Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kendra Sulick was convicted by a jury on three counts of criminal civil rights violations pursuant to W. Va. Code 61-6-21(b). Sulick appealed the circuit court's denial of her post-trial motions, raising several arguments that essentially challenged the constitutionality of section 61-6-21(b) on vagueness and proportionality grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to prove that Sulick committed the acts complained of, and the evidence proved that the acts met the requirements of the statute; and (2) section 61-6-21 is not unconstitutionally vague and does not allow for a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the offenses sought to be prosecuted. View "State v. Sulick" on Justia Law

At issue in these consolidated appeals was the redistricting legislation adopted by the Legislature in 2011. Petitioners, several individuals and groups, challenged the constitutionality of H.B. 201, which was redistricting legislation regarding the House of Delegates, and S.B. 1006, which was redistricting legislation regarding the Senate. The constitutional challenges were before the Supreme Court as petitions for writs of prohibition and mandamus. The Court denied the requested writs, holding that the redistricting plans for the House of Delegates and the Senate were securely within the realm of constitutional mandates, as (1) in regards to H.B. 201, the constitution did not prohibit splitting counties or a plan containing multi-member delegate districts, the delegate residency dispersal requirement served a valid purpose, and no unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering occurred in this matter; and (2) S.B. 1006 did not violate the equality in population provisions of the state Constitution, did not unconstitutionally divide certain election precincts and cross county boundary lines, and did not violate the compactness requirement of the state Constitution insofar as it established certain senatorial districts. View "State ex rel. Cooper v. Tennant" on Justia Law

In two condemnation proceedings, the circuit court entered orders requiring the Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH) to turn over to Defendants, three individuals who owned and leased condemned property, appraisal reports involving several properties condemned by DOH for its South Mineral Wells Project. The DOH filed petitions for writs of prohibition, contending that federal law did not permit the release of appraisal reports from properties not owned or possessed by Defendants. Defendants argued that the court's orders were consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. West Virginia Department of Transportation v. Cookman, which allowed appraisal reports to be discoverable. The Court consolidated the petitions and granted the writs of prohibition, holding (1) the decision in Cookman was expressly overruled in its entirety because it failed to consider controlling federal law; and (2) a real property appraisal report generated in compliance with 42 U.S.C. 4601 and W. Va. Code 54-3-1, et seq., and its accompanying regulations, was not discoverable in a condemnation proceeding by party who did not own or have any legally cognizable possessory interest in such real property. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. Circuit Court (Reed)" on Justia Law

This was a consolidated appeal of two cases wherein the circuit court dismissed two appeals filed by a corporation, Shenandoah Sales & Services (Shenandoah), disputing the county assessor's valuation of real estate owned by the corporation. The corporation failed to retain a lawyer to prosecute its appeals to the circuit court and instead appeared through its vice-president, David Tabb. The circuit judge ordered the corporation to appear through a lawyer in circuit court and stated that the court would not accept pleadings or motions from the corporation that were not signed by a lawyer. The corporation failed to retain a lawyer and the court dismissed the corporation's appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by ruling that Shenendoah was required to be represented by a lawyer in the circuit court; and (2) W. Va. Code 11-3-25(b) is unconstitutional insofar as the word "agent" allows an applicant's non-lawyer representative to appeal a decision of the board of equalization and review to a circuit court. View "Shenandoah Sales & Service, Inc. v. Assessor of Jefferson County" on Justia Law

Steven Posey was injured after falling at the City of Buckhannon's solid waste transfer station while unloading garbage bags and other material. Posey and his wife filed a complaint against the City, alleging negligence. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the City was entitled to immunity from liability pursuant to the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act. The Poseys appealed, contending that transfer stations, such as the one conducted by the City, were not included in the governmental immunity provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that a transfer station conducted directly by a political subdivision as a temporary collection site for solid waste to be transported to a dump or sanitary landfill constitutes a "facility" within the meaning of the immunity provisions of the Act. View "Posey v. City of Buckhannon" on Justia Law

Timothy Waldron was convicted by a jury of one count of delivery of a controlled substance and was sentenced to one to five years imprisonment. Waldron appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court committed error in admitting audio and video recordings of the drug transaction because the admission of certain statements on the recordings violated his right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the record provided on the issue, the trial court did not err in admitting the recordings of the drug transaction where Waldron failed to provide the Court with either the recordings of the drug transaction or the text of the statements he alleged violated Crawford v. Washington, nor did the trial transcript contain any testimony from the recordings, and, consequently, the Court was unable to determine whether those statements fell outside the application of the general rule that such statements are admissible the defendant when they are not offered for the truth of the matter they assert. View "State v. Waldron" on Justia Law

When he was fifty-five years old, Plaintiff Albert Postlewait, Jr. applied for a job with the City of Wheeling as a mechanic. Although Plaintiff had the highest score on the City's application examination, the City instead hired an eighteen-year-old applicant. Plaintiff filed an age-discrimination lawsuit against the City, and the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The City filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that one of the jurors had not been forthright and truthful during voir dire. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the City's motion for a new trial was timely, and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion. View "Postlewait v. City of Wheeling" on Justia Law

Defendant Rhonda Stewart was convicted for the first degree murder of her husband. At trial, the circuit court prohibited Defendant from presenting evidence that she had been battered and abused by her husband during their thirty-eight-year marriage and did not allow an expert witness to testify as to how this abuse may have affected Defendant's state of mind and reasoning as it related to premeditation, malice, or intent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on well-established precedent, Defendant was entitled to present evidence of Battered Woman's Syndrome and evidence of abuse through eyewitnesses and expert witnesses; and (2) because the jury could have reasonably found that Defendant's crime was not first degree murder, but second degree murder or manslaughter had the jury been allowed to hear the abuse evidence, Defendant did not receive a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Appellee was allegedly hit in the head by a law enforcement officer during a confrontation. Appellee filed a civil complaint against the city and the two officers involved in the incident (Appellants), alleging that his civil rights had been violated due to the use of excessive force by the officers. Appellants moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity from suit both on qualified immunity and statutory immunity grounds. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of summary judgment, holding (1) a public officer is entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages for performance of discretionary functions where (i) a trial court finds the alleged facts do not demonstrate that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, or (ii) a trial court finds the evidence could establish the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right but further finds that it would be clear to any reasonable officer that such conduct was lawful in the situation confronted; and (2) Appellants were entitled to qualified immunity from suit, either because (i) no constitutional violated was established by the facts alleged, or (ii) a reasonable officer confronting the same situation, without notice to the contrary, would have considered the action lawful. View "City of St. Albans v. Botkins" on Justia Law

The Racing Commission suspended certain jockeys' occupational permits for thirty days and imposed fines for the jockeys' failure to declare an overweight amount. Afterwards, PNGI Charles Town Gaming (PNGI), a non-party in the underlying action, excluded the jockeys from its facility. The circuit court (1) entered an injunction and stayed the imposition of sanctions by the Racing Commission until the conclusion of a hearing before the Commission; and (2) extended the injunction and the stay to include PNGI, preventing PNGI from excluding the jockeys from PGNI's premises pending the outcome of the jockeys' administrative appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an ejection of a permit holder by a racing association or its stewards is subject to review by the Commission, and therefore, the jockeys, as permit holders, had the right to appeal the ejection, and PNGI was bound by the Commission's decision, subject to judicial review; and (2) PNGI waived its assigned errors regarding the injunction and stay. View "PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC v. Reynolds" on Justia Law