Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Brian E. Lyon, II, who was convicted of eight felonies, including first-degree murder, first-degree sexual assault, and attempted first-degree murder. The trial court imposed the maximum penalty for each offense. On appeal, Lyon argued that unpreserved trial errors affected the fairness of the proceedings. He claimed that the trial court delivered a defective jury instruction on first-degree sexual assault because it failed to include an element of the crime, lack of consent. He also claimed that the assistant prosecuting attorney made improper comments to the jury when he referred to Lyon as a “monster” and “evil” during his opening statement and closing argument.The Circuit Court of Marion County conducted Lyon’s jury trial in September 2021. The State introduced evidence showing that Lyon’s cell phone’s geo-location data placed him at the crime scene on the night of the crimes. Lyon’s DNA was found on a beer can recovered from the home, and his seminal fluid and skin cells were found on a piece of paper towel there. Lyon’s girlfriend testified about meeting him after he committed the crimes and traveling with him to Pennsylvania where he was eventually apprehended by authorities.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the convictions, finding no merit to Lyon's assignments of error. The court concluded that the trial court's jury instruction on first-degree sexual assault, although it erroneously omitted the lack of consent element, did not impair the truth-finding function of the trial or affect the outcome of the court proceedings. The court also found that while the prosecutor's remarks referring to Lyon as a "monster" and "evil" were improper, they did not unfairly mislead the jury or prejudice Lyon considering the strength of the State’s evidence establishing his guilt. View "State v. Lyon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed a case involving a man, Juan McMutary, who was stopped by a police officer for a traffic violation. During the stop, the officer conducted a search of McMutary's vehicle with his permission, uncovering a firearm and four bags later determined to contain illegal drugs. As a result, McMutary was indicted, tried, and convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and felony possession of a controlled substance, fentanyl, with intent to deliver in an amount more than one gram but less than five grams.The Circuit Court of Wood County had previously denied McMutary's motion to suppress the evidence collected by the police officer during the search of his vehicle, and his motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to the sentence enhancement imposed under West Virginia Code § 60A-4415(b)(2). McMutary appealed these decisions to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision to deny McMutary's motion to suppress the evidence, ruling that the officer had probable cause to conduct a traffic stop when she witnessed McMutary commit a traffic infraction. However, the court reversed the conviction and sentencing order which enhanced McMutary's sentence under West Virginia Code § 60A-4-415(b)(2), as the evidence presented at trial did not support the conviction and subsequent sentencing enhancement. The court remanded the case for resentencing under West Virginia Code § 60A-4-415(b)(1). View "State of West Virginia v. Juan McMutary" on Justia Law

The State of West Virginia sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Circuit Court of Monongalia County from enforcing its order dismissing a six-count indictment against J.L. and D.F., who were charged with crimes relating to child abuse and neglect. The Circuit Court had dismissed the indictment based on its assessment of the evidence presented in a related abuse and neglect proceeding, concluding that no trial jury could convict the parents based on that evidence. The State argued that the Circuit Court had exceeded its legitimate powers by dismissing the indictment.Previously, the Circuit Court had dismissed the indictment on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support it. The court based its decision on its knowledge of the evidence from a related abuse and neglect proceeding, and its opinion regarding the State's likelihood of obtaining convictions by a petit jury.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted the writ of prohibition. The court found that the Circuit Court had exceeded its legitimate powers by dismissing the indictment based on its improper consideration of evidence in a prior proceeding. The court held that a circuit court may not grant a defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment on the basis of the sufficiency of the evidence or whether a factual basis for the indictment exists. The court concluded that the State was entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, as the Circuit Court's order was clearly erroneous as a matter of law, and the State would be damaged in a way that was not correctable on appeal. View "State of West Virginia ex rel. State of West Virginia v. Gwaltney" on Justia Law

The case involves Rachel Louise Adkins, who was charged with one felony count of driving under the influence causing death, along with four misdemeanor charges. Adkins entered a Kennedy plea in the Circuit Court of Cabell County, under the impression that she would be sentenced to home confinement, based on off-the-record plea discussions with the court. However, the court sentenced her to not less than two nor more than ten years of incarceration. Adkins objected, stating that she entered the plea because the court had promised to sentence her to home confinement.The Circuit Court of Cabell County denied Adkins's motion to withdraw her guilty plea and resentenced her for the purpose of this appeal following her conviction for DUI causing death. Adkins appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, arguing that she would not have accepted the plea had the court not promised to sentence her to home confinement.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that the lower court's participation in plea discussions was a violation of Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, which explicitly prohibits judicial participation in plea discussions with criminal defendants. The court concluded that this violation constituted plain error, affecting the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The case was remanded with directions to allow Adkins to withdraw her plea and for assignment to a different circuit court judge. View "State of West Virginia v. Adkins" on Justia Law

The defendant, Kristen Nicole Wetzel, was convicted of unlawful taking of a vehicle, also known as "joyriding," under West Virginia Code § 17-8-4(a). As part of a plea agreement, she was sentenced to six months of incarceration, with only ten days of actual confinement and the remainder of the sentence suspended in favor of probation. The court later amended the confinement period to 240 hours of actual incarceration. Wetzel filed a motion to correct her sentence, arguing that the language of the sentencing order was denying her "good time" credit, a reduction of sentence for good conduct.The Circuit Court of Barbour County denied Wetzel's motion. The court found that the issue of good time credit was within the discretion of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, not the court. The court also noted that its sentencing order did not prohibit Wetzel from receiving good time credit. If Wetzel believed she should be receiving credit for good time, the court suggested she should file a civil action against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Wetzel's sentence was within the statutory limits and was not based on any impermissible factor. The court agreed with the lower court that the issue of good time credit fell within the discretion of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Therefore, the court found no basis to grant Wetzel any relief under Rule 35(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. View "State of West Virginia v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Kyle Slaughter, who was arrested and charged in two separate counties in West Virginia. In Fayette County, he was arrested after leading police on a high-speed chase and subsequently charged with bribery and other offenses. While incarcerated for these charges, his bond was revoked for separate charges pending in Raleigh County. At sentencing in Fayette County, the court credited Slaughter with thirty days for time served—the time between when he was first incarcerated and when his Raleigh County bond was revoked. Slaughter appealed, arguing that he should have been credited for the entire 263-day period that he was incarcerated.The Circuit Court of Fayette County determined that any credit for time served after Slaughter's bond had been revoked in Raleigh County should be applied to the charges in Raleigh County, not Fayette County. Slaughter appealed this decision, arguing that he should receive credit for the entire period he was incarcerated on the Fayette County charges.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that the Circuit Court of Fayette County erred in failing to credit Slaughter for the full 263 days he spent incarcerated on Fayette County charges and awaiting sentencing in Fayette County. The court stated that criminal defendants are entitled to credit for time served awaiting trial and sentencing while incarcerated on the underlying offense if the offense is bailable. However, the court deemed the error harmless and affirmed the lower court's decision because Slaughter was ultimately credited his full time served in the Raleigh County sentencing order. View "State v. Slaughter" on Justia Law

Hagerman used a shotgun to kill his former brother-in-law, while drinking with friends at Hagerman’s home. Charged with first-degree murder, he argued self-defense. After his conviction for second-degree murder, a lesser included offense, Hagerman discovered that six individuals who reside in or near the community of Bradshaw, where the shooting occurred, had been selected for the jury panel but the circuit court had directed the circuit clerk not to call them. The trial court denied Hagerman a new trial, stating: No juror was excluded from the case on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, economic status or being a qualified individual with a disability. The six jurors were from a “tight-knit community” of approximately 259 people, would generally know each other, and would be aware of the local knowledge or gossip. The court reasoned that the jurors would have likely been removed from the jury panel based on their relationships with people involved in the case.The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the circuit court violated his right to a randomly selected jury representing a fair cross-section of the community and committed plain error when it instructed the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter. View "State of West Virginia v. Hagerman" on Justia Law

Ward, charged with felony possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, moved to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment. He alleged that Raleigh County Sheriff’s Officers arrived at his mother’s residence, questioned him regarding a dispute, and asked him for identification. Ward stated he could retrieve it from “downstairs in [his] mother’s house in the [t]-shirt shop.” Both officers and Ward walked around to the door. Ward opened the door. The officers grabbed the door and followed him in. Ward then walked through another door that led into a separate room used for his t-shirt printing shop. While Ward retrieved his identification, an officer observed a firearm. Ward testified that a person standing at the entryway to the basement door would not have been able to see the firearm because it would have been obscured by two doors and a curtain. The basement was not his residence and there was a lock on the front door. Detective Queen stated that he watched Ward retrieve his identification “[f]or officer safety” although he did not have a specific reason to fear for his safety.The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. Officers conducted the search and seized the firearm without a warrant; the plain view and officer safety exceptions do not apply. View "State of West Virginia v. Ward" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the sentencing order of the circuit court and remanded this case with instructions to dismiss Petitioner's conviction for malicious assault and resentence him on the remaining charges, holding that the indictment was insufficient because it did not include an essential element of the offense of malicious assault.Before trial, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the malicious assault count of the indictment because it did not reference the intent to "maim, disfigure, disable or kill." The circuit court denied the motion, finding that a person may commit malicious assault (1) by maliciously shooting, stabbing, cutting, or wounding any person; or (2) by any means causing a person bodily injury with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's sentencing order, holding (1) the intent to main, disfigure, disable, or kill is an essential element of the offenses of malicious assault and unlawful assault pursuant to W. Va. Code 61-29; and (2) therefore, the indictment in this case was insufficient. View "State v. Maichle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction of sexual assault in the first degree following a jury trial, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of attempted sexual assault in the first degree; (2) did not err when it denied Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial regarding a photographic identification; (3) did not abuse its discretion when it denied an in camera hearing on the suggestibility of the pretrial photographic identification; and (4) did not err when it denied Petitioner's motions for a mistrial due to vouching. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law