Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Marcella Dunbar appealed from an order of the circuit court accepting Petitioner's plea to the charge of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentencing Petitioner to incarceration for not less than one nor more than fifteen years. Petitioner contended that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress the evidence gathered pursuant to a traffic stop of the vehicle in which he was riding as a passenger. The Supreme Court reversed Petitioner's conviction, holding that the traffic stop initiated in this case was improper, and consequently, the evidence leading to Petitioner's arrest for drug violations was not admissible evidence and should have been suppressed. Remanded. View "State v. Dunbar" on Justia Law

Petitioner Charles Thompson was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree, sexual abuse by a custodian, and sexual abuse in the third degree. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's direct appeal. Petitioner then filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus, which the circuit court denied after two evidentiary proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State produced sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner; (2) Thompson's argument that certain testimony should have been excluded was not recognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding; and (3) Petitioner failed to prove his claims of ineffective assistance by a preponderance of the evidence. View "State ex rel. Thompson v. Ballard" on Justia Law

This case was a consolidation of three separate wrongful death lawsuits. Each lawsuit arose from a nursing home's attempt to compel a plaintiff to participate in arbitration pursuant to a clause in a nursing home admission contract. The Supreme Court (1) ruled that the arbitration clauses were unconscionable and unenforceable in two of the cases, and (2) held that the Nursing Home Act could not be relied upon to bar enforcement of the arbitration clause in the third case. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded to consider whether the arbitration clauses were enforceable under state common law principles that were not specific to arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA. On remand, the Supreme Court (1) held that the doctrine of unconscionability that the Court explicated in Brown I was a general, state, common-law, contract principle that was not specific to arbitration and did not implicate the FAA; (2) reversed the trial courts' prior orders compelling arbitration in two of the cases and permitted the parties to raise arguments regarding unconscionability anew before the trial court; and (3) found the issue of unconscionability in the third case was not considered by the trial court but may be raised on remand. View "Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioners Robert and Rickie Bansbach sought injunctive relief in connection with allegations that their neighbors, Respondents Daniel Harbin and Mary Fanok, were engaging in conduct which constituted both a nuisance and harassment. The trial court ruled that Petitioners had failed to demonstrate that Respondents' conduct constituted a private nuisance or that Respondents' speech, both verbal and written, was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in ruling (1) Respondents' storing of materials on the Fanok property did not create a nuisance that must be abated by the Court; (2) Respondents' posting of signs and shouting profanities at Petitioners did not amount to fighting words for First Amendment purposes; and (3) Respondents' behavior was not so outrageous that it required injunctive relief. View "Bansbach v. Harbin" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Griffy pleaded guilty to two counts of grand larceny and was sentenced to two indeterminate one-to-ten year terms of imprisonment. Griffy subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence and a motion to withdraw plea. The circuit court denied the motions. Griffy appealed, asserting that the circuit court committed reversible error by failing to comply with W.Va. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was evident that Griffy did not understand when he pled guilty that he would not be allowed to later withdraw his plea if his sentence did not meet his expectations, and there was no evidence that Griffy was ever given a Rule 11(2)(e) warning; and (2) the substantial rights of Griffy were affected by the circuit court's failure to give the Rule 11(e)(2) warning. Remanded with instructions that Griffy be given an opportunity to either plead anew or to grant specific performance so that the sentence comported with the reasonable understanding and expectations of Griffy as to the sentence for which he bargained. View "State v. Griffy" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner Samuel Scarbro was convicted in the circuit court of the felony offense of fraudulent use of a bank conveyance or access device. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court erred in excluding from the evidence at trial a prior inconsistent statement of the State's key witness. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the witness's pre-trial statement should have been admitted at Petitioner's trial, and the circuit court's refusal to do so constituted error; and (2) the error in excluding the evidence was not harmless, as the improper exclusion of the witness's prior inconsistent statement placed the fairness of Petitioner's trial in doubt. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Scarbro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Angela Smith filed a complaint against her employer, CSX Transportation, Inc., alleging sexual harassment, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment, and negligent retention of an employee. The jury returned a verdict for Smith and awarded Smith $1,557,600 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. The circuit court denied CSX's motion for post-trial relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by denying CSX's request for post-trial relief, as (1) Smith presented sufficient evidence to prove her hostile work environment claim; (2) the jury was instructed correctly on the law of retaliatory discharge; and (3) the evidence supported the jury's award of punitive damages. View "CSX Transp., Inc. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Respondent Christopher Toler's driver's license was revoked by the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles after Respondent's vehicle was stopped at a vehicle equipment checkpoint and Respondent was arrested for driving under the influence. The circuit court reversed, concluding (1) Respondent was driving while under the influence of alcohol; but (2) the vehicle equipment checkpoint at which Respondent was stopped was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the judicially-created exclusionary rule is not applicable in a civil, administrative driver's license revocation or suspension proceeding; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in applying the exclusionary rule to exclude all evidence in this case. Remanded. View "Miller v. Toler" on Justia Law

Petitioner Tony Myers was convicted of three counts of first degree robbery and was sentenced to three concurrent terms of incarceration of sixty years each. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) allowing the admission of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless arrest, search, and seizure; (2) permitting witnesses called by the State to identify Petitioner despite being subjected to a prior identification procedure; (3) charging, trying, and convicting Petitioner of three counts of robbery; and (3) denying Defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal or a new trial based upon the insufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. View "State v. Myers" on Justia Law

In the underlying action in this case, Respondent Michael Brown was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. Respondent filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and the circuit court set aside the convictions and granted Respondent a new trial. The basis of the circuit court's ruling was that a juror in the criminal trial failed to answer certain questions during voir dire. The court concluded that in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Dellinger, the juror's lack of candor deprived the circuit court and the parties of the ability to determine the juror's fitness to serve, which foreclosed Respondent's constitutional right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the relevant statutory and case law and the material from the habeas corpus proceedings and the criminal trial, the circuit court committed reversible error in granting Respondent a new trial. Remanded. View "Coleman v. Brown " on Justia Law