Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and malicious wounding. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder count and up to ten years' imprisonment for the malicious wounding count. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of perjured testimony because the jury was made fully aware that a false statement was made to Defendant's grand jury; (2) sufficient evidence supported Defendant's convictions; and (3) the trial court did not err by permitting the State to introduce two prior acts of violence that Defendant committed against the victim. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on appeal. Defendant later filed a petition for habeas relief. After an omnibus hearing, the circuit court found that Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to investigate a confession by a third party that he had killed the victim. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting Defendant habeas relief in the form of a new trial, holding that Defendant's counsel provided constitutionally deficient performance and that, but for counsel's errors, there was a reasonable probability the results of the proceedings would have been different. View "Ballard v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, wanton endangerment, and carrying a concealed weapon without a permit. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that he was denied his constitutional right to an effective cross-examination when the trial court interrupted defense counsel's cross-examination of a key witness and directed counsel to meet with prosecutors and the witness to prepare questions for the continuation of the cross-examiantion. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court deprived Defendant of his constitutional right to an effective cross-examination by requiring defense counsel to prepare the witness in advance for the continuation of cross examination. View "State v. Garner" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of child neglect. Thereafter, a jury convicted Defendant on recidivist charges, for which Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The trial court subsequently granted Defendant a new trial on the underlying child neglect felony. After a retrial, Defendant was found guilty of child neglect. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to a second recidivist life sentence. Defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his second recidivist life sentence was invalid because he was not arraigned on the recidivist information during the same term of court in which he was convicted on retrial for the underlying offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the recidivist life imprisonment sentence was void and unenforceable because (1) the State failed to comply with the requirements of W. Va. Code 61-11-19 insofar as Defendant was not arraigned on the information during the term of court in which he was convicted of the principal offense; and (2) a recidivist sentence under section 61-11-19 is automatically vacated whenever the underlying felony conviction is vacated. View "Holcomb v. Ballard" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) Defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's exclusion of members of the press from pretrial hearings; (2) the circuit court did not commit reversible error by failing to strike two potential jurors for cause; (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of malfunctions within Defendant's gun; (4) the circuit court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on manslaughter; (5) the circuit court erred by admitting the testimony of certain witnesses, but the errors were harmless; and (6) the trial court erred by admitting disputed W. Va. R. Crim. P. 404(b) "bad character" evidence, but the error was harmless. View "State v. Bowling" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of child neglect resulting in death and two counts of gross child neglect creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury or of death. The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's convictions, holding (1) the indictment, which charged Petitioner with child neglect causing injury, did not result in the trial court imposing an illegal sentence on Petitioner for child neglect resulting in death because the indictment provided Petitioner with enough information to defend against the charge of child neglect resulting in death; and (2) the evidence at trial was clearly sufficient to convict Petitioner of child neglect creating a substantial risk of bodily injury. View "State v. Chic-Colbert" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of second degree sexual assault and sentenced to a suspended sentence of ten to twenty-five years in prison. Petitioner appealed, alleging several assignments of error. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court erred by allowing the State to question the victim regarding Petitioner's sexual history, as the victim's answers, which attacked Petitioner's reputation and character as an alleged sexual predator, constituted the type of character evidence that is barred by W. Va. R. Evid. 404(a). View "State v. Maggard" on Justia Law

Respondent began employment with Employer in 2005. In 2006, Respondent was terminated for refusing to take a drug test, but he was re-hired one month later. In 2007, Respondent suffered a compensable back injury and later underwent surgery. Respondent filed a worker's compensation claim and later agreed to a settlement for his claim. A few weeks later, Respondent was terminated. Respondent filed a civil action against Employer, asserting discrimination and that his receipt of the workers' compensation settlement was a significant factor in Employer's decision to discharge him. The jury found for Respondent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law; (2) the circuit court did not err in its denial of Employer's motion for a new trial; (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in providing a punitive damages instruction to the jury; and (4) Employer suffered no prejudice emanating from a late disclosure of Respondent's recent employment with Walmart. View "JWCF, LP v. Farruggia" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree in violation of W. Va. Code 61-2-1 and arson in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and five years imprisonment for the arson conviction. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the first degree murder conviction; (2) section 61-2-1 is not unconstitutionally vague; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress; and (4) Defendant's argument that the trial court erred when it denied his post-trial motions was without merit. View "State v. Horn" on Justia Law

Joseph Jackson, an employee of the Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH), was operating a dump truck and performing clean-up work pursuant to a state of emergency declaration, when he struck Joseph Belcher's automobile. Belcher filed this action against Jackson and the DOH (Defendants), alleging negligence and vicarious liability. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that because Jackson was working as an emergency service worker at the time of the accident, he was entitled to immunity under W. Va. Code 15-5-11(a). The circuit court denied Defendants' motion, concluding that section 15-5-11(a) contemplated exceptions to the immunity that the statute provided to emergency service workers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 15-5-11(a) operates to provide a limited waiver of the emergency service worker immunity provided by the statute where the emergency service worker is an employee of the State and the recovery sought is confined to "the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage." View "Jackson v. Belcher" on Justia Law