Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, New Hampshire Insurance Company, appealed an order of the circuit court granting partial summary judgment in favor of Respondent, RRK, Inc., finding that pursuant to the commercial marine property insurance policy issued by New Hampshire, RRK's barge and the barge's contents were covered property under the policy and that a wear-and-tear exclusion in the policy was invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that there was no question of fact regarding whether a renewal policy was mailed to and received by RRK; but (2) the circuit court erred by granting partial summary judgment in favor of RRK because there was a question of fact as to whether, under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the wear-and-tear exclusion present in the policy mailed to RRK was part of the insurance contract. Remanded. View "N.H. Ins. v. RRK., Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the sale of a residence. The buyers, the plaintiffs below, sought compensatory and punitive damages from the sellers regarding water leakage in a basement storage room of the residence the buyers purchased. The leak was disclosed to the buyers after the signing of a purchase agreement and before the closing of the sale. In the complaint, the buyers also asked the circuit court to direct the sellers to proceed with the closing and deliver a deed to the buyers containing covenants of general warranty as specified in the purchase agreement. In granting partial summary judgment to the sellers, the circuit court concluded that the buyers' claims were without merit because they were on notice of the water leak prior to the closing of the sale. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the sellers were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law based on the purchase agreement; (2) the refusal of the circuit court to allow discovery constituted reversible error; and (3) the circuit court erred in failing to direct the sellers to deliver a deed to the buyers setting forth the language required by the purchase agreement. View "Hinerman v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Victoria Drumheller and three corporate entities sought relief from the default judgment entered against them by the circuit court in connection with a breach of contract action filed by Respondents James and Diane Fillinger. Petitioners asserted (1) they were wrongfully denied the right to have a jury determine the amount of damages they owed to Respondents in connection with the default judgment, and (2) the damage award was not supported by the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not commit error in entering the subject default judgment and in holding a bench trial on the issue of damages. View "Drumheller v. Fillinger" on Justia Law

Petitioner, The Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation (ACT), filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that a public highway construction contract awarded to Respondent, Nicewonder Contracting, Inc., by Respondent, West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH), violated state competitive bidding and prevailing wage laws. The circuit court dismissed ACT's action, finding it lacked standing to challenge the highway construction contract. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that ACT had representative standing to seek the declarations. On remand, the circuit court determined that the Court's opinion in ACT I did not completely decide the issue of ACT's standing and ordered that ACT join the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) as a defendant in the action. The Supreme Court subsequently granted ACT's requested writ of prohibition because the circuit court did not give effect to the mandate of the Court in ACT I, holding (1) ACT, as a matter of law, had standing to prosecute its lawsuit; and (2) FHWA was not an indispensable party to the lawsuit. View "State ex rel. Affiliated Constr. Trades v. Circuit Court (Stucky)" on Justia Law

As the primary beneficiary under an insurance policy issued by Appellee Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, Appellant Roger Goff brought a cause of action under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act, asserting that Penn Mutual had violated the statutory duty of good faith and fair dealing. After deciding that Goff did not meet the accepted definition of either a first- or a third-party bad faith claimant, the trial court dismissed Goff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a primary life insurance beneficiary may assert a statutory bad faith action upon the death of the insured. Remanded. View "Goff v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case was a consolidation of three separate wrongful death lawsuits. Each lawsuit arose from a nursing home's attempt to compel a plaintiff to participate in arbitration pursuant to a clause in a nursing home admission contract. The Supreme Court (1) ruled that the arbitration clauses were unconscionable and unenforceable in two of the cases, and (2) held that the Nursing Home Act could not be relied upon to bar enforcement of the arbitration clause in the third case. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded to consider whether the arbitration clauses were enforceable under state common law principles that were not specific to arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA. On remand, the Supreme Court (1) held that the doctrine of unconscionability that the Court explicated in Brown I was a general, state, common-law, contract principle that was not specific to arbitration and did not implicate the FAA; (2) reversed the trial courts' prior orders compelling arbitration in two of the cases and permitted the parties to raise arguments regarding unconscionability anew before the trial court; and (3) found the issue of unconscionability in the third case was not considered by the trial court but may be raised on remand. View "Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp." on Justia Law

In this matter the Supreme Court considered whether a decedent's will that directed "all my just debts be paid as soon as conveniently possible after the date of my death" obligated the decedent's estate to pay the mortgage on two parcels of real property devised to Respondents. The circuit court determined that the "just debts" clause required the decedent's estate to pay the mortgage on the two properties and deliver an unencumbered interest in the two properties to Respondents. Petitioner, the executrix of the will, appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the doctrine of exoneration was applicable to this case, and under the doctrine, Respondents were entitled to receive an unencumbered interest in the two devised properties. View "Estate of Fussell v. Fortney " on Justia Law

Petitioners, David and Shirley Finch, appealed from an order entered by the circuit court, which granted summary judgment to Defendant, Inspectech, LLC. The circuit court concluded that, by signing the parties' inspection agreement, which contained a clause entitled "unconditional release and limitation of liability," the Finches had released Inspectech from liability for any defects it failed to report in its inspection of the house the Finches planned to, and ultimately did, purchase. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Inspectech was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon the terms of the parties' inspection agreement and the release language therein because anticipatory releases contained in home inspection contracts are void and unenforceable as contrary to the public policy of the State. View "Finch v. Inspectech, LLC" on Justia Law

The Davises failed to pay the real estate tax for their property, resulting in a statutory tax. The Davises then filed a petition for bankruptcy, which was granted. Subsequently, the sheriff sold the tax lien. After the statutory time period that the Davises could redeem the property had passed and the property remained unredeemed, the tax lien purchaser received a tax deed conveying the Davises' property. The trial court set aside the tax deed, concluding that the tax lien sale should not have been held because the Davises had been in bankruptcy and because the sheriff did not give sufficient notice to the Davises of the tax delinquency, lien, and sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred (1) in considering issues relating to the sufficiency of the sheriff's service of the notices; (2) in considering the sheriff's pre-sale notices to the Davises, as only the post-sale notice to redeem is relevant in a lawsuit to set aside a tax deed; and (3) by granting judgment without making sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the effect the Davises' bankruptcy had on the tax lien. Remanded. View "Rebuild America, Inc. v. Davis" on Justia Law

Employee submitted a claim for workers' compensation under Employer's policy with Insurer, which claim was paid in full. Employee also filed a deliberate intent lawsuit against Employer. After assuming the attorney's fees and costs associated with defending and settling the action, Employer filed a complaint against Insurer, alleging various claims related to Insurer's denial of coverage in the defense of the deliberate intent action. The circuit court granted Employer's motion for partial summary judgment on its bad faith claim against Insurer and awarded damages to Employer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Insurer met its obligation under W. Va. Code 23-4C-6 to make deliberate intent coverage available to Employer upon the Employer's voluntary request; and (2) because the language of the policy was plain, and the exclusion of deliberate intent coverage was clear, the circuit court erred in concluding that the policy was ambiguous and therefore resulted in deliberate intent coverage being included in the policy under the doctrine of reasonable expectations. View "W. Va. Employers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Summit Point Raceway Assocs." on Justia Law