Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This litigation arose out of the construction of the home of Randie Lawson and Deanna Lawson (together, Respondents). G & G Builders, Inc. (Petitioner) filed suit asserting that it was owed $303,686 under the parties’ construction agreement. Respondents asserted a counterclaim for breach of contract. Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss Respondents’ counterclaim and to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration provisions in the construction agreement were not binding on Randie because they were set forth in a document that was never provided to him, nor were they binding on Deanna, who was a non-signatory to the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that there was no agreement between the parties to arbitrate their dispute. View "G & G Builders, Inc. v. Lawson" on Justia Law

Robert Perry was issued a Citibank MasterCard account in 1998. The terms and conditions of the Citibank Card Agreement governing Perry’s account included an arbitration agreement. In 2010, Citibank filed a debt collection action against Perry seek to recover the balance owed on Perry’s account. In 2015, Perry filed an answer to Citibank’s complaint and a class counterclaim alleging that Citibank had violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. Thereafter, Citibank filed a motion asking the court to compel arbitration of the parties’ claims. The circuit court concluded that Citibank had implicitly waived its right to arbitration by filing suit in circuit court and waiting nearly five years before seeking to invoke its contractual right to arbitrate. Citibank appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Citibank did not waive its right to compel arbitration in this matter. Remanded. View "Citibank, N.A. v. Perry" on Justia Law

Braxton Lumber Company filed suit against Lloyd’s Inc. seeking payment on a promissory note. Braxton Lumber did not file suit within six years of the due date on the promissory note owed to it. The circuit court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding, in part, that the statute of limitations expired on Braxton Lumber’s claims. Braxton Lumber appealed, arguing that its suit was not time-barred because tolling provisions in two West Virginia statutes extended the time in which it could have filed suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither of the tolling provisions relied upon by Braxton Lumber tolled the six-year statute of limitations on its lawsuit. View "Braxton Lumber Co. v. Lloyd's Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff signed a contract with Defendant for the construction of a house. The contract contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiff later brought suit against Defendant, claiming that there were defects in the house. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the arbitration clause was unconscionable. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by ruling on questions of arbitrability despite the existence of a delegation provision in the arbitration agreement that vested the arbitrator with authority to determine issues of arbitrability relating to the dispute. The Supreme Court determined that the circuit court was within its rights not to enforce the delegation language because the language did not reflect the parties’ clear and unmistakable intention to delegate issues about the validity, revocability, or enforceability of the arbitration agreement to an arbitrator. The United States Supreme Court granted Defendant’s requested writ of certiorari, vacated the Supreme Court’s opinion, and remanded for further consideration in light of their decision in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order, holding that because Plaintiffs never specifically challenged the delegation language before the circuit court or Supreme Court, Plaintiffs waived any right to challenge the delegation language. Remanded for arbitration. View "Schumacher Homes of Circleville v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Allegheny Country Farms entered into a contract to purchase a portion of Carper’s 33-acre property. The agreement was intended to resolve a boundary dispute. Before the conveyance was made, however, Carper sold her property at auction to the Huffmans, by a contract wherein the Huffmans agreed to abide by the terms of the first contract. Allegheny sought specific performance. The court granted summary judgment to the Huffmans and dismissed, as moot, and action against Carper. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed: the Huffmans are contractually bound to convey a portion of their property to Allegheny. “The Huffmans entered into this contract, and its attending obligation to execute the Boundary Line Agreement, with their eyes wide open. They were clearly put on notice and assented to this requirement at the property auction.” View "Allegheny Country Farms, Inc. v. Huffman" on Justia Law

Bayles rolled over his 401(k) retirement account, signing an Ameriprise Brokerage Individual Retirement Account Application. Bayles later signed an Active Portfolios Application-IRA Account Application. The first page of each application states that a copy of the related Brokerage Agreement must be provided to the client; the IRA Application states: You acknowledge that you have received and read the Ameriprise Brokerage Client Agreement and agree to abide by its terms….. This brokerage account is governed by a predispute arbitration clause which is found on Section 26.... You acknowledge receipt of the predispute arbitration clause." Similar language appears in the Portfolios Application. Bayles died in 2013. His wife thought she was the beneficiary, but decedent’s children were the designated primary beneficiaries on both accounts. Mrs. Bayles challenged Ameriprise’s payout of the proceeds. The defendants unsuccessfully moved to compel arbitration. The trial court found the absence of a signature on a brokerage agreement created an ambiguity that invalidated the arbitration clause. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed and remanded. Decedent signed the IRA Application, expressly acknowledging the arbitration clause, but there are unresolved issues, including whether the arbitration clause is unconscionable and whether anyof Mrs. Bayles’ claims “fall within the substantive scope of that arbitration agreement.” View "Jeffrey N. Evans/Ameriprise Fin. Servs. v. Bayles" on Justia Law

Jarred Wellman, a West Virginia resident, was killed in a one-car rollover crash in West Virginia. Jarred was operating a 2002 Ford Explorer at the time of the accident. Plaintiff, a West Virginia resident and the father and administrator of Jarred’s estate, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Wyoming County against Ford Motor Company alleging product liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. Ford filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the grounds that it was a nonresident corporation. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Ford requested the Supreme Court to issue a writ of prohibition seeking dismissal from the underlying action. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ as moulded, holding (1) Ford has not shown that it is entitled to extraordinary relief whereby the Court would dismiss it from the underlying civil action; but (2) Ford’s assertions regarding its challenge to jurisdiction are of such a significant nature that the parties are entitled to an opportunity to develop the record and submit argument to be considered and determined by the circuit court. View "State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Hon. Warren R. McGraw" on Justia Law

Respondents entered into a loan agreement with Nationstar Mortgage, LLC. As part of the mortgage loan transaction, Respondents signed an arbitration agreement. Respondents later filed a complaint alleging that Nationstar engaged in predatory lending practices and abusive and unlawful debt collection in connection with the mortgage loan. Nationstar filed a motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondents did not demonstrate that the arbitration agreement was either procedurally or substantively unconscionable. Remanded. View "Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. West" on Justia Law

J.F. Allen Corporation (J.F. Allen), a utility contractor, and the Sanitary Board of the City of Charleston (CSB), a utility owner, entered into a written agreement for a construction project involving improvements to the City of Charleston’s municipal sewer system. Final completion was delayed under the contract, and adjustments were made that increased the contract price. After final payment was made under the contract, J.F. Allen sought additional compensation for extra, non-contractual work. After CSB refused the request J.F. Allen filed a complaint alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Upon CSB’s motion, the circuit court dismissed, with prejudice, the breach of contract claim pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that J.F. Allen set forth a claim upon which relief could be granted. Remanded. View "J.F. Allen Corp. v. Sanitary Bd. of City of Charleston" on Justia Law

This appeal involved three different leases negotiated by Defendant between plaintiff-landowners and an oil and gas company. Each of the three leases engendered a different lawsuit against Defendant. In each case, Plaintiffs claimed that the nature of the services provided by Defendant constituted the unauthorized practice of law. Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ lawsuits and sought to compel Plaintiffs to participate in arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in each lease. Plaintiffs challenged the arbitration clauses as void on the grounds that the arbitration clauses were contrary to public policy because they were procured through the unauthorized practice of law. In all three suits, the circuit court concluded that a plaintiff’s claim that a defendant engaged in the unauthorized practice of law can never, as a matter of matter of state law, be referred to arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that any state-based rule that prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Geological Assessment & Leasing v. O'Hara" on Justia Law