts of sexual offenses involving a minor female child. The circuit court granted the post-trial motion of Derek S. for a new trial based upon the trial court’s failure to strike a juror for cause. The prosecuting attorney sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of the order granting Derek S. a new trial. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that the juror should have been removed from the jury panel for cause, and the error resulted in the State being deprived of a valid conviction. View "State ex rel. Parker v. Hon. Thomas H. Keadle" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to the willful and knowing violation of the terms of a domestic protective order. After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of burglary by entering without breaking, abduction with the intent to defile, and second degree sexual assault. Prior to sentencing, Petitioner was found guilty of recidivism. The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and attendant sentencing, holding (1) Petitioner’s convictions of abduction with intent to defile and second degree sexual assault did not violate Petitioner’s constitutional right against double jeopardy; (2) the State’s evidence was sufficient to convict Petitioner of the crimes of burglary and second degree sexual assault; (3) the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the elements of abduction with intent to defile; and (4) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error related to Petitioner’s recidivist conviction and sentencing. View "State v. Lewis" on Justia Law