Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The complex issues at issue in these three consolidated appeals revolved around four overlapping leases to extract oil and gas from land owned by Plaintiff. Each lease contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiff filed the instant case against Defendants seeking a declaration as to which lease was controlling as to which defendants and seeking damages from Defendants. The circuit court entered an order voiding two of the four leases, addressing the substantive terms of two other leases, and compelling the parties to arbitrate any remaining claims by Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) properly found the arbitration clause in one lease to be unenforceable and correctly ruled that the entire lease was unenforceable; (2) erred in compelling certain defendants to participate in arbitration under the terms of a second lease but did not err when it made findings of fact and conclusions of law that addressed the substance of Plaintiff’s claims regarding that lease; (3) erred in voiding a third lease, and its included arbitration clause, in violation the doctrine of severability; and (4) erred in its substantive rulings interpreting a fourth lease, as the court should have referred questions about the lease to arbitration. View "Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Hickman" on Justia Law

The case involved an alleged fraudulent scheme involving United Bank and McQuade Appraisal Services (collectively, Respondents) to inflate the value of property in a residential development called Walnut Springs Mountain Reserve (Walnut Springs). Walnut Springs ultimately failed and was abandoned by the developer. Petitioners were owners of lots in Walnut Springs. The circuit court dismissed Petitioners’ claims, concluding, inter alia, that the majority of the claims were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims for fraud in the inducement and aiding and abetting fraud in the inducement, negligence, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, respondent superior, and punitive damages, as the claims were not time-barred; and (2) affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, holding that the court’s judgment regarding these claims was not in error. View "Evans v. United Bank, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a verbal contract with Jerry Morrison for the construction of a log home on her property. Plaintiff entered into a second verbal contract with James Phillips to build the basement walls and a chimney with two fireplaces. Concerned about the number of apparent defects in the construction and excessive costs of the labor and materials, Plaintiff fired Morrison. Plaintiff later filed suit against Morrison and Phillips (together, Defendants), alleging fraud and misrepresentation, breach of contract, and negligence, among other claims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff only with respect to her negligence claim against Morrison. The jury further found that Plaintiff had failed to mitigate her damages and/or was comparatively negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) limiting the time the parties had to present the case to the jury; (2) placing limitations on expert testimony; (3) granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Phillips; (4) denying Plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to her negligence and breach of warranty claims against Morrison; (5) instructing the jury on comparative negligence; (6) instructing the jury on outrageous conduct; and (7) denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. View "Sneberger v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Jarrett Smith was injured when his vehicle collided with a truck owned by Modular Building Consultants of West Virginia, Inc. and operated by Billy Joe McLaughlin. Prior to the collision, McLaughlin had arrived at a job site to retrieve a Modular storage container being leased and utilized by Poerio, Inc. Smith filed suit against Modular, alleging negligence. Modular brought a third-party complaint against Poerio, seeking contribution and indemnification pursuant to the lease agreement. Before trial, Modular settled with Smith. Trial as to Modular’s third-party complaint proceeded. A jury found that Poerio did not breach the lease agreement but found that Poerio, Modular, and Smith were all comparatively negligent. The circuit court subsequently entered judgment in Poerio’s favor on its contribution claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury’s finding that Poerio was negligent was not inconsistent with its finding that Poerio did not breach the lease agreement; (2) the circuit court erred in ruling that Modular’s contribution claim was extinguished by its good faith settlement with Smith as a matter of law; but (3) the jury’s verdict was neither inconsistent nor impermissibly considered the comparative fault of Smith. View "Modular Building Consultants of W. Va., Inc. v. Poerio, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs signed a form contract with Defendant for the construction of a house. The contract contained an arbitration clause within which was a provision that Defendant contended was a “delegation provision” stating that the parties agreed to delegate, from the courts to an arbitrator, any question about the enforceability of the arbitration clause. Plaintiffs later filed a complaint against Defendant for alleged defects in the house. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, finding that the arbitration clause was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court should have enforced the delegation provision and referred the parties’ claims about arbitrability to arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the delegation provision did not reflect a clear and unmistakable intent by the parties to assign to the arbitrator all questions about the enforceability of the arbitration clause; and (2) the circuit court was correct in deciding that the arbitration provision was unenforceable under West Virginia contract law. View "Schumacher Homes of Circleville v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an attorney, and Respondent, a non-lawyer, entered into a fee-sharing agreement in connection with certain lawsuits. Petitioner later filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment on the issue of whether Respondent was entitled to compensation for services he performed in relation to the litigation, seeking a ruling as to whether a sharing of legal fees with Respondent would violate Rule 5.4 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct. The federal district court certified the following question to the Supreme Court: “Are the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct statements of public policy with the force of law equal to that given to statutes enacted by the West Virginia State Legislature?” The Supreme Court affirmed the question, as modified, in the affirmative, holding (1) Rule 5.4, which proscribes the sharing of fees between lawyers or law firms and non-lawyers, is an explicit judicial declaration of West Virginia public policy with the force and effect of law; and (2) accordingly, a fee-sharing agreement between a lawyer or law firm and the non-lawyer that violates the provisions of Rule 5.4 is void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable. View "Rich v. Simoni" on Justia Law

In purchasing a vehicle, Robin Hinkle and her former husband purchased GAP Insurance issued by Safe-Guard Products International, LLC (Safe-Guard). The Hinkles were told that the GAP Insurance would relieve them of payment owed on the vehicle if it was declared a total loss as a result of an accident and more was owed for the vehicle than the value assigned to it at the time it was totaled. Robin was later involved in an accident that resulted in her vehicle being declared a total loss. To pay off the balance owed on the vehicle, Robin submitted a claim to Safe-Guard under the GAP Insurance. Safe-Guard denied coverage. Robin subsequently filed this action against Safe-Guard, alleging breach of contract and bad faith. Robin filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the GAP Insurance constituted insurance under state law for purposes of this litigation. The circuit court granted the motion. Thereafter, Safe-Guard initiated the instant proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition to preclude enforcement of the partial summary judgment order. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Safe-Guard’s GAP Insurance constituted insurance under the laws of West Virginia. View "State ex rel. Safe-Guard Prods. Int’l LLC v. Hon. Miki Thompson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Quicken Loans, Inc., alleging that Quicken committed common law fraud and violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act in connection with a loan agreement between Plaintiff and Quicken. The circuit court found in favor of Plaintiff on all but one of her claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that the circuit court improperly cancelled Plaintiff’s obligation to repay the loan principal, failed to support its punitive damages award with the correct analysis, and failed to offset the compensatory damages award against Plaintiff’s pretrial settlement with defendants who did not proceed to trial. After remand, the circuit court entered an opinion and order. The Supreme Court again reversed, holding that the circuit court (1) improperly created a lien on Plaintiff’s property; (2) erred in increasing the compensatory damages award to Plaintiff; (3) erred in awarding attorney fees and costs for both the first appellate proceeding and the post-appellate proceedings; (4) improperly increased the punitive damages award; and (5) erred in refusing to offset Plaintiff’s award of attorney fees and costs by a pretrial settlement between Plaintiff and the codefendants. Remanded. View "Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Petitioners, the West Virginia Investment Management Board (IMB) and the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board (Board), instituted a declaratory judgment action against the Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company (VALIC) requesting judicial resolution of Petitioners’ entitlement to a full surrender of two annuity contracts without delays in payment or surrender charges. The trial court granted VALIC’s motion for summary judgment, resolving Petitioners’ claims on grounds of standing, the absence of a justiciable controversy, and the lack of ambiguity concerning the language of a policy endorsement in dispute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in finding that no justiciable controversy existed between the parties and that Petitioners lacked standing in relation to the contracts; and (2) the policy endorsement language under review was of such doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might disagree as to its meaning. View "W. Va. Inv. Mgmt. Bd. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins." on Justia Law

In 1982, Hospital and Doctor entered into a “Memorandum Agreement” in which Hospital agreed to deed certain real property to Doctor. The Memorandum Agreement contained a provision entitled “Option to Repurchase.” In 2012, Hospital filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Doctor asking the circuit court to declare that the Option to Repurchase was an option contract rather than a right of first refusal. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Hospital, finding that the Option to Repurchase agreement was a “valid” option contract. Doctor appealed, arguing that the validity of the option contract was not an issue before the circuit court, and therefore, the summary judgment order should be reversed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the ruling contained in the circuit court’s summary judgment order that the option contract was a “valid” option contract, as Hospital’s complaint for declaratory judgment did not seek a determination of the validity of the option contract; and (2) affirmed the order’s ruling that the Option to Repurchase agreement was an option contract. View "Black v. St. Joseph's Hosp. of Buckhannon, Inc." on Justia Law