Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2004, the Petitioner was charged with sexual abuse in the first degree, attempt to commit a felony of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the first degree and sexual abuse by a custodian, based on 2001 incidents involving his step-granddaughter. He was convicted in 2005. The court ordered that, following his discharge from the penitentiary after serving a 10-20 year sentence for his sexual abuse by a custodian conviction, he “shall be placed on probation for a period of ten (10) years” with specific conditions. In 2006, the Legislature amended the statute to require a mandatory period of extended supervised release, West Virginia Code 62-12-2631. In 2015, the circuit court modified petitioner’s probationary period to five years followed by 20 years of “intensive supervision as a sex offender.” The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the extension of his sentence, citing the ex post facto clause found in both the West Virginia and United States Constitutions. View "West Virginia v. Deel" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of twenty counts of possession of material visually portraying a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Petitioner also received a related recidivist conviction. Through a second amended sentencing order Petitioner was sentenced to a total period of incarceration of seventeen years. The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it allowed expert opinion testimony concerning the ages of the children depicted in the images; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (3) Petitioner was not denied his constitutional right to a fair trial when the trial court allowed the State to present hearsay testimony; and (4) Petitioner’s convictions did not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. View "State v. Shingleton" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the return of items seized by a state police trooper (Trooper) in his execution of a search warrant at Petitioner’s business premises. In his complaint, Petitioner alleged that the search warrant was an improper general warrant. Also named as a defendant was the former prosecuting attorney for Mineral County (Prosecutor). The circuit court denied Petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly denied Petitioner’s complaint seeking a writ of mandamus because mandamus was not a proper remedy in this case. View "Pristine Pre-Owned Auto, Inc. v. Courrier" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of robbery in the first degree, nighttime burglary, and conspiracy. At issue in this case were two plea deals offered by the State. The first was a pre-trial offer and the second was a post-conviction offer regarding a recidivist action. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective by giving erroneous advice before trial and by failing adequately to prepare him for his trial testimony. After an omnibus hearing, the circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly determined that Petitioner could not establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. View "Raines v. Ballard" on Justia Law

The State filed an information charging Caleb Toparis with the misdemeanor offenses of domestic assault and domestic battery. Toparis filed a motion to dismiss the information, asserting that his right to a speedy trial had been violated because he had not been tried on the charges within one year of the execution of the warrant. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The State sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit the circuit court from dismissing the two misdemeanor charges against Toparis, contending that the circuit court erred in finding that Toparis’s right to a speedy trial had been violated. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ, holding that Toparis’s right to a speedy trial was not violated in this case. View "State ex rel. Sorsaia v. Hon. Stowers" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of fleeing in a vehicle, possession with intent to deliver a schedule II controlled substance (cocaine), and possession with intent to deliver a schedule II controlled substance (methamphetamine). Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence a police officer discovered upon searching Defendant’s vehicle, arguing that no probable cause existed for either the traffic stop or the subsequent search. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions and resultant sentences and remanded, holding that the warrantless search of Defendant’s vehicle was unlawful, and therefore, the circuit court erred by not suppressing the evidence found during that search. View "State v. Noel" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder and conspiracy to commit burglary. Defendant was sentenced to life with mercy on his conviction of felony murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s statements to a police officer in a police cruiser on the way to jail were voluntarily made and thus properly admitted into evidence; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a witness’s hearsay statements, as the statements were not testimonial and were admissible under a firmly rooted hearsay exception; (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting phone call statements Defendant made from jail, which were recorded by jail authorities; (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting either exemplar shoes purchased by the State as a demonstrative aid or an investigator’s opinion testimony concerning the shoes; and (5) the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the convictions. View "State v. Bouie" on Justia Law

Defendant entered an Alford plea of guilty to unlawful assault. Defendant was subsequently notified that he would be processed for deportation to Jamaica because of his felony conviction. When Defendant was discharged from his sentence he was turned over to the federal government for deportation proceedings. Defendant filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, alleging that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to inform him that his guilty plea could result in his being deported. The circuit court denied relief, concluding (1) the writ of error coram nobis did not exist in West Virginia, (2) a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not a recognized ground for relief under the writ, and (3) Defendant failed to show that his counsel did not inform him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in West Virginia, the common law writ of error coram nobis is available in criminal proceedings; and (2) courts permit a constitutional legal error claim to be brought under the writ of error coram nobis so long as the framework adopted in this opinion for asserting a constitutional legal error is followed. Remanded for the circuit court to apply the test to the facts of this case. View "State v. Hutton" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to the willful and knowing violation of the terms of a domestic protective order. After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of burglary by entering without breaking, abduction with the intent to defile, and second degree sexual assault. Prior to sentencing, Petitioner was found guilty of recidivism. The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and attendant sentencing, holding (1) Petitioner’s convictions of abduction with intent to defile and second degree sexual assault did not violate Petitioner’s constitutional right against double jeopardy; (2) the State’s evidence was sufficient to convict Petitioner of the crimes of burglary and second degree sexual assault; (3) the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the elements of abduction with intent to defile; and (4) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error related to Petitioner’s recidivist conviction and sentencing. View "State v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Respondent was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and refused to submit to a secondary breath test. Respondent’s driver’s license was subsequently revoked by the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles for both DUI and the refusal to submit to the designated chemical test. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) rescinded the driver’s license revocation on the grounds that (1) Respondent was misled to believe that he had a choice as to whether he wanted to take a breath test or a blood test, and therefore, revocation for refusing the secondary chemical test was inappropriate; and (2) Respondent was effectively denied his right to obtain an independent blood test. The circuit court upheld the OAH’s order. The Supreme Court found that Respondent’s license revocations for refusal to submit to the secondary breath test were proper but his license revocations for DUI were erroneous, holding (1) the lower tribunals erroneously concluded that Respondent had a rational basis for perceiving that he had a choice between the breath test and the blood test, and therefore, revocation for refusing the secondary chemical test was appropriate; and (2) Respondent was denied his statutory and due process rights to have his blood tested independently. View "Reed v. Hall" on Justia Law