Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Rhonda Stewart was convicted for the first degree murder of her husband. At trial, the circuit court prohibited Defendant from presenting evidence that she had been battered and abused by her husband during their thirty-eight-year marriage and did not allow an expert witness to testify as to how this abuse may have affected Defendant's state of mind and reasoning as it related to premeditation, malice, or intent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on well-established precedent, Defendant was entitled to present evidence of Battered Woman's Syndrome and evidence of abuse through eyewitnesses and expert witnesses; and (2) because the jury could have reasonably found that Defendant's crime was not first degree murder, but second degree murder or manslaughter had the jury been allowed to hear the abuse evidence, Defendant did not receive a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Appellee was allegedly hit in the head by a law enforcement officer during a confrontation. Appellee filed a civil complaint against the city and the two officers involved in the incident (Appellants), alleging that his civil rights had been violated due to the use of excessive force by the officers. Appellants moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity from suit both on qualified immunity and statutory immunity grounds. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of summary judgment, holding (1) a public officer is entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages for performance of discretionary functions where (i) a trial court finds the alleged facts do not demonstrate that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, or (ii) a trial court finds the evidence could establish the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right but further finds that it would be clear to any reasonable officer that such conduct was lawful in the situation confronted; and (2) Appellants were entitled to qualified immunity from suit, either because (i) no constitutional violated was established by the facts alleged, or (ii) a reasonable officer confronting the same situation, without notice to the contrary, would have considered the action lawful. View "City of St. Albans v. Botkins" on Justia Law

The Racing Commission suspended certain jockeys' occupational permits for thirty days and imposed fines for the jockeys' failure to declare an overweight amount. Afterwards, PNGI Charles Town Gaming (PNGI), a non-party in the underlying action, excluded the jockeys from its facility. The circuit court (1) entered an injunction and stayed the imposition of sanctions by the Racing Commission until the conclusion of a hearing before the Commission; and (2) extended the injunction and the stay to include PNGI, preventing PNGI from excluding the jockeys from PGNI's premises pending the outcome of the jockeys' administrative appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an ejection of a permit holder by a racing association or its stewards is subject to review by the Commission, and therefore, the jockeys, as permit holders, had the right to appeal the ejection, and PNGI was bound by the Commission's decision, subject to judicial review; and (2) PNGI waived its assigned errors regarding the injunction and stay. View "PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

After Appellee was arrested for DUI, the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked Appellee's driver's license for two years. Appellee filed a request for an administrative hearing, which was conducted on May 6, 2008. By final order dated October 13, 2009, the DMV Commissioner ordered that Appellee's privilege to drive a motor vehicle be revoked for six months. Appellee appealed the revocation order, arguing that the seventeen-month delay between the administrative hearing and entry of the final order revoking his driver's license violated his procedural due process rights. The circuit court reversed the order, concluding that the excessive delay violated Appellee's due process rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellee was required to show actual and substantial prejudice as a result of the delay. Remanded to (1) give Appellee the opportunity to present evidence of prejudice and to give the Commissioner the opportunity to present evidence regarding the reasons for the delay; and (2) balance the resulting prejudice against the reasons for the delay in order to determine whether the delay violated Appellee's right to due process. View "Miller v. Moredock" on Justia Law

Petitioners were fifteen employees of the county Board of Education, who filed a grievance regarding changes made to the subsequent year's extracurricular coaching contracts, claiming they were entitled to receive notice and a hearing prior to the adoption of the changes and that they received neither. The ALJ and the circuit court denied the grievance. Petitioners appealed, contending that W. Va. Code 18A-2-7 gave them the right to receive a hearing before the Board could unilaterally alter the terms of the coaching contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Petitioners' grievance, holding that the circuit court's decision was not clearly wrong nor was it arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law. View "Martin v. Barbour County Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Appellant David Kaufman was convicted of first degree murder in the circuit court. On appeal, appellant argued that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence the victim's diary and certain statements by the victim to others, both of which recounted alleged threats and acts of violence by appellant towards the victim during the weeks preceding her death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) the trial court's admission of the entire diary without an analysis of each declaration and remark from the diary was an abuse of discretion because when ruling upon the admission of a narrative under the hearsay rule of evidence, a trial court must break down the narrative and determine the separate admissibility of each single declaration or remark; and (2) the trial court committed error in admitting certain statements by the victim without setting forth any reasoning in support of its ruling that the victim's statements were admissible under State v. Sutphin. Remanded. View "State v. Kaufman" on Justia Law

Appellant Carroll Humphries, a convicted felon, filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court after his conviction. The Court reversed and remanded the case due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon remand, appellant pleaded nolo contendere to the crime of accessory before the fact to murder, and appellant was found guilty. Later, appellant instituted a legal malpractice action against his attorney, Paul Detch. Detch filed a motion to dismiss, which the circuit court granted. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in a suit against an attorney for negligence, the plaintiff must prove the attorney's employment, the attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of loss to the plaintiff; (2) to state a cause of action for legal malpractice arising during a criminal proceeding, a plaintiff must establish that he is actually innocent of the underlying criminal offense; and (3) the rules of evidence in this case did not prohibit the conviction and sentence that resulted from the nolo contendere plea from being admitted as evidence in the legal malpractice action to prove the plaintiff was convicted of the crime that was the subject of the nolo contedere plea. View "Humphries v. Detch" on Justia Law

The Clerk of the McDowell County Commission appealed an order of the Circuit Court of McDowell County pertaining to mandamus proceedings. The Commission was directed to reimburse the attorney fees of A. Ray Bailey who was the prevailing party in an election contest. The Commission argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the Commission to pay Mr. Bailey's fees when the Commission was not a party to the election contest. Furthermore, The Commission argued that there was no statutory authority to support the award. Upon review of the arguments and law governing this matter, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's order directing payment of attorney fees by the Commission.

Appellants Family Protection Services Board, its secretary/treasurer, and several of its members all appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Men & Women Against Discrimination (MAWAD). The Board is a public body created by the West Virginia Domestic Violence Act (WVDVA). Among other things, the Board is charged with establishing and enforcing standards for the licensure of all domestic violence shelters and family protection programs in the state. The Board also provides funds for shelters and programs once they become licensed. In 2008, MAWAD filed a complaint alleging that the Board implemented the WVDVA in a discriminatory manner. MAWAD sought to enjoin the Board from disbursing funds to shelters and programs until the alleged discriminatory practices were addressed. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of MAWAD, rendering three legislative rules promulgated by the Board as "null and void." Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Court found MAWAD lacked standing to bring suit against the Board. The Court dismissed the case.

Defendant Stanley Myers appealed an order of the circuit court that determined he was a sexually violent predator. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant asserted that the trial court failed to make a statutory determination within the time frame contemplated by the governing statute. On the day after Defendant's release from prison in 2006, he registered with the State Police as a "sexual predator." As a result of an incident several years later, the State discovered Defendant was not on the "sexually violent predator" list. The State filed a motion to request Defendant be placed on the list. Upon careful review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by determining, contrary to state law, that Defendant was a sexually violent predator after Defendant had completed his period of incarceration. The Court reversed the decision of the lower court.